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Abstract
This study analyzes mixed partisan outcomes in simultaneous gubernatorial and 
presidential elections. It examines the twentieth century State Reorganization Movement 
that separated most gubernatorial elections from presidential elections, and evaluates the 
electoral consequences of these reforms against their stated aims. This study also 
attempts to provide an explanation for the occurrence of mixed partisan outcomes in 
simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections. It tests the thesis that campaign 
strategies of gubernatorial candidates and their state party organizations are the primary 
factors affecting state voter choice of gubernatorial and presidential candidates of 
different parties in the same election year. The methodology for testing this thesis 
incorporates data interpretation, media analysis, and case studies of two 2004 
gubernatorial elections featuring personal interviews with campaign participants and 
observers. The data thus collected indicate the validity of this study’s thesis, albeit with 
minor qualifications. Yet conclusive quantitative data are not available to test the thesis 
further. As a result, this study is indicative but not conclusive.  
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Chapter I: Introduction to the Study of Simultaneous Gubernatorial 
and Presidential Elections
In recent years, it has become commonplace to label states ‘red’ or ‘blue’ in 
accordance with their vote for a Republican or Democratic presidential candidate. These 
partisan labels vastly oversimplify the nation’s political landscape, implying monolithic 
political characteristics among the states that fail to account for either varying degrees of 
polarization or the full range of electoral outcomes. In fact, voters in so-called red or blue 
states often defy such partisan categorizations by electing to other offices candidates of a 
different party than their presidential favorite.  
A particularly compelling illustration of state electorates’ complex voting 
behavior is found in state selection of gubernatorial and presidential candidates of 
different parties. Although the specific functions of governors and presidents differ in 
many important respects, their offices are unique within their respective spheres of 
government, as primary sources of legislative agendas and symbols of executive 
leadership. Shared partisan affiliation is a strong, although not a foolproof, indicator of 
coherent values and policies. Assuming that voters have clear hopes for the direction of 
their government, one would expect voters to support gubernatorial and presidential 
candidates of the same political party. Yet modern voters do not behave with the 
coherence or predictability often ascribed to them by such assumptions. 
This study demonstrates state electorates’ complex voting behavior by focusing 
on simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections. To explain the causes of mixed 
partisan outcomes in such elections, this study analyzes the campaign strategies used by 
gubernatorial candidates and their state party organizations in years when the politics 
winds blow against their party in the state presidential race. 
Why Simultaneous Gubernatorial and Presidential Elections? 
 
Following the 2004 elections, twenty-one out of fifty U.S. governors served in 
states whose voters selected a presidential candidate of another party that year. Included 
among these states were many that produced the nation’s most lopsided presidential 
votes: Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Vermont, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Wyoming.1 Why 
not, then, study all the states that have produced mixed partisan outcomes in 
gubernatorial and presidential elections? Why restrict this study’s focus to simultaneous 
gubernatorial and presidential elections? This study’s focus on simultaneous elections is 
designed to provide the most accurate analysis of partisan incoherence in gubernatorial 
and presidential elections. This study is also designed to consider the dramatic 
ramifications of state reform efforts to strengthen American governorships over the past 
century, and to evaluate the success of these efforts against their stated aims. 
 
Analytical Advantages of Simultaneous Versus Separated Gubernatorial and 
Presidential Elections 
 
Analysis of mixed partisan outcomes in all fifty states’ recent gubernatorial and 
presidential elections would be fascinating. Why, for example, have Massachusetts voters 
selected Republican candidates in four consecutive gubernatorial elections while 
overwhelmingly selecting Democratic candidates in presidential elections?  Answers to 
 
1 Democratic presidential states with Republican governors included: California, Connecticut, Hawaii, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont. Republican presidential states 
with Democratic governors included: Arizona, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Montana, New Mexico, North 
Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, Wyoming.  
this question and others pertaining to all states, irrespective of their gubernatorial and 
presidential election schedules, are worthy of thorough study. Unfortunately, a general 
study of this nature would confront substantial analytical barriers. Separated 
gubernatorial and presidential elections are influenced differently by disparities in voter 
mobilization and political contexts; voter mobilization is much higher in presidential 
election years (see Chapter V), and influential atmospheric conditions, such as the 
economy, can change dramatically between an off-year gubernatorial election and a 
presidential election year. Simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections eliminate 
such disparities in voter mobilization and political contexts. As a result, they provide a 
superior method for examining mixed partisan outcomes in gubernatorial and presidential 
elections.  
 
Contemporary Relevance of Simultaneous Gubernatorial and Presidential Elections 
 
Today, simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections occur in only eleven 
out of the fifty states.2 In recent decades, typically one-third to nearly one-half of these 
elections has favored gubernatorial and presidential candidates of different parties. In 
2004 this occurred in Montana, North Carolina, Vermont, and West Virginia, and very 
nearly occurred in Washington.3 The fact that so few states today hold simultaneous 
gubernatorial and presidential elections represents a dramatic change from the early 
twentieth century when presidential elections coincided with gubernatorial elections in 
more than three-quarters of the states. 
 
2 The eleven states that hold simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections include: Delaware, 
Indiana, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Washington, 
West Virginia.  
 
3 A recount found that Democratic gubernatorial candidate Christine Gregoire defeated Republican 
gubernatorial candidate Dino Rossi by a 129-vote margin in 2004. The initial vote tally showed Rossi 
defeating Gregoire, in a state that voted heavily that year for Kerry.  
Historical Relevance of Simultaneous Gubernatorial and Presidential Elections to 
Reforms of the Governorship 
 
Simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections are much less common 
today than they were a century ago, due to state reform efforts that isolated many 
gubernatorial elections from the presidential election cycle. In the twentieth century the 
State Reorganization Movement emerged in many states for the purpose of strengthening 
traditionally weak governorships. Many states amended their constitutions to expand 
gubernatorial terms and also to separate gubernatorial elections from presidential 
elections. The latter reform was aimed at eliminating the influence of presidential 
coattails in gubernatorial elections. The widespread enactment of these two reforms 
indicates the success of the State Reorganization Movement. During the twentieth 
century, the number of states holding simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential 
elections was reduced from a high of thirty-seven out of forty-eight states (as recently as 
1932) to eleven out of fifty states by the century’s close. Similarly, the number of states 
allowing one, two, and three-year gubernatorial terms declined from twenty-four out of 
forty-five states to only two out of fifty states.  
 
How To Explain Mixed Partisan Outcomes in Simultaneous Gubernatorial and 
Presidential Elections? 
 
Having controlled for differences in voter mobilization and political contexts, this 
study is designed to test the thesis that campaign strategies of gubernatorial candidates 
and their state party organizations are the primary factors affecting state voter choice of 
gubernatorial and presidential candidates of different parties in the same election year. To 
test this thesis, several key questions must be answered: What is the effect of presidential 
elections on simultaneous gubernatorial elections? Do gubernatorial candidates believe 
that presidential politics are relevant to their elections? If so, how do they incorporate 
presidential politics into their campaigns? What campaign strategies do gubernatorial 
candidates of the same party as the state’s losing presidential candidate use to address the 
simultaneous presidential election? How do they speak about their party’s presidential 
candidate? How do they distinguish themselves from that candidate? Do state voters 
carefully distinguish between gubernatorial and presidential elections? 
 
Methodology 
 
Thorough analysis of information from many sources is required to answer the 
above questions and test this study’s thesis. To that end, this study analyzes the relevant 
literature in the fields of elections and voting behavior, focusing specifically on the 
literature about changes in gubernatorial power, straight and split-ticket voting, state 
versus national political alignments, electoral contributions of political parties, and the 
significance of election campaigns. It also presents the 2004 gubernatorial elections in 
Vermont and Montana as case studies. The Vermont and Montana gubernatorial elections 
were won by candidates of the party whose presidential candidates lost their states by 
landslides in the same year. The case studies are based primarily on media analysis, data 
interpretation, and personal interviews with campaign participants and observers.  
 
Analysis of Literature Relevant to This Study 
 
A substantial body of political science literature is relevant to this study, 
providing insights into the factors underlying voters’ choices of gubernatorial and 
presidential candidates of different parties in the same election year. This body includes 
analyses of changes in gubernatorial power, straight and split-ticket voting, state versus 
national political alignments, electoral contributions of political parties, and the 
significance of election campaigns. The works of Larry Sabato, Mark Tomkins, Dennis 
Simon, James Campbell, James Gimpel, Paul Herrnson, and Susan Howell are 
particularly relevant. Sabato details the transformation of the governorship into a more 
consequential, professionalized institution. He also discusses the significance of 
simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections, concluding that the latter obscures 
the former. Tomkins’ study of voting behavior in gubernatorial and presidential elections 
leads him to conclude that voters choose deliberately between the two. Simon’s study of 
voting behavior in gubernatorial and presidential elections leads him to conclude the 
opposite, that presidential coattails determine individual votes and gubernatorial elections 
in many cases. Campbell finds evidence of presidential coattails in simultaneous state 
legislative elections. Gimpel’s study of state versus national voting patterns leads him to 
conclude that voters typically align differently in state versus national elections. Herrnson 
argues that political party organizations make important electoral contributions, despite 
losing influence in recent decades. Howell finds that institutional factors typically 
determine electoral outcomes, not campaign activities.  
 
Review of Relevant Literature  
 
Analysis of why voters choose gubernatorial and presidential candidates of 
different parties in the same election year involves several related areas of study in 
elections and voting behavior. First, to understand recent changes in the American 
governorship and the electoral consequences of a strengthened governorship, Sabato 
(1978), Ransone (1982), and Holbrook (1993) are particularly useful.4 Second, important 
works concerning straight and split-ticket voting include Miller (1955), Key (1956), Press 
(1958), Trilling (1976), Campbell (1986), Tomkins (1988), Simon (1989), Fiorina (1991), 
Petrocik (1991), and Feigert (1979).5 Third, works that analyze state versus national 
political alignments are relevant, including Erickson, Wright, and McIver (1993), Brown 
and Wright (1991), Carsey and Wright (1998), Jackson and Carsey (2002, 1999), Partin 
(1995), Holbrook (1987), Renner (1999), Gimpel and Schuknecht (2002), and Gimpel 
(2003, 1999, 1996).6 Fourth, Herrnson (1988, 1986) explores the contributions of 
 
4 Larry J. Sabato, Goodbye to Good-Time Charlie: The American Governorship Transformed, 1950-1975 
(Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1978); Coleman B. Ransone, Jr., The American 
Governorship (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982); Thomas Holbrook, “Institutional Strength 
and Gubernatorial Elections: An Exploratory Analysis,” American Politics Quarterly, Vol. 21 (July, 1993), 
pp. 261-271. 
 
5 Warren E. Miller, “Presidential Coattails: A Study in Political Myth and Methodology,” The Public 
Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 19 (Winter, 1955), pp. 353-368; V.O. Key, Jr., American State Politics: An 
Introduction (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965); Charles Press, “Voting Statistics and Presidential 
Coattails,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 52 (December, 1958), pp. 1041-1050; Richard J. 
Trilling, Party Image and Electoral Behavior (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976); James E. Campbell, 
“Presidential Coattails and Midterm Losses in State Legislative Elections,” American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 8 (March, 1986), pp. 45-63; Mark E. Tomkins, “Have Gubernatorial Elections Become More 
Distinct Contests?” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 50 (February, 1988), pp. 192-205; Dennis M. Simon, 
“Presidents, Governors, and Electoral Accountability,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 51 (May, 1989), pp. 
286-304;  Morris P. Fiorina, “Divided Government in the States,” in Gary W. Cox and Samuel Kernell, 
eds., The Politics of Divided Government (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991); John R. Petrocik, 
“Divided Government: Is It All in the Campaigns?” in Ibid.; Frank Feigert, “Illusions of Ticket-Splitting,” 
American Politics Quarterly, Vol. 7 (October, 1979), pp. 470-488. 
 
6 Robert S. Erickson, Gerald C. Wright, and John P. McIver, Statehouse Democracy (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993); Robert D. Brown and Gerald C. Wright, “Elections and State Party 
Polarization,” American Politics Quarterly, Vol. 20 (October, 1992), pp. 411-426; Thomas A. Carsey and 
Wright, “State and National Factors in Gubernatorial and Senatorial Elections,” American Journal of 
Political Science, Vol. 42 (July, 1998), pp. 994-1002; Robert A. Jackson and Thomas M. Carsey, “Group 
Effects on Party Identification and Party Coalitions Across the United States,” American Politics Research,
Vol. 30 (January, 2002), pp. 66-92; Randall W. Partin, “Economic Conditions and Gubernatorial Elections: 
Is the State Executive Held Accountable?” American Politics Quarterly, Vol. 23 (January, 1995), pp. 81-
95; Thomas Holbrook, “National Factors in Gubernatorial Elections,” American Politics Quarterly, Vol. 16 
(October, 1987), pp. 471-483; Tari Renner, “Electoral Congruence and the Autonomy of the American 
State Party,” American Politics Quarterly, Vol. 27 (January, 1999), p. 122-132; James Gimpel and Jason E. 
Schuknecht, “Political and Demographic Foundations for Sectionalism in State Politics,” American Politics 
Research, Vol. 30 (March, 2002), pp. 193-214; James Gimpel, Patchwork Nation (Ann Arbor, Michigan: 
University of Michigan, 2003); James Gimpel, “Contemplating Congruence in State Electoral Systems,” 
political party organizations to electoral campaigns.7 Finally, Gosnell (1950) and Howell 
(1982) consider whether campaigns make a difference in electoral outcomes.8
Sabato on the Modern Governorship and Gubernatorial Election Scheduling 
 
Larry Sabato’s Goodbye to Good-Time Charlie analyzes the transformation of 
governorships between 1950 and 1975, from positions of limited responsibility to 
positions of substantial consequence, independence, and professionalism. His work, as it 
pertains to this study, is particularly useful in evaluating the development and 
significance of the State Reorganization Movement.  
Sabato also comments on the significance of simultaneous gubernatorial and 
presidential elections. He writes, “Too often the platforms and pronouncements of 
gubernatorial aspirants… have been lost in the glare surrounding tumultuous presidential 
contests, and the state issues have been relegated to the back pages of the newspapers.”9
Consequently, he recommends separating all gubernatorial and presidential elections. 
“Scheduling elections in the off-years or odd-numbered years makes sense [because 
voters then] have a better chance to evaluate the candidates and their programs wisely 
and unencumbered by the distractions and complexities of presidential politics.”10 Many 
 
American Politics Quarterly, Vol. 27 (January, 1999), p. 133-140; James Gimpel, National Elections and 
the Autonomy of American State Party Systems (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996). 
 
7 Paul S. Herrnson, “Do Parties Make A Difference? The Role of Party Organization in Congressional 
Elections,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 48 (August, 1986), pp. 589-615; Herrnson, “The Importance of 
Party Campaigning,” Polity, Vol. 20 (Summer, 1988), pp. 714-719. 
 
8 Harold F. Gosnell, “Does Campaigning Make a Difference?” The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 14 
(Autumn, 1950), pp. 413-418; Susan E. Howell, “Campaign Activities and State Election Outcomes,” 
Political Behavior, Vol. 4 (1982), pp. 401-417. 
 
9 Sabato, op. cit., p. 149. 
 
10 Ibid.., p. 149. 
state reformers attempting to separate gubernatorial elections from presidential election 
cycles have used such arguments. 
 
Tomkins on the Weakness of Presidential Coattails in Gubernatorial Elections 
 
Tomkins analyzes gubernatorial and presidential elections held between 1947 and 
1986. He chooses gubernatorial elections for comparison because they “[offer] a set of 
quasi-autonomous but highly visible contests for analysis.”11 Tomkins notes that some 
people believe gubernatorial elections have been “nationalized” by increased media focus 
on issues applicable to state and national politics (health care, education, and so forth), 
increasingly expensive gubernatorial campaigns that require out-of-state fundraising, 
weakened state parties, and the growth of nationally potent interest groups. However, he 
finds that short-term forces in the states were relatively stable in gubernatorial 
competition during the period studied, while they fluctuated more in presidential 
elections. This leads him to conclude that “the gubernatorial election contest has, in 
general, become more distinctive from the national context, reflecting a more fully 
autonomous office.”12 In other words, he believes gubernatorial elections are beyond the 
influence of presidential coattails. 
 
Simon on the Strength of Presidential Coattails in Gubernatorial Elections 
Unlike Tomkins, Simon finds that presidential coattails play a clear and decisive 
role in gubernatorial elections. He claims that voters’ attitudes toward presidential 
performance act as a “mechanism of accountability” by which they judge members of the 
president’s party in all other elections. “[Citizen] evaluations of presidential performance 
 
11 Tomkins, op cit., p. 193. 
 
12 Ibid.., p. 192. 
operate as an influence on voting in gubernatorial elections,” Simon writes, and “the 
impact of these evaluations is sizable enough to alter both the voting of individuals and 
the outcomes of gubernatorial contests.”13 Moreover, he suggests that efforts to insulate 
gubernatorial elections by scheduling them in non-presidential years has had the opposite 
effect of what was intended by state reformers. “Rather than insulating gubernatorial 
elections from national politics, holding gubernatorial elections in midterm years has, in 
practice, produced the unintended consequence of reducing the vote garnered by 
candidates of the president’s party,” he claims. 
 
Campbell on the Strength of Presidential Coattails in State Legislative Elections 
Presidential coattail effects are most often discussed in relation to U.S. 
congressional elections. They are used to explain the fact that a president’s party typically 
loses seats in midterm elections. Campbell examines presidential coattail effects in state 
legislative elections to determine whether they experience the same trends as national 
legislative elections. He finds that presidential coattail effects are quite evident in state 
legislative elections: “The analysis indicates that the president’s party gains seats in 
presidential elections in proportion to the presidential vote in a state, and subsequently 
loses seats in mid-term elections also in proportion to the prior presidential vote in the 
state.”14 
It is also worth noting that much of what Campbell writes about the relationship 
between state legislatures and presidents applies to this study’s focus on governors and 
presidents. He writes,  
 
13 Simon, op cit., p. 286. 
 
14 Campbell, op cit., p. 45. 
State legislatures and presidents deal at different levels of government and for the most 
part are concerned with different issues. Nevertheless, parties are generally known by the 
presidential candidates they nominate, and candidates for state legislative seats are a good 
deal less well known to voters than the congressional candidates who ride presidential 
coattails. Therefore, even though one can make a case that there may be no good policy 
reasons for coattails to affect state legislative races, many voters may use the presidential 
vote as a guide in casting a vote for the state legislature because they lack other 
information. 
 
This description of presidential coattail effects for the most part mirrors the argument 
advanced by many, including Sabato above, to explain the consequences of simultaneous 
gubernatorial and presidential elections. Like the relationship between state legislatures 
and presidents, governors and presidents also work on different levels of government and 
handle many different issues.  
 
Gimpel on State Voter and Party Autonomy 
 
Gimpel and Schuknecht recognize the unique executive relation between 
governors and presidents. They analyze substate sectionalism, in terms of political 
partisanship, by studying gubernatorial and presidential election results in Connecticut 
between 1928 and 2000.15 Gimpel also expresses particular interest in simultaneous 
gubernatorial and presidential elections in National Elections and the Autonomy of 
American State Party Systems, when arguing that simultaneous choices of gubernatorial 
and presidential candidates of different parties in Utah, Montana, and Washington 
represent “not merely a fluke or an accident of the off-year election calendar.”16 This 
comment, however, stems from Gimpel’s discussion of the local implications of 
presidential Republicanism in western states; simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential 
elections are not the focus of his analysis.  
 
15 Gimpel and Schuknecht, op cit.
16 Gimpel, National Elections and the Autonomy of American State Party Systems, p. 24. 
Gimpel’s work is primarily important to this study because of its findings on the 
differences between state versus national political alignments. In the 1950s, V.O. Key 
described state parties as “but the shadow of their national counterparts.”17 Gimpel’s 
National Elections explains that by the mid-1990s state parties had become largely 
autonomous of national control, and the political cleavages that defined them were 
typically different from those in national politics and in other states.18 Gimpel also 
challenges the notion advanced in many other works, including those of Key, Sabato, 
Simon, and Campbell, that national politics exert a powerful influence on state level 
elections. Instead, Gimpel posits that electoral coalitions align differently for state versus 
national elections, often producing mixed electoral outcomes. Thus Gimpel’s work 
contributes importantly to understandings of voting behavior and state party activities, 
two research areas that are relevant to analysis of mixed partisan outcomes in 
simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections. 
 
Herrnson on the Electoral Contributions of Political Parties 
Herrnson (1988) notes the many reasons why political parties are widely 
considered to be less important in modern elections than they were in previous decades. 
These reasons include decreasing partisanship, the influence of special interests and 
political action committees, candidate-centered elections, and the rise of professional 
consultants. Despite these developments Herrnson concludes that parties remain relevant 
in modern elections; “party activity in elections reveals that parties are meeting the 
 
17 Key, op. cit., p. 18. 
 
18 On page 206 of National Elections and the Autonomy of American State Party Systems, Gimpel writes, 
“States maintain their own unique political identities and react to national circumstances differently.” 
challenges posed by the new politics and that parties really do matter.”19 Their 
contributions include campaign funds, professional services and strategic advice, 
facilitating relationships between campaigns and potential consultants and special interest 
contributors, voter registration, get-out-the-vote efforts, and advertisements on behalf of 
the party ticket.  
 
Howell on the Significance of Election Campaigns 
 
Howell divides campaign activities into five categories: researching 
constituencies; personally reaching the electorate through speeches and public 
appearances; mobilizing voters; gaining the support of political elites, including 
organizations, political leaders, and business leaders; media advertising. She concludes 
that these activities typically do not determine election outcomes. Instead, she finds in 
three-quarters of elections that the outcomes are attributable to four institutional factors: 
incumbency, competition levels, candidates’ years of political experience, candidates’ 
prior elective offices. Incumbency is the most important factor, accounting for 56% of 
variance in vote percentage. She writes, “The painfully obvious conclusion is that 
campaigning, in many instances, is a waste of time.”20 
This Study’s Contribution to the Literature 
 
Sabato, Tomkins, Simon, Campbell, Gimpel, Herrnson, and Howell provide 
analyses relevant to the study of mixed partisan outcomes in simultaneous gubernatorial 
and presidential elections. However, further analysis is necessary to fully understand the 
characteristics and implications of the phenomenon. This study updates and clarifies the 
 
19 Herrnson, “The Importance of Party Campaigning,” p. 714. 
 
20 Howell, op cit., p. 414. 
arguments made in their work by focusing exclusively on one revealing aspect of 
electoral behavior. 
 
Focusing Sabato’s Analysis of Gubernatorial Transformation and Evaluating His 
Conclusions About Gubernatorial Election Scheduling 
 
Sabato analyzes the transformation of state governorships and the scheduling of 
gubernatorial elections. This study focuses Sabato’s work by analyzing the entire 
historical development of the State Reorganization Movement, particularly in terms of 
gubernatorial election scheduling. This study also measures the electoral significance of 
simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections against the aims of state reform 
efforts, by examining mixed partisan outcomes in such elections. The data presented in 
this study indicate that, as Sabato contends, mixed partisan outcomes are more likely to 
occur in separate versus simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections. The data 
also indicate, however, that presidential elections do not obscure simultaneous 
gubernatorial elections to the extreme argued by Sabato. Scholarly understanding of the 
actual, against the perceived, impact of simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential 
elections is enhanced by this study’s analysis of their outcomes over the last forty years.  
 
Testing Tomkins’ Conclusions About Presidential Coattail Effects in Simultaneous 
Gubernatorial Elections 
 
Tomkins makes an important contribution to the literature of the field by 
challenging popular notions of presidential coattail effects. His work, however, can be 
significantly strengthened by two elements unique to this study. First, Tomkins does not 
focus on simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections, although he notes the 
important correlation claimed by state reformers between voting patterns in simultaneous 
versus separated elections. For reasons set forth above, simultaneous gubernatorial and 
presidential elections are uniquely valuable bases for assessing presidential coattail 
effects and voting behavior. Second, Tomkins does not make a significant attempt to 
explain why voters in some states choose gubernatorial and presidential candidates of 
different parties in any year, let alone the same year. This study improves on Tomkins’ 
work and makes a unique contribution to the literature of the field, by proposing that 
campaign strategies of gubernatorial candidates and their state party organizations are the 
primary factors affecting state voter choice of gubernatorial and presidential candidates 
of different parties in the same election year. 
Testing Simon’s Conclusions About Presidential Coattail Effects in Gubernatorial 
Elections 
This study tests Simon’s conclusion that presidential coattails exert a decisive 
influence in gubernatorial elections. It does so by examining the most recent electoral 
data from presidential and gubernatorial elections, as well as presenting case studies of 
two gubernatorial elections. It also evaluates Simon’s claim that off-year gubernatorial 
elections have failed to isolate gubernatorial elections from presidential politics, by 
comparing electoral outcomes and voting patterns in simultaneous versus separated 
elections.  
 
Improving on Campbell’s Analysis of Presidential Coattail Effects in State Level 
Elections 
 
Campbell studies presidential coattail effects in state level elections by focusing 
on state legislative elections. He explains the influence of presidential coattails in these 
elections in part by stating that “candidates for state legislative seats are a good deal less 
well known to voters than the congressional candidates who ride presidential coattails.” 
While this may be true of state legislative candidates, it is unclear whether it applies to 
gubernatorial candidates. Sabato, in a comment above, contends that presidential 
elections obscure simultaneous gubernatorial elections. His description of a more 
independent and consequential governor, as well as Tomkins’ finding that voters 
distinguish between gubernatorial and presidential elections, suggest that gubernatorial 
candidates are in fact well known to voters and therefore capable of defying presidential 
voting trends. A finding that presidential coattail effects do not significantly influence 
simultaneous gubernatorial elections would indicate that coattails are limited to certain 
types of state elections, instead of applying generally. 
Applying Gimpel’s Findings to Simultaneous Gubernatorial and Presidential 
Elections 
 
Gimpel’s analysis of differences in voting behavior and party activity between the 
state and national levels is among the most relevant to this study. More than the other 
works highlighted here, Gimpel’s is based on relatively recent data. Therefore, it does not 
require a significant updating. However, like Tomkins’, it is not specifically focused on 
the study of simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections. Gimpel briefly refers 
to this phenomenon when discussing the election of Democratic governors in western 
states that tend to vote for Republican presidential candidates.21 Yet he does not use this 
analysis of differing state and national political cleavages and state party autonomy to 
explain how voting behavior and state party activity contributed to such outcomes. A 
contribution of this study is its application of Gimpel’s findings to the analysis of 
simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections. 
21 Gimpel, National Elections and the Autonomy of American State Party Systems, p. 24. 
Focusing Herrnson’s Analysis on State Political Parties 
This study focuses Herrnson’s analysis of the electoral contributions of political 
parties by examining the role of state party organizations in gubernatorial elections. It 
exposes their functions primarily through case studies of gubernatorial elections. These 
case studies give specific insights into the contributions and limitations of state party 
organizations. They also reveal the different ways in which state party organizations 
work with gubernatorial campaigns. As a result, this study provides a concrete basis for 
assessing the electoral contributions of political parties beyond what is offered in 
Herrnson’s analysis. 
 
Challenging Howell’s Dismissal of Campaigns 
Howell quite boldly dismisses campaigns as a “waste of time.” Yet her analysis is 
too limited to justify discounting all campaigns. Howell’s analysis focuses on state 
legislative elections, which, as noted in the above discussion of Campbell’s work, enjoy a 
much lower profile than elections to other offices including governor. This study further 
tests the significance of campaigns. It does so by focusing on the contributions of 
campaign strategies in simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections that produce 
mixed partisan outcomes. In particular, it presents case studies of gubernatorial 
campaigns that detail campaign strategies and evaluate their effectiveness. 
How This Study is Designed to Test Its Thesis 
 
In order to test the thesis that campaign strategies of 
gubernatorial candidates and their state party organizations are the 
primary factors affecting state voter choice of gubernatorial and 
presidential candidates of different parties in the same election year, 
this study is organized into five chapters covering the development and 
significance of the State Reorganization Movement, case studies, and 
conclusions.  
Chapter II traces the historical development of the State 
Reorganization Movement during the twentieth century, and measures 
the effects of that movement on today’s gubernatorial elections. 
Specifically, Chapter II considers the frequency of, and possible 
explanations for, mixed partisan outcomes in simultaneous 
gubernatorial and presidential elections over the last four decades.  
Chapters III and IV focus specifically on the campaign strategies 
of gubernatorial candidates and their state party organizations in 
Vermont and Montana, respectively. In Vermont’s 2004 gubernatorial 
election, Republican Governor Jim Douglas was reelected 
overwhelmingly in a state that strongly supported Democratic 
presidential candidate John Kerry. Gubernatorial campaign strategies 
appear to have played a key role in Douglas’ success, but observers 
have often cited voter independence, candidate organizations, and 
incumbency as alternative primary explanations. The 2004 Montana 
gubernatorial election further tests this study’s thesis by eliminating 
some of the Vermont case study’s alternative primary explanations. 
Democrat Brian Schweitzer was narrowly elected in Montana at the 
same time that voters overwhelmingly supported Republican President 
George W. Bush. Schweitzer had never held political office, and he 
was running for an open gubernatorial seat. In this race gubernatorial 
campaign strategies also seem to have been critical to Schweitzer’s 
success.  
Drawing on the preceding chapters, Chapter V presents 
conclusions on the viability of this study’s thesis and makes 
recommendations for further research. 
 
Chapter II: The Development and Significance of the State 
Reorganization Movement
The twentieth century State Reorganization Movement transformed the 
governorship from a weak to a strong position across the United States. Gubernatorial 
election timing was an important element of this movement. Many reformers believed 
that presidential elections exerted undue national influence on simultaneous gubernatorial 
elections. To highlight state issues and give governors the appearance of independence, 
many states separated gubernatorial and presidential elections through constitutional 
amendments. 
This chapter begins by analyzing the historical development of the American 
governorship through the colonial, early constitutional, Jacksonian Era, and post-Civil 
War periods. It continues with analysis of the development of the State Reorganization 
Movement and its implications for the modern governorship. It considers gubernatorial 
election timing and existing theories about presidential coattail effects. The chapter 
concludes by measuring the impact of these elections and considering arguments about 
why and how frequently they produce mixed partisan outcomes. Election data show that 
states are more likely to select gubernatorial and presidential candidates of different 
parties in separated elections, but simultaneous elections are more likely to produce 
mixed partisan outcomes than reformers have often suggested.  
 
Historical Development of the American Governorship 
Before the State Reorganization Movement began, the governorship had already 
undergone several stages of development during its three centuries of existence in 
America. The major stages of development have been colonial, early constitutional, 
Jacksonian Era, and post-Civil War. Beginning as a position of strong colonial authority, 
the governorship was weakened by state legislative control in the early constitutional 
period. Governors increasingly became subject to direct election during the Jacksonian 
Era and gained substantial administrative responsibility during the post-Civil War period. 
Yet the governorship remained a weak position due to shared executive power and 
insufficient administrative authority.  
 
Colonial Governorships 
Prior to the American Revolution, most governors were appointees of the British 
Crown. Only Rhode Island and Connecticut elected their governors, annually through 
their state legislatures. Governors in others colonies represented the monarch and 
enforced his policies. During the Revolutionary period, many considered governors 
tyrants for enforcing what were perceived to be the abusive policies of King George III. 
From this came the stigmatization of gubernatorial power that discouraged a strong 
governorship throughout early United States history.  
 
Early Constitutional Governorships 
After declaring their independence, American colonies drafted state constitutions. 
To avoid the perceived tyrannical abuses of colonial governors, early constitutional 
governors were subject to control by their state legislatures. State legislatures selected 
governors in every state except Massachusetts and New York, and only Massachusetts 
and South Carolina permitted their governors to veto legislation. Also, executive councils 
were appointed by state legislatures to share executive power with most governors. The 
weakness of the governor was well-known and widely celebrated as a deterrent to 
government abuse. Asked about the amount of authority given to the state’s governor 
under its new constitution, a returning delegate from the North Carolina convention said 
approvingly, “Just enough to sign the receipt for his salary.”22 
Jacksonian Era Governorships 
22 Leslie Lipson, The American Governor: From Figurehead to Leader (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1939), p. 14. 
During Andrew Jackson’s two terms as president, from 1829 to 1837, suffrage 
requirements were liberalized across the American electorate to make the political 
process more representative of popular will. In every state except South Carolina (where 
governors were appointed by the state legislature until 1865) constitutions were changed 
to allow statewide plurality election of governors. The direct election of the governor in 
most states enhanced his symbolic authority as a representative of the people’s will, at the 
expense of the legislature. Nonetheless, state legislatures still exercised considerable 
control over governors’ institutional authority. During this period, legislatures began 
creating new executive positions to share power with the governor. The product is often 
referred to as the “plural executive.” Furthermore, legislative committees continued to 
conduct the bulk of administrative affairs rather than entrusting them to the executive 
branch.  
 
Post-Civil War Governorships 
After the Civil War, the United States experienced massive urbanization and a 
consequent expansion of government services. Yet while state government gained 
substantial power in this process, most governors did not. State legislatures created 
numerous agencies, boards, and commissions to share administrative authority with the 
governor. Legislators believed that corruption and abuses of power were less likely to 
occur under independent bodies than under a strengthened governor with increased 
patronage opportunities.  
 The former Confederate states underwent a somewhat different process of 
gubernatorial change following the Civil War than other states. At the behest of the 
federal government, states reentering the Union during the Reconstruction period of 1866 
to 1876 rewrote their constitutions to centralize power in the governor. Federal officials 
feared that disloyal or rebellious members of state legislatures would dominate state 
government and thwart Reconstruction efforts otherwise. After Reconstruction ended, ex-
Confederate state officials wrested control back from the “carpetbaggers” who had ruled 
for the previous decade. They immediately began diluting the strength of the 
governorship through statutory constitutions and the “long ballot.” Statutory constitutions 
are extremely specific constitutions mandating financial and administrative policies. (For 
example, Oklahoma’s current constitution declares that all public schools must teach 
home economics.) The “long ballot” refers to the legislature’s creation of new elected 
executive offices, such as auditor or comptroller and superintendent of public instruction, 
to absorb executive duties that would otherwise fall to the governor.  
 Professor John Fairlie referred to the post-Civil War governorship as “neither the 
single executive, nor the collective executive, nor any intermediate type.”23 Most state 
constitutions endowed the governor with “supreme executive power” to see that the laws 
were faithfully executed, yet governors lacked administrative authority over the executive 
branch because most of its power was distributed among appointed agencies, boards, and 
commissions and elected executive officials. While governor of New Jersey, Woodrow 
Wilson was a leader in the State Reorganization Movement. In 1889, he wrote: “Of state 
officials associated with the Governor it may be said that both in law and in fact they are 
colleagues of the Governor, in no sense his agents or subordinates, except perhaps in 
mere formal procedure.”24 By the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, governors 
 
23 A.E. Buck, The Reorganization of State Governments in the United States (New York: Morningside 
Heights, 1938), p. 10. 
24 Lipson, op cit., p. 31. 
 
were widely regarded as figureheads incapable of initiating and administering significant 
changes in state government. In his influential book on American government, The 
American Commonwealth, British Ambassador to the United States James Bryce 
concluded at this time, “State office carries little either of dignity or power.”25 
The State Reorganization Movement Begins 
Displeasure with state governments grew in the early twentieth century. 
Reformers had been disappointed in their expectation that improvements in state 
government efficiency and integrity would result from the creation of the plural 
executive. Instead, the wide distribution of executive authority came to be regarded as an 
obstacle to good governance. The solution, many believed, was to increase gubernatorial 
authority in terms of leadership and administration. 
 
Investigating State Government Inefficiency 
Most states in the early twentieth century distributed executive authority across at 
least fifty independent agencies, boards, and commissions. New York, for example, went 
from having ten agencies in 1800, to twenty in 1850, to eighty-one in 1900. Within 
another twenty-five years, the number doubled.26 Investigations into the efficiency of 
various states’ agencies, boards, and commissions yielded dramatic results. Many days 
were required just to record the names of all agency, board, and commission members in 
some states; weeks were required to quantify the members and determine their functions. 
According to A.E. Buck, “Those who surveyed the situation in these states were literally 
amazed at the complexity of the administration; they found agencies that even the 
 
25 Ibid., p. 24. 
26 Ibid., p. 29.  
governor did not know existed.”27 Often these administrative bodies were duplicative and 
wasteful. For example, New York Governor Alfred E. Smith lamented the creation of the 
Soldiers’ Bonus Commission after World War I, when agencies and executives already 
existed to identify deserving veterans and authorize payments. 
 
Gubernatorial Inability to Promote State Efficiency 
Governors were unable to improve state government efficiency because they 
lacked necessary administrative authority. Agency, board, and commission members 
usually served longer terms than the governor and were appointed by state legislatures or 
previous governors. In Ohio before 1921, for example, some governors inherited nearly 
all appointed administrators from their predecessors. Walter Dodd declared in his 1922 
study of state government that the governor’s task, “from an administrative standpoint 
[is] largely a hopeless one.”28 Many politicians and reformers concurred in this 
assessment. William Anderson and Edward Weidner later described the genesis of the 
State Reorganization Movement as follows: 
Budgets and payrolls began to get out of hand. Waste and corruption were widely 
suspected and occasionally found. Who could be made responsible for supervising and 
controlling this enlarged administration?... The evidence suggests that no one but the 
governor was seriously considered for the new managerial role.29 
Early Events in the State Reorganization Movement 
 
A confluence of initiatives provided the impetus for the State Reorganization 
Movement. In 1910 the People’s Power League of Oregon published a plan to centralize 
 
27 Buck, op cit., p. 12. 
 
28 Walter F. Dodd, State Government (New York: The Century Company, 1922), p. 246. 
29 William Anderson and Edward W. Weidner, State and Local Governments in the United States (New 
York: Henry Holt and Co., 1951), p. 395. 
state power in the governor. Also that year, New York Governor Charles Evans Hughes 
became the first governor to advocate greater power for his office in hopes of improving 
government efficiency. In a message to the state legislature, he called for administrative 
centralization in the governor and his cabinet, the latter to be chosen by the former 
instead of being elected. In a subsequent speech at Yale University, Hughes declared that 
problems with state government efficiency required  
the grouping of administrative powers, with the necessary divisions or departments, 
under a chief administrative head; the enforcement of responsibility of the administrative 
head through an election upon which the attention of the people can be centered with 
respect to the importance of which they are fully convinced, - in these, I believe, will be 
found important securities of efficient administration.30 
One year later, President William Howard Taft asked Congress to appropriate $100,000 
for the purpose of evaluating efficiency in national government, and for the authority to 
carry out necessary changes previously unauthorized for the executive. The Taft 
Economy and Efficiency Commission’s report was rejected by Congress the next year, 
but it inspired similar investigations in many states. According to Leslie Lipson, “Those 
who had intimate knowledge of the states knew well that, however bad the national 
government, the organization of the state executive branches was far worse.”31 Wisconsin 
became the first state to investigate government efficiency, in 1911; sixteen states 
followed by 1917.  
 
Constitutional Reforms Sought for State Government Reorganization 
The achievement of a strengthened governorship and a more efficient state 
government required constitutional changes. While the reorganization plans of various 
states and reform groups differed, they shared many of the same goals. Most state 
 
30 Buck, op cit., p. 7. 
31 Lipson, op cit., p. 82. 
reorganization plans advocated concentration of administrative authority in the governor; 
gubernatorial budget-making authority; expanded gubernatorial terms; gubernatorial veto 
power; consolidation of executive departments; reduction of agency, board, and 
commission size and authority; coordination of staff services administration; provision 
for an independent state auditor; recognition of the governor’s cabinet, as selected by the 
governor. In 1921 the National Municipal League, one of the leading organizations in the 
State Reorganization Movement, published an influential blueprint for reform called “A 
Model State Constitution.” This work encompassed many of the goals just described, but 
it also advocated direct gubernatorial participation in legislative agenda-setting; provision 
of seats in state legislatures for the governor and his cabinet; quarterly reports from the 
governor to the legislature; power for the legislature to remove the governor with a two-
thirds vote. Unlike later reform efforts, early state reorganization plans did not mention 
the timing of gubernatorial elections. 
Objections to the State Reorganization Movement 
Many objected to state reorganization plans because they feared the creation of 
“autocratic government.” A strengthened governor, they contended, would use his new 
power to abuse the patronage system and serve his political interests, at the expense of his 
constituents. Even some governors condemned the reforms as unnecessary and 
dangerous. “The governor has no need for further power,” argued Maryland Governor 
Albert C. Ritchie in 1921.  
[In] large measure, the things done in other states thus to centralize power in the 
governor, do not centralize any powers in him at all, but simply remove the checks and 
balances which now exist, and which certainly for the most part, ought to be retained.32
Even those advocating reform conceded that most governorships had gained power in 
recent years. Dodd, a strong proponent of state government reorganization, wrote in 
1922: “With the rapid increase in the number of things that the state government 
undertakes to do, there has thus been an increase in the power vested in the office of the 
governor, and at the same time an increase in the importance of the office.”33 Unlike 
Ritchie, though, Dodd and other reformers believed that recent increases in gubernatorial 
power still fell short of providing governors the administrative authority necessary to 
promote state government efficiency.  
 
The State Reorganization Movement Leads to a Strong Modern Governorship 
The state reorganization initiatives of the 1910s led to decades of constitutional 
change, resulting in strong modern governorships. While the State Reorganization 
Movement has impacted every state’s system of government, its progress has not been 
linear or uniform across the states. Lipson writes,  
The reorganization movement proceeded independently from state to state at various 
times and was modified to suit local exigencies. One must expect to find not a logically 
coherent scheme perfectly applied but a patchwork threaded with compromise and 
conflict.34 
The movement’s early strength dissipated in the 1930s, before blossoming in the 1960s. 
It has had a major impact on the conduct, character, prestige, and election of governors.  
 
The 1910s and 1920s: Governors Advance Reform Efforts 
32 Buck, op cit., p. 16. 
 
33 Dodd, op cit., p. 242. 
34 Lipson, op cit., p. 80. 
 
Ambitious governors eager to improve state government efficiency championed 
the initial state reorganization plans. Among the most prominent of these governors were 
Woodrow Wilson (New Jersey), Charles Evans Hughes (New York), Frank Lowden 
(Illinois), Robert La Follette (Wisconsin), and Hiram Johnson (California).35 Hughes was 
the first to propose state constitutional amendments to achieve a strengthened 
governorship. New York voters rejected his plan in November 1915. Two years later, 
Lowden was successful in pursuing government reforms that led to the reduction of 
independent state agencies from fifty to fourteen. By the mid-1930s, twenty-six states had 
strengthened their governorships through major revisions to their state laws and 
constitutions. Often this was the result of governors’ leadership in emphasizing state 
government reorganization. For example, Virginia’s Governor Harry Byrd, Sr., used it as 
a major campaign issue in his 1926 bid for reelection. His success in the election gave 
him a mandate to achieve state government reorganization.  
The 1930s Through 1960s: The State Reorganization Movement Stalls 
The State Reorganization Movement lost its momentum in the 1930s, and for the 
most part lay dormant until the 1960s. The shift toward centralization of federal power 
during the Great Depression and later World War II diminished enthusiasm for strong 
state government, to the point that New Dealers briefly flirted with the idea of replacing 
states with “regional commonwealths.” Also, state government revenues and services 
decreased during this period, for two reasons. First, taxable income dropped sharply 
 
35 This list, including leading Democratic, Republican, and Progressive governors, indicates the emerging 
consensus in favor of state government reorganization at the time. 
during the Great Depression and did not recover until after the war. Second, increased 
urbanization without corresponding reapportionment by state legislatures in many states 
created malapportionment in favor of rural voters. Rural voters tended to prefer lower 
taxes and fewer government services than urban voters. Revenue losses and decreased 
demand for services lessened the need for a strong administrative governor. 
Consequently, the State Reorganization Movement experienced a lull in the 1930s that 
lasted for three decades.  
 
The 1960s and 1970s: The State Reorganization Movement Blossoms 
In 1962 the Supreme Court ruled in Baker v. Carr that malapportionment of state 
legislatures violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. In accordance 
with Baker v. Carr and other relevant court decisions, many state legislatures were 
reapportioned to give urban voters proportional, and therefore much greater, 
representation. Taxes and government services subsequently increased, renewing the 
need for strong and efficient administration of state government. Then, during the late 
1960s, President Richard Nixon’s New Federalism program increased revenue sharing 
with the states by delivering large sums of money, often in block grants. (Block grants 
are funds provided for a general interest, such as education, to be spent at the state 
government’s discretion.) As a result of increased administrative demands, state 
reorganization and strengthened governorships became a major priority of state 
governments once again. 
 
The Achievement of a Strengthened Governorship 
The renewal of the State Reorganization Movement had swift and dramatic 
consequences. Whereas five states rewrote their constitutions from 1902 to 1963, ten 
approved new constitutions and ten others restructured theirs significantly from 1964 to 
1976; the average number of elected executives per state decreased from thirteen in 1950 
to ten in 1975;36 constitutional restrictions against consecutive gubernatorial terms were 
eliminated in every state except Virginia; the number of governors serving four-year 
terms swelled from twenty-nine in 1955 to forty-seven in the mid-1980s.  
 The modern governor, as a result of the State Reorganization Movement and other 
changes, is a much more consequential actor in state politics than a century ago. 
Governors typically play a central role in the agenda-setting process, submit budgets, 
veto legislation, send messages to the legislature, set out clear objectives in high-profile 
campaigns, and communicate directly to constituents through the media, particularly 
television. The enhanced prestige of the governorship has attracted a new breed of 
governors over the last several decades. They now tend to be younger, better educated, 
and more ambitious in their agendas than in previous eras. Governors are also prime 
contenders for national office, as indicated by the fact that all but one of the presidents 
elected since 1976 served previously as governors.  
The Electoral Significance of a Strengthened Governorship 
The achievement of a strengthened governorship through the State Reorganization 
Movement has had important implications for gubernatorial elections. Most gubernatorial 
elections are now, like other elections for prominent offices, candidate-centered. This is 
due in part to other changes independent of the State Reorganization Movement, 
including decreased partisan identification, increased split-ticket voting, and the influence 
 
36 Larry J. Sabato, op cit., p. 68. 
of television. Yet, according to Barbara Salmore and Stephen Salmore, candidate-
centered elections were slower to develop for governorships than were candidate-
centered elections for other offices, because they were not considered as important or 
worthy of close attention. As the office gained in power and prestige, however, 
gubernatorial elections became more prominent. “There is more at stake in state level 
elections, more political players are interested in their outcomes, and more resources are 
available to wage campaigns,” wrote Salmore and Salmore.37 
The Role of Election Timing in the State Reorganization Movement 
Simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections were slow to emerge as an 
essential element in the State Reorganization Movement. Ignored by early reformers, it 
became a common notion in the mid-twentieth century that such elections negatively 
affected gubernatorial selection by elevating partisan affiliation above competence and 
policy matters. As a result, many states amended their constitutions to schedule 
gubernatorial elections in non-presidential years. 
Simultaneous Gubernatorial and Presidential Elections a Non-Factor in the Early 
State Reorganization Movement 
Election timing, particularly in terms of simultaneous gubernatorial and 
presidential elections, was simply not an issue in the early years of the State 
Reorganization Movement. Such elections were not mentioned in early works on state 
government, such as Dodd’s (1922) and Buck’s (1938). They were not mentioned in the 
National Municipal League’s 1921 “A Model State Constitution.” Furthermore, they do 
 
37 Barbara G. Salmore and Stephen A. Salmore, “The Transformation of State Electoral Politics,” in Carl E. 
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not seem to have concerned state governments in the early movement years. In 1911, as 
efficiency and government reorganization were first attracting attention on the state and 
national levels, Arizona and New Mexico were admitted into the Union. That year, the 
two states held their first gubernatorial elections. Instead of scheduling their next 
gubernatorial elections two years later, also in a non-presidential year, Arizona and New 
Mexico temporarily extended their first governors’ terms to three years so that the next 
gubernatorial election would be held in 1914, and then every two years henceforth. By 
going out of their way to hold gubernatorial elections in even-numbered years, the new 
states showed no concern for the potential pitfalls of simultaneous gubernatorial and 
presidential elections. Similarly, the revised New York constitution proposed in 1927 
would have expanded the governor’s term from two to four years, starting in 1928. The 
fact that all subsequent gubernatorial elections would occur at the same time as 
presidential elections apparently did not alarm state reformers advocating the new 
constitutional provisions. 
 
Simultaneous Gubernatorial and Presidential Elections Are Deemed Significant by 
Some Politicians of the Early Movement Years 
Among the first to recognize the potential significance of simultaneous 
gubernatorial and presidential elections were the people affected by them most, the 
gubernatorial candidates. New York Democratic Governor Al Smith objected in part to 
the revised 1927 state constitution on the basis that it established simultaneous 
gubernatorial and presidential elections. Scarred by his gubernatorial defeat in the 
Republican landslide of 1920, “He wanted a state election to be concerned with state 
affairs” and believed that simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections inhibited 
that ideal.38 Smith later attempted to use simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential 
elections to his advantage. Running for the presidency in 1928, Smith recruited fellow 
Democrat Franklin Roosevelt to seek the New York governorship because he believed 
that Roosevelt’s popularity would boost his chances of winning the state’s electoral 
votes. Similarly, Roosevelt in 1936 urged incumbent New York Democratic Governor 
Herbert Lehman to seek reelection, in order to help him gain New York’s vote for a 
second term as president.  
 
Scholars Begin to Recognize the Potential Significance of Simultaneous 
Gubernatorial and Presidential Elections in the 1950s and 1960s 
 
Starting in the 1950s, many scholars began to consider the potential influence of 
presidential elections on simultaneous gubernatorial elections. Anderson and Weidner 
speculated in 1951 that “partisan issues important on one level may also affect the results 
on another.”39 V.O. Key elaborated on the potential of coattail effects in American State 
Politics (1956): 
The presidential candidate who leads his party to a landslide victory carries into office 
with him large numbers of gubernatorial candidates of his party, who win without much 
regard to their role or place in the state, but because they float along with national 
movement of sentiment.40 
Joseph E. Kallenbach, in a section of The American Chief Executive (1966) entitled 
“Election Reform Issues,” highlighted simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential 
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elections as “warrant[ing] special significance in connection with the choosing of 
executives.”41 
Many scholars who acknowledged the potential significance of simultaneous 
gubernatorial and presidential elections were skeptical about its actual impact. Anderson 
and Weidner said “The argument [that presidential elections obscure state issues in 
simultaneously held gubernatorial elections] is plausible, but it is hard to adduce evidence 
to prove the point.”42 Kallenbach noted that nearly four out of ten gubernatorial 
candidates were chosen at the same time that state voters selected a presidential candidate 
of a different party from 1956 to 1964. On this basis, he wrote  
The conclusion seems warranted that coincidental presidential and gubernatorial 
elections, even when coupled with voting procedures that tend to encourage straight-
ticket voting, are by no means an insurmountable obstacle to a discriminating choice by 
voters.43 
Kallenbach also detailed the potential benefits of simultaneous gubernatorial and 
presidential elections. He said they decreased the burden on voters by electing both 
positions at one time rather than at two separate times; decreased state and municipality 
expenses by holding one rather than two elections; increased voter turnout for 
gubernatorial elections, since presidential elections tend to draw more voters than other 
elections. He also indicated that they 
induce greater harmony and identification of interest between the state party organization and its 
candidates and the national party and its leadership, thus making for a somewhat clearer fixing of 
party responsibility and a strengthening of party ties generally between national and state 
interests.44 
41 Joseph E. Kallenbach, The American Chief Executive: The Presidency and the Governorship (New York: 
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42 Anderson and Weidner, op cit., p. 399. 
 
43 Kallenbach, op cit., p. 105. 
44 Ibid., p. 105. 
Election Timing Becomes an Essential Aspect of the State Reorganization 
Movement 
By the end of the 1960s, the separation of gubernatorial elections from 
presidential elections became a major element in the State Reorganization Movement. 
Between 1964 and 1996, the number of states holding simultaneous gubernatorial and 
presidential elections dropped from twenty-five to eleven, while only North Dakota 
moved its gubernatorial election to coincide with the presidential cycle. The pattern of 
change over the past century is striking. At the beginning of the twentieth century, thirty-
four out of forty-five states held simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections. 
Today, as a result of the State Reorganization Movement, only eleven out of fifty states 
hold them simultaneously. (See Graph 1, which tracks the number of simultaneous 
gubernatorial and presidential elections held, 1900-2004.)  
 
Graph 1: The Number of States Holding Simultaneous 
Gubernatorial and Presidential Elections, 1900-1924
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More changes in election timing are still possible. The National Municipal League 
and the National Governors Association recommend holding gubernatorial elections in 
odd-numbered years, to avoid the potential national influences of presidential and 
congressional elections. Currently, only Virginia, New Jersey, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
and Kentucky, elect their governors in odd-numbered years 
 
Assessing the Impact of Election Timing in Recent Gubernatorial Elections 
Many reformers have claimed that states with separated gubernatorial and 
presidential elections are more likely to produce mixed partisan outcomes than those with 
simultaneous elections. Since many states began separating gubernatorial and presidential 
elections as part of the State Reorganization Movement, election data from the last forty 
years provide the optimal available basis for assessing these claims. The data indicate that 
states with separated gubernatorial and presidential elections are more likely to produce 
1900 - 2004 
mixed partisan outcomes than those with simultaneous elections. However, states with 
simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections are much more likely to produce 
mixed partisan outcomes than state government reformers have often suggested. 
 
Are Separated Gubernatorial and Presidential Elections More Likely to Produce 
Mixed Partisan Outcomes than Simultaneous Elections? 
Despite many state government reformers’ claims that national politics 
dramatically overshadows state politics in simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential 
elections, mixed partisan outcomes in these elections occur frequently. Since 1980, 
twenty-nine out of eighty-three, or thirty-five percent, of simultaneous gubernatorial and 
presidential elections have produced mixed partisan outcomes. (See Graph 2, detailing 
the historical trend toward increased occurrence of mixed partisan outcomes in 
simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections.)  
Graph 2: Percentage of States With Mixed 
Partisan Outcomes in Simultaneous 
Gubernatorial and Presidential Elections, 1900-
2004
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These data prove that voters are not only capable of separating presidential from 
gubernatorial preferences, but they do so very often.  
 Analysis of recent election data also shows that separated gubernatorial and 
presidential elections are significantly more likely to produce mixed partisan outcomes 
than simultaneous elections. Since 1980, one hundred forty-two out of two hundred sixty-
seven, or fifty-three percent, of separated gubernatorial and presidential elections have 
produced mixed partisan outcomes. (See Graph 3, comparing mixed partisan outcomes in 
simultaneous versus separated gubernatorial and presidential elections, since 1980.) 
Graph 3: Rates of Mixed Partisan Outcomes in 
Simultaneous Versus Separated Gubernatorial and 
Presidential Elections, 1980-2004
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Recent election data thus reinforce the State Reorganization Movement claim that off-
year gubernatorial elections are less likely to be influenced by national politics than 
simultaneous elections.  
 
Is There a Pattern of Voting for Change in Simultaneous Gubernatorial and 
Presidential Elections? 
Some scholars and other observers have proposed that there are patterns in voter 
selections of gubernatorial and presidential candidates in the same election year. Recent 
election data provide the basis for assessing their theories.  
 Kallenbach hypothesized that presidential coattail effects are particularly strong in 
simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections when state voters support a change 
of presidential party. He wrote, “The influence exerted by the presidential election upon 
the outcome of gubernatorial contests is most likely to be felt in those years when there is 
a change in national party control of the presidency.”45 He based his theory on Angus 
Campbell and Warren E. Miller’s 1957 study, “The Motivational Bases of Straight and 
Split-Ticket Voting.” Yet Campbell and Miller’s analysis applied to all offices on the 
ballot in presidential elections years, meaning that split-ticket voters may still have 
supported the same party for governor and president. 
 Kallenbach’s hypothesis is not supported by recent election data. Since 1980, 
twenty-nine out of thirty-nine states (seventy-four percent) voting for a change in 
presidential party leadership during simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections 
have also voted to maintain the party in gubernatorial power. Only ten out of eighty-three 
simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections since 1980 (twelve percent) have 
produced state votes for changes in the party leadership of the presidency and the 
governorship. In fact, since 1960, years in which a new party is elected to the presidency 
have proven less likely to produce mixed partisan outcomes in simultaneous 
 
45 Ibid., p. 103. 
gubernatorial and presidential elections than years in which the president’s party remains 
in power (thirty-six versus forty percent).  
 Nor do election data support an assumption that Kallenbach’s theory is better 
applied to landslide votes for change. For example, in 1980, the most recent case of a 
landslide vote for change in presidential party leadership, Republican Ronald Reagan 
defeated incumbent Democratic President Jimmy Carter with 489 out of 538 electoral 
votes. Yet only four out of eleven states voting for a change in presidential party 
leadership in 1980 (thirty-six percent) also voted for a change in gubernatorial party 
leadership.  
 
Does the Competitiveness of a Presidential Election Affect Rates of Mixed Partisan 
Outcomes in Simultaneous Gubernatorial and Presidential Elections? 
 
It might also be suggested that the closeness of a presidential election affects the 
rate of mixed partisan outcomes in simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections. 
A close presidential race would perhaps lead to more split-ticket voting and more mixed 
partisan outcomes between states’ choices of gubernatorial and presidential candidates, as 
non-partisan or loosely partisan “swing” voters divide somewhat evenly between 
unusually appealing candidates of different parties. Conversely, perhaps a dull 
presidential election contest causes voters to focus their attention on the governor’s race, 
inducing greater scrutiny and more mixed partisan outcomes. Again, recent election data 
do not support a pattern in either case. Since 1960 there have been six highly competitive 
presidential elections (1960, 1968, 1976, 1992, 2000, 2004), during which thirty-six out 
of ninety-eight states (thirty-seven percent) have voted for gubernatorial and presidential 
candidates of different parties. Also since 1960, there have been six largely 
uncompetitive presidential elections (1964, 1972, 1980, 1984, 1988, 1996), during which 
thirty-seven out of ninety-four states (thirty-nine percent) have voted for gubernatorial 
and presidential candidates of different parties. Judging from the election data, whether a 
presidential election is competitive or uncompetitive makes virtually no difference in the 
national incidence of mixed partisan outcomes in simultaneous gubernatorial and 
presidential elections.  
 
Assessing the Electoral Significance of Simultaneous Gubernatorial and Presidential 
Elections 
Analysis of recent election data suggest that gubernatorial elections held at the 
same time as presidential elections are, as State Reorganization Movement reformers 
have argued since the 1950s and 1960s, more likely to be influenced by presidential 
politics than are separated gubernatorial elections. Despite evidence of heightened 
national political influence in simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections, 
however, many produce mixed partisan outcomes in which gubernatorial elections and 
state politics are certainly not obscured by presidential politics. Thus, this evidence 
indicates that State Reorganization Movement reformers have been correct to a certain 
degree about the electoral significance of simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential 
elections. Chapter V, however, presents conflicting evidence of presidential coattail 
effects. 
 Contrary to many existing theories, there does not seem to be a clear formula for 
predicting patterns of mixed partisan outcomes in simultaneous gubernatorial and 
presidential elections. Other factors must be considered to explain this phenomenon. This 
study proposes that campaign strategies of gubernatorial candidates and their state party 
organizations are the primary factors affecting state voter choice of gubernatorial and 
presidential candidates of different parties in the same election year. To test this thesis, 
the following two chapters present case studies of the 2004 gubernatorial elections in 
Vermont and Montana, in which state voters selected gubernatorial and presidential 
candidates of different parties in the same election year. 
 
Chapter III: The 2004 Vermont Gubernatorial Election 
 
“I always do what’s right for Vermont, regardless of party affiliation.” – 
Governor Jim Douglas46 
“If you support the candidacy of Jim Douglas, make no mistake: You support the 
candidacy of George Bush.” –B.J. Rogers, spokesman for Peter Clavelle47 
In 2004, Vermont’s Jim Douglas was the only Republican governor in the nation 
elected by a state that voted for the Democratic presidential candidate, John Kerry. 
Douglas’ reelection was especially noteworthy because it occurred in what was 
widely considered the most liberal state in the nation. Moreover, Douglas (who was 
initially elected governor by a narrow plurality in 2002) defeated Democratic 
challenger Peter Clavelle in 2004 by a slightly greater landslide than Kerry’s margin 
over Republican President George W. Bush in the state. Douglas won 59% of the vote 
to Clavelle’s 38%, whereas Kerry won 59% to Bush’s 39%.  
Governor Douglas’ victory has been attributed to a variety of factors, primarily voter 
independence, candidate organization, and incumbency. Campaign strategies attracted 
little attention in evaluations of the 2004 Vermont gubernatorial election. This chapter 
analyzes the issues and factors influencing the Douglas-Clavelle race, with particular 
attention to the campaign strategies used by the Douglas campaign and the Vermont 
Republican Party to elect a Republican governor at the same time that Vermont 
 
46 Mike Kalil, “Clavelle Slams Douglas Over Iraq War,” Brattleboro Reformer, October 13, 2004. 
http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=e8401a57176f8eca343e8c0c46d63f08&_docnum =13& 
wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkVb&_md5=e370322d3b29da417c66050325322683. 
 
47 “Prominent Democrats Endorse Douglas’ Re-election,” Associated Press, August 4, 2004. 
http://web.lexis -nexis.com/universe/document?_m=84f7c27b40c677eb74f4325fed66400b&_docnum=1& 
wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkVb&_md5=20940ff91acc5d8035e1bcb1de48a7d5. 
overwhelmingly supported the Democratic presidential candidate. By specifically 
analyzing the role of campaign strategies in the 2004 Vermont gubernatorial election, 
this chapter tests the thesis that campaign strategies of gubernatorial candidates and 
their state party organizations are the primary factors affecting state voter choice of 
gubernatorial and presidential candidates of different parties in the same election 
year.  
 
Vermont’s Political Transformation 
 
Governor Jim Douglas’ election as a Republican governor in Vermont was very 
surprising to many, given Vermont’s reputation as an exceptionally liberal state. Yet 
for most of the twentieth century, the election of a Vermont Republican would not 
have been noteworthy. Before its recent political transformation, Vermont had long 
been recognized as perhaps the most Republican state in the nation. In 1936 it was 
one of only two states, along with Maine, to support Republican presidential nominee 
Alf Landon over Democratic President Franklin Roosevelt. Before 1992, Vermont 
had backed only one Democratic candidate for president since the creation of the 
Republican Party, President Lyndon Johnson in 1964. In the early 1960s, however, 
the state began a period of dramatic change that continues to impact its culture and 
politics today.  
In 1960, Vermont was still the small, agrarian state it had always been; the 390,000 
people living in the state that year were outnumbered by cows. Within the next two 
decades, Vermont’s population surged to 511,000, then to 609,000 by 2000.48 At the 
same time, Vermont underwent an economic transition in which tourism, skiing, 
summer resorts, computer technology, and Ben & Jerry’s Ice Cream diversified and 
enhanced a state economy long known primarily for its agriculture. Most important 
for Vermont’s political environment, the immigrants of this period tended to be much 
more liberal than the native population.  
While next-door New Hampshire, trumpeting its low taxes and aversion to government, 
attracted right-leaning migrants from Massachusetts and elsewhere who were happy to 
live in spanking-new developments and ravenous for low taxes, Vermont, proclaiming its 
desire to preserve the environment and the past, attracted left-leaning migrants from New 
York and elsewhere who were willing to pay higher taxes and higher prices for the 
privilege of living in a seemingly pristine setting.49 
The younger and wealthier immigrants eventually redefined Vermont, so that by 2004 
it had “become the leader of America’s left.”50 At that point, the state was well 
known for its stringent environmental standards, homosexual civil unions, and its 
regular reelection of Independent Congressman and self-described socialist Bernie 
Sanders. In 2004, Vermont gave Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry his 
third greatest vote percentage of any state, while distinguishing itself as the only state 
in the nation to give President Bush a lower percentage of the vote than it had in 2000 
(41% in 2000, 39% in 2004). Given these facts, Vermont did not seem a likely setting 
for a Republican landslide in the 2004 gubernatorial election. 
 
Governor Jim Douglas 
48 Michael Barone and Richard E. Cohen, eds., The Almanac of American Politics 2006 (Washington, D.C.: 
National Journal Group, 2005), p. 1690. 
49 Ibid., p. 1690.
50 Ibid., p. 1692. 
Governor Douglas possessed many important electoral advantages that helped 
him to overcome the stigma of being a Republican candidate in Vermont. Most 
notably, Douglas’ familiarity with Vermonters, moderate image, and first-term record 
made him an unusually appealing gubernatorial candidate, even while the presidential 
candidate of his party was headed for certain defeat the same year.  
The Political Rise of Jim Douglas 
 
Born in Springfield, Massachusetts, in 1951 and raised in neighboring Longmeadow, 
Jim Douglas came to Vermont as a Middlebury College student in 1968. A lifelong 
Republican, Douglas campaigned for Republican presidential candidate Barry 
Goldwater in 1964 at age thirteen, and while in college led rallies in support of 
Republican President Richard Nixon amid protests against the Vietnam war. Upon 
graduation in 1972, Douglas ran successfully for Middlebury state representative, and 
five years later he became majority leader of the Vermont House of Representatives. 
In 1979, Douglas lost a bid for House speaker and subsequently became an aide to 
Republican Governor Richard Snelling. He also worked as a radio announcer and 
executive director of the United Way before being elected Vermont’s secretary of 
state in 1980. After being reelected five times to that office, he attempted to enter 
national politics by challenging popular three-term U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy in 
1992. Douglas presented the greatest electoral threat of Leahy’s senatorial career, but 
lost by a 54% to 43% margin. In 1994, Douglas returned to state politics when elected 
treasurer, a post that he held for four consecutive terms.  
In 2002, Douglas ran for the governor’s seat being vacated by Democratic 
presidential aspirant Howard Dean. His opponents in this three-way race were 
Democratic Lieutenant Governor Doug Racine and Con Hogan, an Independent 
candidate who had initially sought the Republican nomination. Douglas’ campaign 
focused on economic recovery for the state. He sought to “create a more business-
friendly environment in Vermont,” primarily by proposing tax cuts, spending cuts, 
and major reforms of Acts 250 and 60.51 Act 250 was an environmental measure 
passed in the early 1970s under liberal Republican Governor Deane Davis. The act set 
ten stringent criteria for the construction of housing developments and ski resorts. 
The authority for evaluating construction plans was distributed across five different 
commissions, and an automatic right of appeal was granted to any citizen objecting to 
commission decisions. Act 60, also called the Equal Education Opportunity Act, was 
passed in 1997 in response to a Vermont Supreme Court ruling mandating equal 
educational opportunities throughout the state. The act complied by equalizing 
property tax rates statewide, so that wealthier districts could no longer use these taxes 
to raise and spend disproportionate amounts of money on their public schools. Many 
blamed Acts 250 and 60 with discouraging business activity in Vermont, causing job 
cuts and slowing economic growth. (Lieutenant Governor Racine joined Douglas in 
advocating revisions of the acts.) Additionally, Douglas ran on the theme of change. 
He blamed many of the state’s problems on seventeen years of Democratic 
governorship over the previous eighteen years.  
 
51 Ibid., p. 1695. 
In the November election, Douglas received 45% of the vote, to Racine’s 42% and 
Hogan’s 10%. Douglas’ victory was especially noteworthy because Democrats 
exceeded expectations in that year’s state legislative elections, maintaining their 
Senate majority and taking control of the House of Representatives.  
 
Governor Douglas’ Familiarity to Vermont Voters 
By the time Jim Douglas was elected governor of Vermont in 2002 he had been 
on a state ballot every other year since 1972, statewide since 1980. In that time, he 
received more votes than any other candidate in Vermont’s history and, by the 
estimate of Eric Davis, professor of political science at Middlebury College, Douglas 
had personally met a quarter of Vermont’s 600,000-plus residents.52 Douglas’ 
familiarity to Vermonters provided a substantial electoral advantage. It was 
particularly relevant because, according to Douglas, Vermont “is a small state where 
politics is retail and local; meeting a candidate for a major office, regardless of 
ideology or positions, certainly makes a difference.”53 Consequently, Douglas 
maintained a strong presence across Vermont while holding each of his statewide 
offices. Douglas’ 2004 campaign chairman Neale Lunderville described his 
interaction with constituents as “essential to the success of Jim Douglas” because it 
allowed him to establish personal connections and spread his messages.54 Douglas’ 
extensive travels as governor attracted criticism from many of his opponents, who 
 
52 Professor Eric Davis, Telephone interview, December 6, 2005. 
 
53 Governor Jim Douglas, Telephone interview, December 23, 2005.  
 
54 Neale Lunderville, Telephone interview, December 23, 2005. 
 
claimed that he could be performing more important functions than “ribbon-cutting.” 
Some referred to him derisively as “Governor Scissorhands.”55 Douglas dismissed 
these criticisms, responding:  
If there’s a ribbon to be cut, it means something good is happening in our state. It means 
a business is opening or expanding; it means a new school; it means a nonprofit 
organization that is providing a new program or service; it means the state is moving 
forward economically or socially in a positive way.56 
Irrespective of opinion concerning the propriety of his travels, there can 
be little doubt that Douglas’ familiarity to Vermont voters was a 
valuable element in his political success. 
 
Governor Douglas’ Personal Appeal 
 
Governor Douglas’ familiarity with state voters allowed him to market what many 
regarded as an attractive personality, in a state where personal appeal had great 
resonance. “I think at least Vermont is more personal than it is party,” said Bill Grover, 
professor of political science at St. Michael’s College. 
Vermont, being a small state, a state where everybody pretty much knows everybody, 
you can’t overemphasize how much face-to-face politics matters here. You can’t 
overemphasize how much people thought of Douglas… as a ‘nice guy’ and an ‘honest 
guy,’ and how much that mattered to them.57 
55 Democratic State Representative Steve Darrow: “For the last two years, Douglas has spent most of his 
time driving around the state, going to meetings and ribbon cuttings, and we call him Governor 
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as Kalil, “Weighing.”] 
 
56 Ross Sneyd, “AP Newsmaker: Douglas Favors Private Market for Health Care,” Associated Press, 
August 30, 2004.  http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=a456a8f6230a691420abcd0be4a4be 
2b&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkVb&_md5=c47714314f676d355b121421c0bb389c. [Hereafter cited 
as Sneyd, “Newsmaker.”] 
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Indeed, Douglas’ reputation as an honorable and friendly person was widely recognized 
and often cited as one of his greatest assets in wooing voters. It helped distinguish him 
from other Republicans, particularly on the national level, whom Vermonters distrusted 
or disliked. For example, Professor Davis said, “Douglas’ personal style – outgoing, 
friendly, dry sense of humor – is very engaging, and voters like him personally. He’s not 
a polarizing candidate, such as George [W.] Bush.”58 Lunderville described him as “very 
genuine, very affable… the kind of guy you would want your sister to marry.”59 While 
this view, to varying degrees, was widely shared and valued in Vermont, it was not 
universally accepted. Professor Grover dismissed Douglas’ friendly image as “a fraud,”60 
while the Brattleboro Reformer, in endorsing Peter Clavelle over Douglas in the 2004 
election, wrote, “we share the view of many Vermonters that Governor Douglas… [is] 
generally [a] nice [guy], [but] being amiable isn’t as important as being creative and 
bold.”61 
Governor Douglas’ Moderate Image 
Governor Douglas’ lengthy political experience in Vermont and strong 
relationship with voters gave him the opportunity to cultivate his image as a pragmatic 
moderate Republican. Though fiscally conservative in many ways, Douglas was quite 
socially liberal. He supported legalized abortion, accepted Vermont’s civil union law, and 
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allowed a medicinal marijuana bill to become law, though without his signature. 
“Governor Douglas isn’t a social conservative to begin with,” said Vermont Republican 
Party Chairman Jim Barnett, “and he probably would not have made it as far in his career 
if he were. He’s not a firebrand by any account.”62 This perception was reinforced by the 
way Douglas spoke about himself and his policies. Shortly after the 2004 election, he 
described his plans for a second gubernatorial term as “my agenda of moderate 
mainstream bipartisanship.”63 Douglas also made efforts to distinguish himself from 
national Republicans, by saying “I’ve never applied labels to myself. I’m a Vermont 
Republican.”64 
Douglas often shifted attention away from his ideology by emphasizing his 
pragmatism and willingness to work with others, particularly Democrats. On the 
campaign trail in 2004, he described his “approach to government” as “very 
collaborative, bringing people together to solve problems and embrace opportunities.”65 
Typical were Douglas’ comments on divisions over health care following the 2004 
election:  
When two points of view are different, I suppose compromise is likely. My most 
important objective is to make progress to ensure we address the issues that are important 
to Vermonters and that I talked about during the campaign.66 
62 Jim Barnett, Telephone interview, December 15, 2005. 
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This is hardly the type of rhetoric that would lead Vermonters to view 
Douglas as an ideologue.  
Governor Douglas was largely successful in convincing voters and other 
observers of his moderate approach, thereby defusing concerns about his association with 
conservative national Republicans. Professor Davis said of Douglas, “He’s not a far-right 
conservative by any means.”67 Most major Vermont newspapers agreed. In fact, in their 
endorsements of Douglas many newspapers indicated that his political differentiation 
from national Republicans was a significant element in his attraction. The Valley News 
claimed, “It’s clear to anyone paying attention that Douglas comes from a very different 
Republican tradition”68 than George W. Bush. The Herald-Times Argus argued, “Douglas 
is the kind of Republican who could help to pull the party back from the extreme 
ideological direction in which Bush has taken it.”69 Such comments recurred in many 
supporters’ discussions of Douglas. They suggest that one of the motivations for 
supporting Douglas was to prove to national Republicans that the moderation of party 
policy could widen their electoral appeal in states they typically lost. This logic may have 
had particular potency in a state that was once the party’s most loyal supporter until, 
many Vermonters believed, Republicans abandoned their founding principles.   
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Were he not so successful in cultivating an image of political moderation, it is 
doubtful that Governor Douglas would have experienced such success as a Republican 
politician in Vermont. “The political graveyard here is littered with candidates, 
Republicans, who tried to just dust off the party platform in Vermont and run on it,” 
explained Lunderville. “That’s not going to win elections, because it generally flies 
completely counter to the majority of the voters.”70 Yet a moderate image seemed useful 
to Vermont candidates generally, not just Republicans. According to 2004 exit polling, 
four in ten Vermonters described themselves as “moderates.”71 Being seen as a moderate 
in Vermont was not always essential; as Professor Grover cautioned, “It depends on the 
nature of the race.” However, in a statewide election where the constituency is larger and 
more diverse, “Probably being seen as some kind of problem-solving, pragmatic 
moderate would help.”72 
Governor Douglas’ First-Term Record 
 
The Douglas campaign believed that its greatest asset in the 2004 gubernatorial 
election was Governor Douglas’ first-term record. Depending on commentary, polling, 
and the election results, it appears that this was a wise strategy upon which to base the 
campaign. Douglas’ first term included significant legislative accomplishments, 
particularly on the central 2002 campaign issues of Act 250 reform and economic 
improvement. In April 2004, the House and Senate approved the first major revisions of 
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Act 250 in its 34-year existence. The revisions eliminated the five citizen approval boards 
designed to evaluate construction plans, transferred their authority to a single 
Environmental Court, and withdrew the automatic right of appeal the act had previously 
accorded to objecting citizens. In terms of the economy, Douglas claimed that 7,000 new 
jobs were created during his first term (although some economists, using different 
definitions of job growth, revised that figure to 1,200), and Vermont’s unemployment 
rate became the third lowest among all the states during his tenure.73 Corporate taxes for 
Vermont businesses were cut 14%, while taxes were increased on out-of-state 
corporations, and Douglas presided over two balanced budgets. 
 Despite Governor Douglas’ accomplishments, there was certainly room for more 
action. He failed to inspire any major revisions of Act 60, and some criticized him for his 
incremental approach. The Herald-Times Argus cautioned, “Douglas could be more 
ambitious or bold in leading Vermont forward, and Douglas would do well to pay 
attention.”74 The Bennington Banner instead portrayed Douglas’ incrementalism as one 
of his strengths, commenting “He has worked methodically, tortoise-like, to move 
Vermont forward.”75 
Governor Douglas’ first-term performance was received well by Vermonters. In 
the 2004 election, he earned the endorsement of every major state newspaper except the 
Brattleboro Reformer. He also received the endorsement of ten prominent Democrats, 
including legislators, businesspeople, and government officials. In an April 2004 poll 
conducted by the polling firm Research 2000, 48% of respondents characterized Douglas’ 
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gubernatorial performance as good or excellent, while 36% rated it fair, 7% poor, and 9% 
were unsure. In terms of favorability, 46% of respondents described themselves as 
favorable towards Douglas, while 35% were unfavorable, and 19% were neutral.76 
Unsurprisingly, on June 28, 2004, Douglas announced that he would seek reelection in 
November. 
 
Democratic Gubernatorial Candidate Peter Clavelle 
Governor Douglas’ 2004 gubernatorial election opponent was 55-year-old 
Democrat Peter Clavelle. Though an accomplished 30-year political veteran and seven-
term Burlington mayor, Clavelle was not expected to present a serious challenge because 
he lacked many of Douglas’ key political assets. Most significantly, Clavelle was 
unfamiliar to most Vermonters. Also, his recent switch from the Progressive to the 
Democratic Party led to divisions among Democrats and the perception that Clavelle was 
outside the political mainstream. 
The Political Rise of Peter Clavelle 
Peter Clavelle entered Vermont politics in 1972, as town manager of Castleton 
and later city manager of Winooski. In 1982, Burlington’s Socialist Party mayor, Bernie 
Sanders, selected him to become the city’s personnel director. The next year Clavelle was 
appointed Burlington’s first director of community and economic development. In 1989, 
after Sanders moved on to become Vermont’s lone U.S. Representative, Clavelle was 
elected to the first of seven terms as mayor of Burlington, running on the left-wing 
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Progressive Party ticket. As mayor, Clavelle focused on housing programs, job creation 
and training, community policing, and waterfront revitalization. Many later attributed 
Burlington’s economic recovery to Clavelle’s leadership in these areas.  
Shortly prior to the beginning of the 2004 campaign, Clavelle left the Progressive 
Party to seek the Democratic nomination for governor. According to Professor Grover, 
Clavelle switched in order to avoid a three-way gubernatorial race that would fragment 
the liberal vote and ensure a Douglas victory. Clavelle won the Democratic nomination 
without opposition, and then arranged for the Progressive Party to nominate a political 
ally who declined to contest the election.77 “Clavelle was not a bad candidate,” conceded 
Lunderville. “He was a good campaigner in the sense that he worked the crowds very 
well, he was good with people, very blue-collar, down-to-Earth, people liked him as 
much as they liked Douglas, and he articulated a lot of the ideological issues very well.”78 
In terms of familiarity and a moderate image, however, Clavelle entered the election 
against Douglas at a substantial disadvantage. 
Clavelle’s Lack of Statewide Familiarity 
 
As a career Burlington-area politician, Clavelle was virtually unknown outside of 
Burlington’s Chittenden County. He was particularly unfamiliar in the Northeast 
Kingdom and southwestern Vermont, where Governor Douglas was well-known. This 
discrepancy between the two candidates was evident in a May 2004 poll conducted by 
Research 2000, in which 24% of respondents did not recognize Clavelle’s name, and 
38% had no opinion of him. In the same poll, all 400 respondents recognized Douglas’ 
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name.79 Garrison Nelson, professor of political science at the University of Vermont, 
observed in October 2004, “Peter is running into the classic problem of a first-time 
statewide candidate for major office without statewide experience, and that usually means 
you lose.”80 Many cited Clavelle’s lack of statewide familiarity as his greatest obstacle 
against Douglas, perhaps dooming him from the start of the campaign. 
 
Clavelle Is Perceived as Being Outside the Political Mainstream 
Clavelle’s policies, comments, and particularly his former membership in the 
Progressive Party led many to believe that he was further outside of Vermont’s political 
mainstream than Governor Douglas, although Douglas was a Republican in the very 
liberal state. Clavelle attempted to overcome the perception that he was an ideologue; 
“On the campaign trail, Clavelle seeks to portray himself as a liberal pragmatist,” said the 
Boston Globe.81 However, his behavior sometimes jeopardized these efforts. Visiting a 
small electronics firm during the 2004 campaign, he unexpectedly asked its owner: “So, 
what’s your social mission?” The owner was caught off guard, unable to respond. The 
Globe described the incident as “the sort of thing that makes the Republicans gleefully 
certain that they will be able to cast Clavelle as a radical leftist.”82 Defining Clavelle as 
an extremist was not a simple task for the Douglas campaign, however; according to 
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Professor Davis, “[Clavelle’s] on the left, but clearly not radical.”83 Still, Clavelle 
unnerved many of the moderate Democrats and Independents who might otherwise have 
opposed a Republican gubernatorial candidate, particularly when roused by anti-Bush 
sentiments. Professor Grover observed, 
I think that many people saw him as a charlatan for leaving the Progressive Party…. 
Many Democrats never believed that he was a Democrat, and I kind of don’t blame 
them…. He did appear more moderate, he did run as a Democrat, kind of a liberal 
Democrat, a lefty Democrat. But I don’t think that helped him.84 
Indeed, divisions were much stronger among Democrats than Republicans in the election. 
One-third of identified Democrats said they voted for Douglas, whereas less than one-
tenth of identified Republicans supported Clavelle.85 
The Gubernatorial Election Takes Shape 
The early stages of the 2004 Vermont gubernatorial election revealed the issues 
and strategies that the two campaigns hoped would lead them to victory. Governor 
Douglas focused mainly on his first-term record, while Peter Clavelle highlighted his 
universal health care plan and Douglas’ support of President Bush and the Iraq war. This 
section analyzes the candidates’ campaign announcements, early advertisements, and 
early tours, in order to assess their intentions and successes in defining the gubernatorial 
election.  
 
February 2004: Clavelle Enters the Gubernatorial Race 
On February 6, 2004, Peter Clavelle officially announced that he would seek the 
Democratic Party’s nomination for governor of Vermont. Clavelle began by emphasizing 
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his accomplishments as mayor of Burlington, namely waterfront revitalization, affordable 
housing, and energy conservation efforts. He said, “What I have done in my thirty years 
of public service is committed myself to building stronger communities, stronger 
communities where everyone has the chance to build a better life for them and their 
families.”86 Among the issues highlighted for the gubernatorial campaign were health 
care, energy, education, and economic development. Clavelle linked Douglas to the 
Republican presidential ticket when discussing the Governor’s energy policy, speculating 
that it “may have been written by Dick Cheney and his cronies.”87 Clavelle twice referred 
to President Bush and Vice President Cheney disapprovingly during his opening speech, 
receiving loud reactions from the crowd both times.  
 Clavelle’s announcement for the gubernatorial race was first among Democrats. 
Senate President Peter Shumlin had considered entering, but immediately after Clavelle’s 
announcement he declared that he would not seek his party’s nomination. Subsequently, 
no Democrats challenged Clavelle in the party primary. It is likely that Democrats were 
reluctant to challenge Governor Douglas because they did not believe that he could be 
defeated. In addition to the previously cited polling that showed Douglas’ high job 
performance and favorability ratings, a late April 2004 poll conducted by Research 2000 
had Douglas beating Clavelle in a head-to-head race, 48% to 34%.88 Campaign insiders 
believed from the beginning that Douglas was bound for reelection; according to 
Lunderville, “Our polls never showed that race close. I’m sure [the Clavelle campaign’s] 
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polls never showed that race close.”89 Barnett said that the question in the campaign was 
never whether Clavelle could defeat Douglas, but “is there anything [Clavelle] could 
have done to close that margin up, make it a more competitive race?”90 
June 2004: Governor Douglas Announces He Will Seek Reelection 
 
Months after Clavelle began his gubernatorial campaign, on June 28, 2004, 
Governor Douglas officially announced that he would seek reelection in November. 
Indicating the strategy that would define his campaign, Douglas focused on his first-term 
record as governor, particularly in terms of economic growth. To highlight this theme, 
Douglas’ announcement was held at SBE, Inc., an electronics manufacturer in Barre, 
Vermont, that had doubled its workforce since the beginning of Douglas’ governorship. 
Douglas boasted, “SBE electronics is an example of success because of the policies we 
put in place over the last seventeen months.”91 SBE Sales Manager Stuart Deliduka 
supported this claim, asserting “It is not coincidental that SBE has seen dramatic 
growth… at the same time Jim Douglas has been governor…. Jim equals jobs!”92
 Douglas went on to discuss his record of attempting major reforms of Acts 250 
and 60, increasing drug trafficking prosecutions, and procuring agricultural benefits. 
Somewhat surprisingly, he also highlighted party differences when criticizing Democrats 
in the state legislature for rejecting his proposed health care reforms. “I know the voters 
will remember that we had the opportunity to make these reforms, but Senate Democrats 
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blocked our efforts,” remarked Douglas. “They offered no alternative, and no regret, just 
obstruction and an unbending adherence to hand-me-down ideas.”93 This provocative jab 
at Democrats showed them that Douglas was not about to cede health care reform to his 
opponent, although Clavelle planned on making it his central campaign issue.  
 
Health Care Emerges as a Central Issue in the Gubernatorial Campaign 
For most of the gubernatorial campaign, Clavelle attempted to overcome 
Governor Douglas’ popularity by focusing narrowly on providing Vermonters with 
universal healthcare. Douglas’ plan for health care reform was a rather conventional, 
market-based approach. His primary objective was to heighten competition by attracting 
private insurers to Vermont. Douglas claimed that competition would lead to lower 
insurance premiums and reductions in the Medicaid rolls as private coverage became 
more affordable for Vermonters.  His plan stressed faith in the capability of the free 
market. He said, “I’m not in favor of a large, government-run, taxpayer-funded program. 
I believe the private sector can and will play a key role.”94 Douglas also advocated health 
savings accounts, initiatives to address chronic illness, and the promotion of healthy 
lifestyles, particularly among children. As the emphasis on children’s health indicated, 
Douglas’ plan focused on the long-term health care picture. “While Vermonters need 
temporary relief from health care costs,” he explained, “the only real long-term solution 
is to make sure people are taking care of themselves. Costs won’t shrink until people start 
taking better care of themselves.”95 Many agreed with the long-term perspective of his 
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approach; the Bennington Banner, for one, said Douglas’ plan provided the best hope for 
decreasing health care costs in the long term.  
 Clavelle dismissed Governor Douglas’ health care plan as timid, unimaginative, 
and overly reliant on the free market. He cited it as evidence of Douglas’ alliance with 
national Republicans, claiming his opponent “supports the standard GOP position that the 
public sector should not be involved in solving the health care problem.”96 In contrast, 
Clavelle proposed “Vermonters First,” a state-run program requiring all Vermonters to 
possess health insurance. According to Clavelle, the elimination of insurance premiums 
would yield $90 million to provide coverage for the poor. After controlling 
administrative costs, importing prescription drugs from Canada, and allowing small 
businesses to provide their own insurance, Clavelle would use the money saved from 
these adjustments to provide health insurance for low- to moderate-income Vermonters. 
The plan was intended as something more than a pragmatic solution to a Vermont 
problem, it was to be a national model for revolutionizing the health care system. “I 
believe Vermont can lead the country,” Clavelle declared proudly. “We can provide 
health care to all citizens at a price they can afford.”97 
The Douglas campaign tried aggressively to discredit Clavelle’s Vermonters First 
program. Governor Douglas charged that a state-run health care program would be 
bureaucratic and unaffordable. His campaign also raised persistent questions about how 
Vermonters First would be funded. “That money is going to come from somewhere,” said 
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Lunderville, skeptically. “It’s going to be a tax increase in the end.”98 Indeed, the 
Brattleboro Reformer, in its endorsement of Clavelle, conceded that his health care plan 
might lead to additional taxes.99 It is worth noting that even the Democratic leadership 
was not enthusiastic about Clavelle’s plan. After Douglas’ victory in November, the 
Democratic House majority leader declined to advance Clavelle’s health care proposals 
in the state legislature, although he was unsatisfied with Douglas’ plan as well. 
 
Prominent Issues in the Gubernatorial Campaign 
Education, energy policy, environment, taxes, and prescription drug reimportation 
emerged as other prominent issues in the gubernatorial campaign. Most of these issues 
followed a consistent pattern in which Governor Douglas touted his first-term record 
while Clavelle criticized it and accused him of being beholden to President Bush and 
national Republicans. For example, on education Douglas boasted about the passage of 
Act 68, which lowered tax rates in most Vermont communities while increasing them in 
towns and cities with greater property wealth. These costs were covered by raising the 
sales tax one percent, thereby helping to wean the state off its reliance on property taxes 
for revenue, according to Douglas. Douglas claimed that 83% of school districts saw a 
reduction in their tax rates as a result of this measure.100 Clavelle’s criticisms focused on 
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issues of national prominence. He attacked Douglas for not opposing the federal No 
Child Left Behind Act, over which other states had initiated lawsuits. Clavelle also 
claimed that Douglas’ “support of unfettered school choice would threaten small schools 
and widen the educational gaps between those Vermonters with ample financial resources 
and those struggling to make ends meet.”101 
In terms of energy policy, Governor Douglas’ stated goal was to “promote 
development and use of renewable energy by facilitating collaboration and market-based 
incentives that encourage employees and residents to install these alternatives.”102 To that 
end he noted that his administration had provided $1 million to 200 renewable energy 
systems in Vermont.103 Clavelle condemned Douglas’ energy policy as ineffective, often 
repeating the suggestion that Vice President Cheney and national oil magnates had 
written it. For his part, Clavelle recommended that Vermont acquire and operate 
hydroelectric facilities in the state to provide cheaper, cleaner sources of energy. 
 The environment is always an issue of great importance in Vermont. Conscious of 
the strong displeasure with President Bush’s environmental policy, even among state 
Republicans, the Douglas campaign often touted a lawsuit the state had filed against the 
Bush Administration to address pollution from coal-fired power plants in the Midwestern 
United States. Governor Douglas also frequently pointed to efforts to reduce phosphorus 
levels in Lake Champlain, whereas Clavelle advocated total removal of phosphorus from 
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the lake. Clavelle claimed that Douglas lacked a clear long-term vision for Vermont’s 
environmental status. Clavelle also alleged that Douglas’ attachment to business interests 
obstructed his commitment to environmental safety. 
 On tax policy, Clavelle proposed using more taxes to fund education by lowering 
property taxes and relying more on income taxes. Governor Douglas claimed that 
Clavelle’s plans would lead to significant tax increases. “To pay for all public education 
with the income tax would require a tripling of the income tax rates that you now pay,” 
Douglas said at an election debate.104 Acknowledging the fact that Act 68 raised the sales 
tax, Douglas compared his one tax hike to the forty such proposals he claimed that 
Clavelle had made. “I think forty [tax increase proposals] versus one is a major message 
that the people of Vermont will weigh when they decide who’s best prepared to provide 
fiscal leadership and responsibility to the state over the next two years,” Douglas 
contended.105 Moreover, anticipating the election contest ahead, Douglas had made tax 
cuts the focus of his second State of the State address, in January 2004. In his speech, 
Douglas proposed substantial personal and corporate income tax reductions and 
advocated the elimination of tax loopholes and exemptions to help balance the state 
budget.  
 Prescription drug reimportation was another prominent topic in the campaign. In 
August 2004 the federal Food and Drug Administration denied authorization for the 
reimportation of prescription drugs to the United States from Canada, and Vermont 
became the first state to sue the federal government over this ruling. Governor Douglas 
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used this lawsuit prominently as evidence that he was willing to oppose the Bush 
Administration when it served Vermont’s interests. Clavelle rebutted this claim on the 
grounds that Douglas was too cautious in opposing the federal policy. Clavelle cited a 
program he had started in Burlington, whereby city employees and families could buy 
prescription drugs from Canadian pharmacies. During the campaign, Clavelle even 
posted a link on his website to this service so that all Vermonters could obtain 
prescription drugs from Canada. He believed that the governor should pursue such 
methods to ensure affordable prescription drugs for Vermonters, regardless of federal 
policy. 
 
Early Campaign Advertisements 
Early campaign advertisements help to identify the campaign strategies being 
used by both sides to draw voters’ attention and define the election. Early advertisements 
in the Douglas-Clavelle race were designed to weaken the opponent through negative 
attacks. In late July, Clavelle released the first television ad of the campaign, focusing on 
prescription drugs and Governor Douglas’ ties to President Bush. In the ad, Clavelle 
lamented that “Jim” was “dragging his feet, preventing Vermont from buying safe, lower-
cost prescription drugs from Canada, waiting until George Bush says it’s okay.” As 
Clavelle concluded, “We don’t need to wait around for Jim and George,” the camera 
zoomed in on a car with two bumper stickers, one for Douglas and the other for Bush-
Cheney.106 
Within days of the Clavelle ad’s airing, the Douglas campaign released an 
Internet ad targeting Clavelle’s tax policies. In the ad, a driver pulls his car up to 
“Clavelle’s Restaurant,” hoping to order fast food. To his surprise, he is instead 
bombarded by a list of tax increases made or considered by Clavelle as mayor of 
Burlington, including property, small business, and gasoline taxes. Finally, the customer 
drives away disgustedly, to the jingle: “Higher taxes at Pete Clavelle’s!”107 The Douglas 
campaign e-mailed the ad, which it claimed to be the first Internet ad in Vermont’s 
political history, to its supporters and made it available on its campaign website.  
 
Early Campaign Tours 
While Clavelle began his campaign tours early to overcome his lack of statewide 
familiarity, Governor Douglas began campaigning aggressively in August 2004. That 
month his campaign began airing television advertisements statewide, focusing on his 
first-term accomplishments and second-term goals. The advertisements were designed to 
coincide with his statewide “Promise of Vermont” tour, which visited fifty communities 
and each county. The tour allowed Douglas to promote his administration’s record on job 
growth, education spending, tax cuts, health care, illegal drug prosecution, environmental 
protection, and farming benefits. The confident, optimistic tenor of the tour was captured 
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in its slogan: “We have. We can. We will.” The contrast to Clavelle’s campaigning struck 
many observers. According to Associated Press reporter Ross Sneyd,  
The launch of Douglas’ campaign illustrated the very different approaches the two men 
[Douglas and Clavelle] are taking. Douglas spends his time talking about a long list of 
accomplishments from his first two years in office, listing additional challenges the state 
faces and promising to tackle them if re-elected… Unlike Douglas, though, [Clavelle] 
focused on a single issue in [his recent] tour, talking about the shortcomings in the state’s 
health care system, especially the lack of affordable, prescription drugs.108
The Clavelle campaign was defensive about the perception that it was running on a single 
issue. Spokesman B.J. Rogers said, “It’s not that we’ve only been talking about health 
care,” stressing Clavelle’s discussion of energy, environment, farming, and education 
policies. Yet Sneyd maintained, “Up to now, voters primarily have heard from Clavelle 
on two topics… escalating health care costs and [Douglas’] ties to President Bush.”109 As 
the campaign progressed, the latter assumed a more prominent role. 
 
National Politics Gain Prominence in the Late Campaign Period 
As the gubernatorial campaign entered its later phases, the issues turned 
increasingly toward national politics. Clavelle had discussed the links between Governor 
Douglas and the Bush Administration through the early part of the campaign, but as his 
universal health care plan failed to generate momentum, Clavelle began relying on the 
Bush-Douglas connection to rescue his candidacy. The evidence suggests that Clavelle 
was largely unsuccessful in establishing a meaningful connection between the Republican 
gubernatorial and presidential candidates, in voters’ minds. This failure must be 
understood in part as a product of the Douglas campaign’s successful counterstrategies. 
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Clavelle’s Attempts to Tie Governor Douglas to President Bush 
 
The Clavelle campaign believed that President Bush’s unpopularity in Vermont 
could damage Governor Douglas’ popularity, if the two were effectively linked in the 
public’s perception. Indeed, Sneyd wrote, “A major part of Clavelle’s campaign strategy 
is built on the assumption that the president is among the most unpopular figures in the 
state.”110 Convinced that the strategy of invoking national politics in a state election 
would influence the campaign in his favor, Clavelle began “speaking of the two [Bush 
and Douglas] whenever possible.”111 His campaign produced and distributed bumper 
stickers reading “Jim = George,” and in late August the Clavelle campaign released an 
Internet advertisement attacking Douglas’ chairmanship of the Vermont Bush-Cheney 
campaign. In the ad, a photo of Douglas is superimposed on a cartoon character dressed 
in a business suit covered by chaps and donning a cowboy hat. In a thick Texas accent, 
Douglas’ character drawls, “I’m the head honcho of the Bush-Cheney campaign. Don’t 
you all go telling Vermonters, now.”112 The ad goes on to list Bush Administration 
policies against which it contends that Douglas should have voiced opposition, including 
Medicare reforms, which allegedly cost 13,000 Vermonters their state pharmaceutical 
assistance; prescription drug reimportation, which he should have opposed beyond the 
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state lawsuit; the Bush tax cuts, which allegedly cost Vermont $92 million otherwise 
destined for education, housing, and environment funding. In fact, throughout the 
campaign, Clavelle chastised Douglas for failing to oppose a number of federal policies, 
including the three mentioned above, the Iraq war, the No Child Left Behind Act, and the 
Bush Administration’s environmental policy in general. At one debate, Clavelle 
demanded in vain that Douglas resign as the Vermont Bush-Cheney campaign chairman 
in order to express his opposition to federal environmental policies. 
 The Douglas campaign countered Clavelle’s efforts to link Governor Douglas 
with President Bush by emphasizing the Republicans’ differences and questioning the 
relevance of national politics to a gubernatorial campaign. Douglas distinguished himself 
from Bush and other Republicans, arguing “No two people agree with their political 
colleagues or spouses all the time. The Republican Party is bigger than any one 
individual and I look forward to continuing to play a role in it.”113 Lunderville dismissed 
national political discussions as a distraction from state issues that a governor can affect. 
He said, “I don’t think Vermonters like these playground tactics of who’s friends with 
whom. Vermonters are looking for a leader who will create jobs, bring about real health 
care reforms, bring down taxes and combat illegal drugs.”114 It is interesting to note that 
in responding to criticisms of Douglas for being too close to Bush, Douglas and his 
campaign did not attempt to defend Bush and his policies. Instead they dismissed 
discussions of national issues as irrelevant. Since they were unlikely to redeem Bush in 
the opinion of most Vermonters, it was probably the best decision to challenge anti-Bush 
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criticisms on the basis of their relevance to the gubernatorial campaign rather than 
debating the merits of Bush’s policies. 
 The Douglas campaign found it necessary to distance itself from President Bush 
on only one issue. In Spring 2004, the campaign conducted polls to determine whether 
Bush’s unpopularity among Vermonters in any policy areas impacted Governor Douglas’ 
popularity in the state. It found this to be the case only in terms of environmental policy. 
Accordingly, Douglas and his campaign made deliberate efforts to inoculate him against 
negative associations with Bush Administration environmental policy, particularly by 
highlighting Vermont’s lawsuit against the federal government over Midwest coal 
pollution. On the campaign trail, Douglas boasted of his administration, “We protected 
our environment and backed legal action against the Bush Administration when they 
wouldn’t protect our air and water.”115 One of Douglas’ earliest advertisements focused 
on this lawsuit. Hence, the Douglas campaign clearly recognized the potential negative 
effects of association with an unpopular president, but it did not condemn Bush or 
attempt to divorce Douglas from support for Bush and his policies, in most cases. In 
terms of putting distance between the Republican gubernatorial and presidential 
candidates, Lunderville said, “We might have been putting yards, but where the 
conventional wisdom would say put football fields in-between you and the unpopular 
candidate.”116 
The Douglas Campaign’s Strategy to Discredit Clavelle 
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Cognizant that Governor Douglas’ reputation as a moderate Republican was key 
to his electoral success, a major aspect of the Douglas campaign strategy was to discredit 
his opponent as an ideological extremist. In early August 2004, the Douglas campaign 
released news accounts of Clavelle’s participation in a 1989 march commemorating the 
tenth anniversary of the overthrow of Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza by Daniel 
Ortega’s communist Sandinistas. “This is clearly a reflection of [Clavelle’s] ideological 
commitments,” Barnett commented at the time. “He’s not moderate…. Make no mistake: 
Peter Clavelle is trying to portray himself as something very different than he is. He’s a 
left-wing extremist.”117 He went on to justify the story’s release as an appropriate 
response to Clavelle’s injection of national politics into the gubernatorial race.  
From day one, Peter Clavelle has engineered a negative campaign based on political 
affiliations…. If that’s the campaign he wants to run, then it’s only fair that he should 
have to account for his own highly objectionable affiliations that show him to be out of 
the mainstream of Vermont for Republicans and Democrats alike.118 
The Douglas campaign was sharply criticized among Vermont media for using the story 
to discredit Clavelle, and Douglas quickly backed off of the tactic, claiming that he had 
not officially “signed off” on it. He also reiterated his intention to run on his first-term 
record. Observers cited this episode as evidence of state party organizations’ usefulness 
in communicating their candidates’ messages. “That’s smart,” said Professor Grover. 
“Your attack dog is the guy who’s not going to be elected, which is Barnett.”119 The 
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advantage of having state political parties and their operatives involved in the campaign, 
Barnett echoed, is that there are  
things that we’re able to do because we’re not the candidate. We’re able to push 
messages that the candidate might otherwise be uncomfortable doing personally, but that 
are important to help educate the voters with regard to your opponent’s own record. So 
candidates like to stay above the fray and take the high ground, and political parties can 
sometimes be useful in delivering a message of contrast with the opponent.120
Releasing the Sandinista story might be seen as a dangerous 
move on the part of the Douglas campaign, inviting a battle over 
candidate ideology that would seem to favor liberal Clavelle among 
Vermonters. It also distracted from Governor Douglas’ otherwise 
steady focus on pragmatic governance. Yet the strategy was useful, 
according to several campaign participants and observers. They said it 
helped to discredit Clavelle among moderate Democrats and 
Independents who might have preferred a candidate whom they 
perceived to be a moderate Republican to a liberal radical. Professor 
Grover described the release of the Sandinista story as a “dirty… but 
brilliant” tactic by the Douglas campaign. He explained, “The target 
audience for a statement like that is probably going to be uncertain 
Democrats who wonder whether Clavelle is the real McCoy or not…. 
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[A] statement like that… stoke[s] the fires of doubt among potential 
Clavelle supporters.”121 Barnett affirmed this assessment, noting:  
Even in the Democratic Party there were divisions over whether or not Clavelle was a 
real Democrat or he was too far left, and things like his marching with pro-Communist 
Sandinistas is a message that, even though the press did not receive it well, I think there 
were plenty of Vermonters [for whom] it solidified in their minds that this guy is not a 
mainstream politician.122 
Barnett conceded that ideological battles were risky for the Douglas campaign, but he 
maintained that exploiting an opponent’s vulnerabilities, ideological or otherwise, is “just 
pragmatic politics.”123 The strategy had its limits, though. Lunderville cautioned that 
ideology was never meant by the Douglas campaign to be its centerpiece and should only 
be discussed to a limited extent by a candidate in Douglas’ partisan circumstances.
 In late September, the Douglas campaign made perhaps its most effective move to 
discredit Clavelle when it released a television commercial focusing on his universal 
health care plan. The ad was a sixty-second excerpt from Clavelle’s September 15, 2004, 
press conference introducing his Vermonters First program. He struggled to clearly 
explain his program at that press conference, often stuttering and fumbling for words. In 
the third week of September, the Douglas campaign released its ad. After witnessing its 
initial effectiveness, the campaign pulled all other ads to run the health care spot 
exclusively. Barnett and Lunderville cited the release of this advertisement as the 
strategic maneuver that finished the Clavelle campaign. According to Lunderville, after 
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assuming the campaign chairmanship in June he received at least one phone call from 
media representatives every day, except on holidays, to discuss the campaign. After 
running the health care ad, he claimed that he received no more than three phone calls 
from media representatives until Election Day. “Suddenly, the environment changed,” 
Lunderville recalled, “everybody was like ‘The bubble’s burst, there’s really no race 
here…. The ad had eviscerated the opponent, there’s really no chance for recovery.’”124 
Barnett believed that the health care ad was effective because it convinced voters 
with reservations about Governor Douglas that his opponent was nonetheless unqualified 
to take over as governor. “[Clavelle] was not perceived to be an articulate or even 
particularly competent manager once Vermonters got a look at his performance during 
that particular press conference that we put on the air…. [Voters] didn’t view him as a 
compelling alternative,” Barnett explained.125 The ad’s release marked the turning point 
in a campaign that Clavelle had previously waged mainly on health care. “[The Clavelle 
campaign] had a winning issue in health care,” according to Lunderville. 
Health care really was the number one issue in the campaign – they made it the number 
one issue in the campaign. They did a good job with that.… [But] because [Clavelle] 
couldn’t explain his own healthcare plan, he stopped talking about the only issue where 
he was doing better than the Governor, and started talking about an issue that was 
completely disconnected from the governor’s race, which was the Iraq war.126 
Clavelle Focuses Narrowly on the Iraq War in the Campaign’s Last Month
After failing to gain traction against Governor Douglas over health care and other 
issues contested during the campaign, Clavelle focused almost exclusively in the last 
month on Douglas’ unwillingness to oppose the Iraq war. Although governors do not 
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make foreign policy or declare or execute war, Clavelle argued that governors’ alignment 
with their constituents on major issues such as war were symbolically important. “I think 
you have a rightful expectation that a chief elected official of the state of Vermont on this 
critical issue of war will be with the people of the state of Vermont, not blindly following 
the Bush Administration,” Clavelle declaimed.127 He contended that the Iraq war was 
relevant to the governor’s race because 1,100 to 1,200 Vermont National Guardsmen 
were placed on alert and, according to the Massachusetts-based think tank National 
Priorities Project, the war had cost Vermont $23 million that otherwise would have been 
available to spend on health care, housing, and education.  
Governor Douglas rejected Clavelle’s invocation of the Iraq war in the 
gubernatorial election. During a radio debate, he responded to Clavelle’s arguments, with 
“an edge of anger in his voice,” saying “What I hear Vermonters want us to talk about is 
what we can do, what things the governor of the state can do…. That’s what I’m talking 
about; that’s not what you’re talking about, Pete. You don’t have anything to offer.” 
Lunderville amplified Douglas’ objection, telling media, “It seems that Peter Clavelle has 
abandoned his race for governor and is now focusing solely on national policy and 
national politics. It’s a last-ditch strategic move to turn the debate off of the issues that a 
governor can affect right here in Vermont.”128 Perhaps Clavelle pressed the Iraq war 
hoping that Douglas would run afoul of Vermonters with a vigorous defense of the 
President and the war. Douglas and his campaign, however, continued to respond by 
dismissing discussions of national politics as irrelevant, while they remained focused on 
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state issues. This is one instance in which different gubernatorial campaign strategies, 
demonstrating less focus and restraint, might have jeopardized Douglas’ candidacy.  
Assessing the Relevance of the 2004 Presidential Election to the Vermont 
Gubernatorial Election 
 
On November 2, 2004, Governor Douglas was reelected over Peter Clavelle by a 
landslide margin of 59% to 38%. Analysis of polling and election data provide a 
fascinating opportunity to evaluate the impact of the presidential election on the 
simultaneous Vermont gubernatorial election. Certainly, if presidential politics had the 
capacity to influence any gubernatorial election, this was the one; Vermonters turned out 
in record numbers to support Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry by a 20-point 
landslide, and Peter Clavelle made Douglas’ support of President Bush and the Iraq war 
one of the central issues of the campaign, particularly in its last month. Yet data and 
observations suggest that the 2004 presidential election did not significantly influence 
voters’ decisions in that year’s Vermont gubernatorial election, although it clearly had an 
impact on mobilizing voters. 
 
Data Suggest that the 2004 Presidential Election Did Not Significantly Influence the 
Vermont Gubernatorial Election 
 
A Research 2000 poll conducted from October 10-12, 2004, found 51% of likely 
voters supporting Governor Douglas in the gubernatorial race and 37% supporting Peter 
Clavelle.129 It was precisely around these dates, and particularly in the following week, 
that Clavelle shifted his campaign focus from health care and other state issues to the Iraq 
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war. If national issues had potency, data should have indicated a movement toward 
Clavelle over the last month of the campaign, since he was running in a state where the 
war was extremely unpopular. Instead, Clavelle gained only one percentage point by the 
November 2nd election over the October poll, whereas Douglas gained eight. Moreover, 
the same October poll had Senator Kerry leading President Bush 53% to 40% in 
Vermont, but Kerry gained six points over the next month and Bush lost one. Voters did 
not move consistently toward Republican or Democratic candidates, or toward 
challengers or incumbents. These facts demonstrate that Vermont voters distinguished 
among elections and candidates, thereby discounting categorical coattail explanations of 
the gubernatorial election and defying the expectations of the Clavelle campaign. Despite 
the Clavelle campaign’s attempts to tie Douglas to Bush and the Iraq war, four in ten 
Vermont voters supported Douglas at the same time that they supported Kerry, and one-
quarter of voters identifying themselves as “strongly opposed” to the Iraq war supported 
Douglas.130 
Campaign Observers and Participants Suggest that the 2004 Presidential Election Did 
Not Significantly Influence the Vermont Gubernatorial Election 
 
At the outset of the 2004 Vermont gubernatorial race, the Douglas campaign 
conducted a poll to test whether Governor Douglas’ relationship with President Bush 
made respondents more or less likely to vote for the former. According to Lunderville, 
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the poll indicated “It really had no effect.”131 The subsequent campaign reinforced this 
finding. “The strategy of tying a gubernatorial race to a presidential campaign didn’t fly,” 
said Professor Davis. “Vermont voters realize that the state government does not make 
decisions affecting foreign policy, the federal deficit, and other national issues.”132 
Lunderville echoed Professor Davis’ sentiments, stressing the voters’ ability to 
distinguish between state and national issues and offices. “Don’t underestimate the 
voter,” Lunderville warned. 
Voters understand the governor cannot call the troops back [from war]. Voters 
understand the governor can wear a black armband around the state house but that is not 
going to effectively change what the president’s doing on the Iraq war, it doesn’t matter. 
People want to know, how are you going to fix health care? How are you going to lower 
my property taxes? They don’t want to know what you’re going to do to protest the Iraq 
war.133 
Douglas acknowledged that gubernatorial involvement in national 
decisions was sometimes warranted when it affected his state, but not 
in all cases.  
If [an issue] affects Vermont I’d certainly speak up, like the budget priorities in 
Washington or other decisions that have a direct impact on what we do here. But just this 
whole notion of, ‘The governor’s got to get us out of Iraq,’ or ‘The governor’s got to do 
something that’s clearly in the national or international arena,’ voters just don’t buy 
that.134 
In some ways the presidential race indeed seemed to impact the gubernatorial 
race. Some voters explained their vote for Clavelle in terms of opposition to President 
Bush and national Republicans. For example, David Worthley, of Waitsfield, said he was 
voting for Kerry and Clavelle because “I think we need change all over.” Greg Haynes, 
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of Duxbury, explained, “I am disillusioned and disappointed with Republicans.” As a 
result, he said he would be voting the straight Democratic ticket.135 Moreover, state 
Democratic officials used voter enthusiasm for Kerry’s candidacy to highlight other 
Democratic candidacies. Democratic spokesman Mark Michaud recalled supporters 
visiting party headquarters to pick up a Kerry lawn sign, only to leave with several other 
Democratic candidates’ lawn signs as well. “We’ve been able to generate a lot of 
volunteer energy from a lot of people,” he said.136 Yet this enthusiasm for Kerry’s 
candidacy and antipathy towards Bush’s was not reflected in the results of the 
gubernatorial election. 
 
The Presidential Election’s Effect on Turnout 
 
How is a presidential election supposed to impact a simultaneous 
gubernatorial election? Typically, its impact is discussed in terms of 
prejudicing voters for or against a gubernatorial candidate based on 
whether he shares the political affiliation of their preferred presidential 
candidate.137 Barnett believed this was the Clavelle strategy, to 
persuade anti-Bush moderate Democrats and Independents that 
Governor Douglas was very closely aligned with Bush and therefore 
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undeserving of their votes. The Douglas campaign, for the most part, 
was unconcerned that this strategy would work; instead, said Barnett, 
Our concern was that with the presidential race, not that voters would necessarily 
associate Douglas with Bush, per the Clavelle strategy, but that turnout may be so high 
among Democrats, partisan Democrats eager to vote Bush out, that that could have the 
effect of swallowing the governor’s campaign as well. So it wouldn’t be that middle-of-
the-road voters were being convinced that Jim Douglas was George Bush incarnate, but 
rather that heavy turnout amongst extreme partisans would engulf the governor’s 
campaign, to a degree.138 
Yet even with record turnout in the state and a groundswell of support for Kerry’s 
candidacy, turnout driven by the presidential election did not have the effect of 
“swallowing” the gubernatorial election.139 
Why Did Vermont Voters Reelect Governor Douglas? 
The above analysis provides the basis for determining the primary factors for 
Governor Douglas’ overwhelming reelection at the same time that his party’s presidential 
candidate lost in Vermont by a landslide defeat. Many theories already exist as to the 
primary, or even the exclusive, explanation for Douglas’ victory, namely voter 
independence, candidate organization, and incumbency. While these factors appear to 
have played important roles in Douglas’ reelection, they cannot provide a comprehensive 
explanation for it. 
 
Voter Independence 
Vermont had perhaps the most independent electorate in the United States at the 
time of Governor Douglas’ reelection. Though justly regarded as a politically liberal 
state, it was certainly not beholden to the Democratic Party. Indeed, it was served by the 
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only two Independents in the U.S. Congress, Senator Jim Jeffords and Representative 
Bernie Sanders. Vermont also elected Republicans to three of its six statewide offices. To 
some observers, Vermont’s independent voting habits were indicative of a preference for 
divided government; Professor Davis attributed Douglas’ reelection to this. Douglas 
suggested that Vermonters’ independent voting habits were linked to its history of 
independent attitudes, going back to its fourteen-year existence as an independent 
republic before joining the United States after the Revolutionary War. He also noted that 
many Vermonters historically had lived in the relative seclusion of countryside, hillsides, 
and farms, so that they had been independent in many of their habits.140 His is an 
inadequate explanation, though, since the most politically influential Vermonters in 2004 
were the left-leaning immigrants who typically did not share the history he described.  
 
Candidate Organization 
Vermont’s party system is notoriously weak. Party staffs are small, only 1,000 
signatures are required for candidates to get on state ballots, and there is no party 
registration, meaning voters can participate in whatever party primary they prefer. 
Consequently, “Candidate organizations are more important than party organizations,” 
said Professor Davis.141 Professor Nelson, who has written extensively on the subject of 
personal political followings in Vermont, described the state Republican Party as “far 
better organized” and “coherent” in its messages than the state Democratic Party, yet still 
weaker and less financially reliable than other states’ parties. This weakness is largely 
attributable to Vermont’s stringent campaign finance laws. By 2004, Governor Douglas 
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had built a strong political following based largely on his moderate image, familiarity 
with voters, and personal likeability. His entrenched position in Vermont politics 
presented Clavelle with a substantial challenge as he attempted to change Vermonters’ 
minds about Douglas and cut into his high approval ratings. Barnett argued,  
The bottom line is, it’s very difficult to demonize someone whose constituents know him 
so well. So when you run into a situation like we had here with an unpopular president, 
it’s a natural strategy for Democrats to link a Republican candidate to that unpopular 
figure, but because of Governor Douglas’ long history here and his familiarity to the 
people, that was exceedingly difficult for them to do and it ultimately failed badly.142 
Perhaps if Clavelle had established a loyal statewide following prior to the gubernatorial 
election he could have more seriously challenged Douglas. 
 
Incumbency 
Incumbency was certainly an important, and some believe the crucial, factor 
influencing Governor Douglas’ reelection. Since the introduction of the two-year 
gubernatorial term in Vermont in 1870, only Governor Ray Keyser, Jr., in 1962, was 
defeated for reelection. The two-year term forces governors to campaign constantly, 
using their high profile to communicate achievements and goals. Douglas deliberately 
took advantage of this opportunity in the way he conducted his first term. Barnett said, 
“Governor Douglas is a firm believer that good policy makes good politics. [Campaign] 
strategy obviously plays an important role, but part of that strategy is to be a good 
governor. And that’s first and foremost.”143 Observers and voters seem to have shared 
Douglas’ opinion of his first-term record as a sound basis for reelection; newspapers 
endorsing his candidacy attributed their support primarily to his gubernatorial 
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performance, and three-quarters of voters who considered themselves “better off” than 
four years before voted for Douglas.144 
While incumbency undoubtedly was an important factor in the 2004 Vermont 
gubernatorial election, there is a tendency to overstate its value so as to make Governor 
Douglas’ reelection appear to have been a fait accompli. The notion that Douglas’ 
incumbency was sufficient to explain his reelection does not withstand scrutiny. The 
power of incumbency in Vermont does not explain the fact that incumbent State Auditor 
Elizabeth Reedy was defeated for reelection on the same ballot in which Vermonters 
reelected Douglas. Moreover, the two-year term frequently cited to explain Vermont’s 
penchant for reelecting governors provided no protection for New Hampshire Republican 
Governor Craig Benson, who was defeated for reelection in 2004 by Democratic 
candidate John Lynch, after two years in the governorship. It is also counterintuitive to 
claim that Vermont’s electorate, the only one in the nation to elect Independent 
congressmen, would be so adverse to change and deferential to the political establishment 
as to return to office governors who would be unacceptable if not for their incumbent 
status.  
 
Do These Factors Explain Governor Douglas’ Reelection? 
 
Attributing Governor Douglas’ reelection to any of the above factors appears to 
be unwarranted. “It’s not just… that people think [Douglas] should have a four-year term 
versus a two-year term,” argued Lunderville. Moreover, because of his personal appeal, 
“Jim Douglas started from a higher platform than a no-name Republican would…. But 
that platform alone didn’t give him the margin of victory, it just enabled him to start from 
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a higher level.”145 It is difficult to determine exactly what value these factors had in 
determining Douglas’ reelection. Certainly, each one was important and one may indeed 
have been decisive. There is no conclusive way to measure this. Given the facts that 
Douglas attracted near-majority support before the campaign even began, according to 
above cited job performance and favorability ratings, and his opponent was virtually 
unknown throughout much of Vermont, it appears that Douglas’ reelection was very 
likely from the outset. Yet did this make the gubernatorial campaign irrelevant?  
The Role of Gubernatorial Campaign Strategies in Determining the 2004 Vermont 
Gubernatorial Election 
 
The 2004 Vermont gubernatorial campaign does not appear to have been 
irrelevant. It was entirely possible, after all, for the Douglas campaign to misuse 
Governor Douglas’ electoral advantages; most observers believed that the Clavelle 
campaign squandered its advantages by inadequately discussing Clavelle’s mayoral 
record and de-emphasizing health care and other state issues in order to debate national 
politics. The Douglas campaign, on the other hand, presented what many regarded as an 
effective, coherent strategy essential to explaining Douglas’ reelection. The decisive 
break towards Douglas at the end of the campaign suggests that the election results were 
shaped well after the campaign began, thanks in large part to the Douglas campaign’s 
strategies. 
 
Coordination Between the Douglas Campaign and the Vermont Republican Party 
Governor Douglas had an effective, well-coordinated campaign operation. 
Heeding the widespread notion that Vermont party organizations are weak and less 
consequential than candidate organizations, the Douglas campaign essentially combined 
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the two into a single organization. The Douglas campaign operated out of the Vermont 
Republican Party headquarters, with Party Chairman Barnett and Campaign Chairman 
Lunderville sharing an office. According to Lunderville, “The Governor’s campaign and 
the party worked very closely together. They worked hand-in-glove through the 2004 
campaign.”146 
Contributions of the Vermont Republican Party  
 
Barnett described political parties as “serv[ing] a good complementary role for the 
candidate” in gubernatorial elections.147 This was certainly the case with the Sandinista 
episode, when Barnett, who in an above quote cited the unique role of the state party in 
“push[ing] messages that the candidate might otherwise be uncomfortable doing 
personally,” took the lead in attacking Clavelle’s ideology. The integration of Douglas’ 
party and campaign organizations also alleviated significant financial burdens. In a state 
with some of the most stringent campaign finance laws in the nation, where candidates 
could receive no more than $400 from any single source for each two-year election cycle, 
the Vermont Republican Party covered many of the Douglas campaign’s overhead 
expenses, including rent, supplies, and telephone services. Governor Douglas was also 
able to receive funds through the state party that could not be raised legally by his 
campaign.148 
The Douglas Campaign’s Monetary Advantage 
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The Douglas campaign’s coordination helped give it a substantial monetary 
advantage over its opponent. Governor Douglas consistently topped Clavelle in campaign 
funds, and outspent him on advertisements. Entering the last week of the election, 
Douglas had $83,115 on-hand, to Clavelle’s $60,935.149 After the election, the Douglas 
campaign still held $56,655 while the Clavelle campaign ended $30,697 in debt.150 The 
financial disparity between the campaigns was especially apparent in terms of 
advertising; two weeks before the election, the Douglas campaign had spent nearly 
$200,000 on advertisements while the Clavelle campaign had spent only $126,533.151 
Clavelle’s inability to spend $20,000 to $30,000 per week on advertisements, particularly 
as a relatively unknown challenger to a popular governor, made it very difficult to run a 
“credible campaign,” according to Professor Davis.152 Professor Nelson described 
Clavelle’s fundraising challenges as general to his party, rather than specific to Clavelle’s 
campaign. He explained,  
The Democratic Party organization in Vermont is extraordinarily weak and statewide 
candidates have generally ignored it when conducting their campaigns. That is why so 
many Democrats operate their personal campaigns – fundraising and campaign 
advertising – separate from the state party organization. 
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On the other hand, said Professor Nelson, “The Republicans are far better organized and 
try to maintain a coherent message.”153 Professor Nelson’s analysis is certainly supported 
by evidence from the 2004 Vermont gubernatorial election.  
Evaluating the Significance of Douglas Campaign Strategies 
 
Although campaign strategies of the gubernatorial candidate and his state party 
organization are often ignored as primary factors in Governor Douglas’ reelection, there 
is good reason to regard them as essential contributors to his victory. The preceding 
discussion highlights the structural advantages presented by the coordination of the 
Vermont Republican Party and the Douglas campaign. Their coordination helped to raise 
campaign funds, advertise the candidate, and maintain a consistent, coherent message, all 
of which exceeded the performance of the Clavelle campaign. In terms of actual strategy, 
the Douglas campaign was effective in maximizing its candidate’s strengths and 
exploiting its opponent’s vulnerabilities. The Douglas campaign understood from the 
outset that Douglas’ first-term record was his most potent electoral asset, particularly 
because it highlighted his pragmatism over his ideology in a state where Republican 
ideology was unpopular. Douglas’ announcement at the electronics manufacturer site, his 
initial campaign advertisements, and his statewide tour in August immediately 
demonstrated his campaign’s intention to focus on state issues and, with few exceptions, 
his first-term record. The Douglas campaign also compensated for President Bush’s 
impending loss in Vermont in the simultaneous presidential election. It polled 
Vermonters to assess the significance of the Governor’s relationship with the President, 
and whether unpopular federal policies might taint the former’s popularity. Finding only 
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that the Bush Administration’s environmental policies were likely to damage Douglas’ 
popularity, Douglas noticeably distanced himself from these policies; he discussed 
Vermont’s lawsuit over coal pollution in campaign speeches, and his campaign aired 
advertisements highlighting the lawsuit. 
The Douglas campaign only shifted its focus from Governor Douglas’ first-term 
record when seeking to discredit its opponent, Peter Clavelle. The first significant effort 
to discredit Clavelle was the release of the Sandinista story in early August, which the 
Douglas campaign believed was necessary to expose Clavelle as a radical ideologue 
rather than a center-left pragmatist. Even observers who regarded this as an unfair attack, 
such as Professor Grover, affirmed its usefulness in discrediting Clavelle, particularly 
given many Democrats’ skepticism about his party credentials.  
In addition to discrediting Clavelle over ideology, the Douglas campaign 
discredited Clavelle’s central policy proposal for universal health care coverage. The 
Douglas campaign’s exclusive airing of its health care advertisement beginning in late 
September and Lunderville’s recollection of an immediate and dramatic decrease in 
media interest in the gubernatorial race afterwards, suggest that the campaign was 
successful in discrediting Clavelle on the basis of his proposals as well as his ideology. 
Indeed, Professor Davis said Clavelle realized at this time that he would not win the 
election and, with nothing else to lose, shifted his focus to criticizing Governor Douglas’ 
unwillingness to oppose the Iraq war.154 
Finally, the Douglas campaign effectively countered many of Clavelle’s attacks 
on Governor Douglas, particularly regarding Douglas’ support of President Bush and the 
Iraq war. Instead of engaging these issues, on which Vermonters heavily sided with 
 
154 Davis, op cit., December 6, 2005. 
Clavelle over Douglas, the Douglas campaign dismissed them as irrelevant to the 
functions of a governor. Data and observations indicate that voters did not perceive 
national issues as relevant to the gubernatorial campaign. Consequently, it appears that 
the Douglas campaign responded wisely to Clavelle’s efforts, by emphasizing state issues 
and declining to vigorously defend President Bush and his policies.  
 
To What Extent Did Gubernatorial Campaign Strategies Influence the Election 
Results? 
 
In terms of structure and strategies, the Douglas campaign and the Vermont 
Republican Party seem to have devised an effective, well-coordinated gubernatorial 
campaign. Were gubernatorial campaign strategies, then, the primary factors affecting 
state voter choice of a Republican gubernatorial candidate at the same time that they 
selected a Democratic presidential candidate? The available election data make this 
impossible to determine conclusively. Exit polls taken in Vermont in 2004 did not ask 
voters whether gubernatorial campaign strategies influenced their votes. Exit polls also 
did not ask voters the extent to which other factors, such as divided government, 
familiarity with the candidates, and incumbency, influenced their votes. Thus, there is no 
concrete statistical basis for testing this study’s thesis to be found in the 2004 Vermont 
gubernatorial election. There are, however, other important bases available for judging 
the thesis viable.  
Analysis of the Vermont gubernatorial election strongly indicates that campaign 
strategies were primary factors in voters’ reelection of Republican governor Jim Douglas. 
Although Spring 2004 polls showed Douglas with near-majority support from 
Vermonters before his campaign began, he received much greater support, 59% of the 
vote, in November 2004. Moreover, above cited polling indicates a decisive movement 
toward Douglas in the last month of the campaign and negligible gains for Clavelle, at the 
same time that Kerry gained significantly on Bush in the state’s presidential race.
 Clearly, many voters decided to reelect Douglas during the campaign process. 
This fact diminishes the importance of candidate organizations as a primary explanation 
for Douglas’ landslide victory, because the argument supposes that voters are so familiar 
with a candidate that they decide to support him well in advance of the election. Voters 
surely knew Douglas well before the close of the campaign, yet the decisive break toward 
his candidacy occurred at the end. Some might also claim that voters chose Douglas 
based on their personal conditions during his tenure, rather than being swayed by the 
campaigns. For a large segment of voters, however, this was not the case. While three-
quarters of voters who considered themselves “better off” than four years before 
supported Douglas, one-third of voters who considered themselves “worse off” still 
supported him.155 
The decisive break toward Governor Douglas at the end of the gubernatorial 
campaign indicates that, although many Vermonters formed their opinions before the 
campaign began, Douglas’ landslide was shaped by later events. The effectiveness with 
which the Douglas campaign promoted his first-term record, discredited his opponent, 
and countered Clavelle’s criticisms, provide a reasonable explanation for this occurrence. 
Yet it seems unwise to dismiss other factors as important contributors to Douglas’ 
reelection, including voter independence, candidate organization, and incumbency.  
To further test the extent to which campaign strategies of gubernatorial candidates 
and their state party organizations produce mixed partisan outcomes in simultaneous 
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gubernatorial and presidential elections, it is necessary to analyze a different election 
in which some of the key factors complicating the 2004 Vermont gubernatorial 
election are eliminated. The 2004 Montana gubernatorial election, in which Democrat 
Brian Schweitzer was elected governor at the same time that Montana 
overwhelmingly voted to reelect Republican President George W. Bush, provides 
such a case. Schweitzer was neither an incumbent nor the leader of an established 
candidate organization; he had never held political office, and he was running for an 
open gubernatorial seat. Therefore, the next chapter presents a case study of the 2004 
Montana gubernatorial election, to further test the thesis that campaign strategies of 
gubernatorial candidates and their state party organizations are the primary factors 
affecting state voter choice of gubernatorial and presidential candidates of different 
parties in the same election year. 
 
Chapter IV: The 2004 Montana Gubernatorial Election
“[Bob Brown] is a product of the system. He is a candidate for governor because 
he has been in government for thirty years. I come from a different direction. I’m not 
beholden to any political party or power-brokers.” – Governor Brian Schweitzer156 
“The people in Montana basically repudiated the Republican leadership in the 
legislature and the incumbent Republican governor, and I happened to be standing in the 
wrong place at the wrong time. That’s the simple long and short of it.” –
2004 Republican gubernatorial candidate Bob Brown157 
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In 2004, Democrat Brian Schweitzer was elected governor of Montana by a 51% 
to 47% margin, defeating Republican Secretary of State and gubernatorial candidate Bob 
Brown. In that same year, Montanans supported Republican President George W. Bush 
over Democratic Senator and presidential candidate John Kerry, by a much wider 59% to 
39% margin. The 2004 Montana gubernatorial election differed from that year’s Vermont 
gubernatorial election (analyzed in the preceding chapter) in many important ways; 
Schweitzer was a political novice elected to an open seat in an election dominated by 
state issues. National issues, particularly the simultaneous presidential election, played a 
negligible role in the rhetoric and outcome of the Montana gubernatorial campaign.  
Although Montana is typically regarded as one of America’s “reddest” states, 
Governor Schweitzer attracted wide support by portraying himself convincingly as an 
effective agent for change in state government. Gubernatorial campaign strategies appear 
to have significantly contributed to Schweitzer’s victory. These strategies included 
projecting an authentic Montanan image (called the “Brawny Rancher” image by some 
observers), highlighting hunting and fishing issues, linking Republican nominee Bob 
Brown to the unpopular Montana political establishment, and conveying Schweitzer’s 
unconventional, bipartisan approach to governance. To be sure, Schweitzer benefited 
from weak opposition. Brown was widely viewed as an uninspiring candidate. His 
candidacy was also inhibited by a divided Republican Party, voter dissatisfaction with 
Republican governance, and poor fundraising. While the Schweitzer campaign very much 
benefited from the major weaknesses of its opponent, it also developed effective 
strategies to capitalize on those weaknesses and maximize Schweitzer’s strengths. 
This chapter analyzes the strategies of the Schweitzer campaign and the Montana 
Democratic Party, and the extent to which they influenced the outcome of the 
gubernatorial election. By eliminating variables of incumbency and familiarity to voters 
that were prominent in the Vermont case study, this analysis further tests the thesis that 
campaign strategies of gubernatorial candidates and their state party organizations are the 
primary factors affecting state voter choice of gubernatorial and presidential candidates 
of different parties in the same election year.   
 
Montana: A Solidly ‘Red’ State? 
 
Montana has experienced many stages of political development. Once a hotbed of 
left-wing labor movements, the state has been transformed by dramatic economic and 
population changes. In recent decades, Montanans have voted rather consistently for 
Republican presidential and congressional candidates, earning widespread recognition as 
a solidly “red” state. Yet closer analysis reveals a more complex political environment 
characterized by a competitive two-party system.  
Left-Wing Politics Dominate Early State History  
In spite of its reputation, Montana is not a political monolith. As Barone and 
Cohen noted in 2006, 
There are two lively political traditions in Montana today. One draws on its heritage of 
class warfare politics, radical miners, and angry labor unions, which made Montana for 
many years the most Democratic of the Rocky Mountain States…. The other, more recent 
political tradition is in line with conservative activist Grover Norquist’s ‘Leave-Us-Alone 
Coalition’ – a fierce opposition to high taxes and federal government dictates.158 
In the early left-wing period, Montana sent many notable progressive representatives to 
the United States Congress. These representatives included Senator Thomas Walsh, who 
uncovered the Teapot Dome scandal of the Warren Harding Administration. At the 
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municipal level, Butte, a major Montana city, elected a Socialist mayor in the early 
twentieth century. As the century progressed, Montanans established a clear preference 
for Democratic representation. From 1911 to 1989, for example, state voters elected only 
one Republican to the U.S. Senate.   
 
Economic and Demographic Changes Disturb the Political Order 
The recent political transformation of Montana can largely be attributed to 
economic and demographic changes of the mid- to late-twentieth century. During this 
period, ore depletion in cities such as Butte led to mine closures across the state and the 
end of Montana’s mining era. From there, the state transitioned into a primarily 
agricultural economy characterized by wheat and cattle grazing. As labor unions and 
class tensions became less prominent features of Montana’s political environment, the 
left-wing politics that had defined most of the state’s history gave way to a conservative 
preference for smaller, less intrusive government.  
 Further altering Montana’s political characteristics were the significant 
demographic shifts it experienced during the late twentieth century, as wealthy 
individuals in search of privacy and solitude bought land and built second homes there. 
Montana’s population grew by thirteen percent during the 1990s, and by 2006 native 
Montanans constituted only 56% of the population.159 
Republicans Gain Strength 
By 2004, Republicans had gained unprecedented strength in Montana. For sixteen 
years, Republicans controlled Montana’s governorship and state legislature. Moreover, 
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Republican Conrad Burns represented Montana in the U.S. Senate from 1988, and 
Republican At-Large Congressman Danny Rehberg was elected to his sixth term, with 
two-thirds of the vote. Only two times since 1952 had Montanans voted for a Democratic 
presidential candidate (1964 and 1992). In 2000 it chose George W. Bush over 
Democratic candidate Al Gore by an overwhelming 58% to 33% margin. “There aren’t 
too many states in the union redder than Montana,” declared Schweitzer campaign 
consultant David Sirota.160 
Not Quite ‘Red’ 
Conclusions such as Sirota’s, although widespread, are deceptively simplistic. 
Bob Brown, who referred to Montanans as “chronic ticket-splitters,” disputed this 
popular notion.161 “Montana’s typically characterized as a ‘red state,’” he noted. “But, 
boy, if you look very far below the surface, it’s not very red.”162 He pointed out that 
Democrats, after the 2004 elections, held nearly every statewide office, including 
governor, attorney general, state auditor, and superintendent of public instruction. 
Democrats also controlled the state legislature and the State Service Commission, and 
claimed one of Montana’s two U.S. Senators, Max Baucus. Jim Lopach, professor of 
political science at the University of Montana-Missoula, agreed that popular conceptions 
of Montana as a solidly Republican state were misleading. “The Montana political culture 
is individualistic and populist. It’s bipartisan,” Professor Lopach argued.163 He cited a 
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study by University of Vermont professor of political science Frank Bryan, who declared 
Montana the only truly competitive two-party state in America.  
Montana is also receptive to third-party candidacies; in 1992 Montanans gave 
Independent presidential candidate H. Ross Perot one of his largest vote percentages in 
any state, 26%. Moreover, in 2000 Montanans gave Independent presidential candidate 
Ralph Nader one of his largest vote percentages, with 6%. 
 
Dissatisfaction with Republican Governance Entering the 2004 Elections 
 Entering the 2004 elections, Montanans exhibited widespread dissatisfaction with 
the performance of Republican legislators and governors over the previous sixteen years. 
Frustration over the state’s weak economy, electricity industry deregulation, and the 
seeming incompetence of Republican Governor Judy Martz’s administration permeated 
the political atmosphere.  
 
The Discredited Republican Legislature 
After sixteen years of controlling the Montana legislature, Republicans had failed 
many voters’ expectations. The state economy remained weak, with wages the lowest in 
the United States. Most importantly, the legislature faced a tremendous backlash from its 
1997 deregulation of the electricity industry. In the wake of deregulation, Montana 
Power, the largest corporation in Montana, sold its power facilities in 2000 for $2.1 
billion. Montana Power invested the profits of its sale in a fiber optics firm, only to have 
that firm go bankrupt. When the purchaser of the power facilities also went bankrupt, 
Montanans experienced substantial job cuts, increased utility rates, heavy investment 
losses, and high-profile lawsuits. Meanwhile, corporate executives involved in these 
dealings received large severance packages, at the same time that corporate scandals such 
as the Enron debacle were commanding national attention. As a result of this catastrophic 
confluence of events, “Republican business-friendly policies were discredited.”164 More 
specifically, the Republican-controlled Montana legislature that had engineered 
electricity industry deregulation was discredited. 
 
The Unpopular Judy Martz Governorship  
 Judy Martz, “darling of the right wing of the [Montana] Republican Party,” was 
elected governor in 2000, with 51% of the vote to Democratic candidate Mark O’Keefe’s 
47%.165 During Governor Martz’s tenure, she delivered on important campaign promises, 
including an income tax reduction and the establishment of automatic state funding 
increases for public schools to keep pace with inflation. Yet her administration became 
one of the most unpopular in the nation due to a series of missteps and apparent ethical 
lapses. 
 The reasons for Governor Martz’s unpopularity were manifold. Perhaps most 
seriously, in August 2001 Martz’s chief policy advisor, Shane Hedges, was involved in a 
motor vehicle accident while under the influence of alcohol. Montana House Majority 
Leader Paul Sliter, a passenger in Hedge’s vehicle, was killed in the accident. Martz 
nearly earned an obstruction of justice charge by taking Hedges from the hospital to the 
governor’s mansion at four A.M. and washing his bloodstained clothes. The next year it 
was revealed that state employees were using the Governor’s office to raise funds for her 
political action committee, and soon after Martz underwent investigation for a suspicious 
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land purchase. The latter controversy arose when Martz purchased land from a company 
named Arco, at a lower price than Arco had offered to other purchasers. Arco operated 
mining sites previously owned by the powerful Anaconda Mining Company, and Martz 
was responsible for making recommendations regarding environmental cleanup at these 
sites. Democrats filed an ethics complaint alleging that Martz had obtained a lower land 
price in exchange for her leniency on the environmental recommendations. The Montana 
political practices commissioner eventually cleared Martz of any wrongdoing in this 
matter, but the investigation was lengthy and it further tarnished her already damaged 
reputation.  
 Adding to Martz’s unpopularity was her penchant for off-putting comments. At 
one point in her administration, a reporter asked for her reaction to critics’ charges that 
she was a “lapdog for big business.” Martz responded that she would happily be a lapdog 
for business if doing so would bring jobs to Montana. Also, Lee Newspaper Statehouse 
Bureau Chief Chuck Johnson related a story, denied by Martz, about her introduction of 
husband Harry at a Butte Chamber of Commerce event. Supposedly, she remarked at the 
time that he had never beaten her because she had not yet given him a reason to do so.166 
After attracting over forty percent approval from Montanans early in her tenure, 
Governor Martz’s poll numbers soon plummeted into the low twenties. Martz’s extreme 
unpopularity persisted throughout her tenure, making her one of the most unpopular 
governors in the United States. Yet Martz gave every indication that she was planning to 
seek reelection, until announcing otherwise in August 2003. By that time, three other 
Republicans had already announced their candidacies for the party’s gubernatorial 
nomination. First were Montana Republican Party Chairman Ken Miller and oilman Tom 
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Keating. However, Miller and Keating were widely considered exceptionally 
conservative and unelectable. Realizing this, many Republicans began pressuring Bob 
Brown to enter the race. Secretary of State Brown, the only Republican holding statewide 
office other than Martz and her lieutenant governor Karl Ohs (who had already decided 
not to run), seemed to be the Republicans’ only viable gubernatorial candidate. Brown 
recalled, “There were people who came to me, oh gosh, for a while there practically on a 
daily basis… saying, ‘There’s no possible way Judy’s going to be reelected. Bob, you 
have to step forward and do this.’”167 Reluctantly, Brown acquiesced.  
 
Republican Gubernatorial Candidate Bob Brown 
Bob Brown entered the 2004 Montana gubernatorial campaign with strong 
government credentials and a sense of duty to the Republican Party. Born in Missoula, 
Montana, in December 1947 and raised on a small grain and cattle ranch near Kalispell, 
Brown came from a humble background. His father was a heavy machine operator and a 
member of the AFL-CIO, as his father had been. Bob Brown also joined the AFL-CIO 
later in life. Despite his strong union background, Brown identified as a Republican from 
an early age, signing up for the Teenage Republicans and campaigning for 1964 
Republican presidential candidate Barry Goldwater.  
 In 1970, Brown earned his B.A. in history from the University of Montana-
Bozeman. After serving in the U.S. Navy from 1971 to 1972, Brown added a B.A. in 
political science before obtaining a masters degree in education in 1988. After five years 
as a farmer-rancher, Brown became a teacher in 1979, the profession with which he 
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identified even after an extensive career in Montana politics. In addition to high school 
education, Brown became a University of Montana administrator in the early 1990s.  
Throughout these endeavors, Brown served three months out of every year in the 
Montana legislature. At just 23 years old he was elected to the Montana House of 
Representatives in 1970, and in 1974 he was elected to the State Senate. He spent two 
years as senate president before being forced out by term limits in 1996. As a legislator, 
Brown was well-respected on both sides of the aisle and by observers. Johnson described 
him as “one of the most ethical and classy legislators I’ve ever covered.”168 Brown was 
widely recognized as a moderate Republican who got along unusually well with 
traditionally left-wing groups such as teachers’ unions and environmentalists. In fact, his 
proudest legislative achievement was an environmental measure he sponsored, the 1970s 
Lakeshore Protection Act. This act protected Flathead Lake by allowing for the creation 
of local committees to set standards for preventing lake pollution. “He was a moderate 
Republican,” Johnson commented, “in a state where there aren’t too many moderate 
Republicans.”169 
After retiring from the legislature, Brown spent four years as a lobbyist for U.S. 
West and the Columbia Falls Aluminum Company (a role that would be used against him 
in the gubernatorial campaign). Additionally, in 1998 Brown headed a campaign to renew 
the statewide property tax in order to better fund the Montana university system. This 
role enabled Brown to meet community leaders from across the state and build a network 
of working relationships that surely aided him in future statewide candidacies. Brown’s 
first statewide race took place in 2000, when he defeated Democrat Hal Harper 51% to 
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44% for secretary of state. It is unlikely that Brown intended at the time to run for 
governor four years later. “I’d never aspired to [the governorship],” he later explained, 
because “that’s a bonecruncher of a job…. It isn’t anything I’d ever had on my radar 
screen.”170 Yet Brown felt pressured to seek the position when encouraged to do so by 
desperate members of his party. “Eventually, you think, ‘Well, duty beckons,’” he said, 
revealingly. “Sometimes you step forward when it seems that your service is called for, 
and you do what you need to do.”171 
Brown Wins a Divisive Republican Primary 
 
Bob Brown’s gubernatorial candidacy was handicapped by a bitterly contested 
and divisive Republican primary. Brown ultimately won the Republican nomination over 
his three more-conservative opponents, but he entered the general election campaign in a 
weakened position; the Republican Party was not united behind Brown and he had spent 
nearly all his money attaining the nomination. These factors seriously hindered Brown’s 
candidacy, costing him crucial support in terms of votes, organization, and campaign 
funds. 
 
Maneuvering Around Governor Martz 
Bob Brown’s decision to enter the gubernatorial race in July 2003 greatly upset 
Governor Martz, who had not yet announced her intentions. Brown and Martz did not 
have an especially comfortable relationship; according to Johnson, “She saw Bob as 
someone who was going to take her out… [although] Bob is not that kind of person.”172 
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While she declined to challenge Brown for the nomination, Martz made it clear that she 
did not support his candidacy. The day after Martz announced her intention not to seek 
reelection, wealthy Billings business consultant Pat Davison entered the race, “from the 
blind side and late on” as Brown put it, with the Governor’s endorsement.173 One of 
Davison’s greatest assets as a candidate was his ability to self-finance his campaign. 
Davison injected $250,000 of his own money into his campaign, which ultimately totaled 
35% of his campaign funds. Brown, as a career educator, had nowhere near this financial 
capability. 
Brown Emerges as the Lone Moderate  
 
Brown quickly distinguished himself as the only moderate Republican vying for 
the party’s gubernatorial nomination, within a state party known for its decidedly 
conservative inclinations. “It is my intention to appeal to voters across the Republican 
spectrum and beyond,” he explained at his campaign announcement.174 This declaration 
indicated his strategy for the primary campaign to cast himself as the party’s only serious 
hope in a general election, due to his bipartisan appeal. As part of this strategy, Brown 
selected for his running mate state representative and House Appropriations Committee 
chairman Dave Lewis. Lewis also had strong bipartisan credentials, having served as 
budget director under four previous governors, including two Republicans and two 
Democrats. Brown further distinguished himself as the lone moderate in the Republican 
primary by refusing to sign a pledge never to raise taxes as governor. He was the only 
primary candidate not to sign the pledge. “You can’t adequately predict what will happen 
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four years in the future,” Brown said in his defense. “No businessman would ever 
promise that he would never raise the price of anything he sells for the next four 
years.”175 
While Brown’s moderate campaign stances were consistent with the political 
instincts exhibited throughout his career, they also indicated an unmistakable electoral 
advantage; Brown had a solid grasp on the Republican Party’s moderate minority while 
his three opponents were certain to split the party’s conservative majority among 
themselves.  
 
Brown and Davison Spar 
Although four candidates competed for the Republican gubernatorial nomination, 
the only viable contenders were Brown and Davison. Brown touted his government 
experience and bipartisan appeal while Davison stressed his business experience and 
conservative credentials. The contest ultimately degenerated into a very negative 
exchange, in which both major candidates cast their opponent as untrustworthy, 
dishonest, unethical, and irresponsible. At one point, a complaint was filed on behalf of 
the Brown campaign that Davison’s running mate, who had spent considerable time 
outside of Montana as superintendent of Glacier National Park, did not meet state 
residency requirements. Davison supporters regarded this as a particularly petty 
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maneuver, and they did not soon forget it after the campaign. For its part, the Davison 
campaign charged that Brown unethically appeared as secretary of state in a public 
service announcement concerning voting law alternatives.  
 
The Republican Party Fails to Unite Behind Nominee Brown 
In the Republican gubernatorial primary held on June 8, 2004, Bob Brown 
defeated his three opponents with 39% of the vote. In second place, Davison finished 
with 23% of the vote, ahead of Miller with 22% and Keating with 16%. After the 
primary, Brown and Davison perfunctorily predicted a unified Republican Party entering 
the general election. Yet due to the bitter nature of the primary and many conservatives’ 
skepticism about Brown’s moderate politics, Brown’s “defeated rivals never ‘buried the 
hatchet’ and supported him.”176 Brown believed that backers of his opponents eventually 
withheld critical support in the general election. “I think a fair number of the real, solid 
movement conservatives left us [the Republican gubernatorial ticket] blank, they just 
didn’t vote for us,” said Brown. Consequently, “I didn’t have the full strength of my own 
side behind me, because of that divisive primary.”177 Brown’s assessment is supported by 
polling data; an October 7-10 poll showed that a staggering 57% of identified 
Republicans were still undecided about whom to support in the gubernatorial election.178 
Monetary Consequences of the Primary Battle 
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Beyond electoral support, the divisive Republican gubernatorial primary cost Bob 
Brown dearly in terms of campaign funds. As Johnson commented, “[Brown] basically 
came out of the primary broke, he had to start fundraising all over.”179 Indeed, Brown 
spent 90% of his campaign funds to win the Republican nomination, leaving him with 
$44,000. This sum was only one-tenth of the war chest retained by general election 
opponent Brian Schweitzer after his token Democratic primary.180 Again, money was 
difficult for Brown to come by as a career educator and part-time legislator. 
Consequently, he spent most of his time between the primary and the general election 
fundraising. “In the situation I was in,” he explained, “I had to somehow or other get 
enough money to put on a decent poor boy act against [Schweitzer] in the general 
election.”181 One source of needed funds was political action committee contributions. As 
of September 5, Brown had received $40,000 from PACs, a fact for which Schweitzer 
later attacked Brown as a conventional, insider politician. Schweitzer, of course, did not 
need to accept PAC money because he held such an enormous monetary advantage 
without it. This was only one of many ways in which Schweitzer cleverly exploited his 
opponent’s disadvantages, while utilizing his own advantages to convince voters that he 
was a more credible agent for needed changes in state leadership.  
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Although he had never held political office before seeking the governorship in 
2004, Brian Schweitzer had already established himself as a formidable presence in 
Montana politics. Born in September 1955 in Havre, Montana, and raised on a ranch near 
Great Falls, Schweitzer earned his B.S. in soil science at Colorado State University in 
1978 before returning to earn his masters degree at Montana State University-Bozeman in 
1980. Shortly after graduating from MSU, Schweitzer undertook the ambitious task of 
running a 15,000-acre farm in the Libyan Sahara. A year later, in 1981, Schweitzer 
helped build the world’s largest dairy farm, in Saudi Arabia. The farm held 10,000 
milking cows, and it also featured grain and vegetable crops. In 1987, Schweitzer 
returned to Montana, where he bought two farms spanning 27,000 acres near his 
hometown of Whitefish (coincidentally, also the hometown of Bob Brown). In 1993, the 
Clinton Administration appointed Schweitzer to his first government position, 
distributing federal funds to farmers through the Farm Service Agency. Although this 
was only a part-time position, it was important to Schweitzer’s political ambitions 
because it allowed him to develop name recognition in the state and make useful 
contacts.  
Schweitzer Runs for U.S. Senator in 2000 
 In 2000, Brian Schweitzer began an improbable campaign for U.S. Senator 
against incumbent Republican Conrad Burns. Despite spending twice as much as 
Schweitzer, Burns won only by the narrow margin of 51% to 47%. Schweitzer made an 
immediate impression on Montanans with his frank and unorthodox approach to politics. 
Standing 6’2” and typically clad in jeans with a gilded silver belt buckle, Schweitzer was 
also, in the words of David Sirota, “gregarious, tough-talking, and utterly without self-
doubt.”182 His candidacy was about more than image, though; Schweitzer inflamed 
populist sentiment against the two-term incumbent through a variety of clever and 
provocative maneuvers. For example, Schweitzer attracted national media attention when 
he became the first political candidate (in what would soon become a popular trend) to 
lead a bus full of senior citizens across the Canadian border to purchase prescription 
drugs. The trip was intended to highlight his proposal to reimport prescription drugs from 
Canada, contrary to federal policy. Schweitzer also focused on campaign financing issues 
by lambasting Senator Burns for accepting large PAC contributions. At one point, 
Schweitzer had armed guards dump a suitcase filled with $47,000, the amount of money 
given to Burns by tobacco lobbyists, on the floor of the state capitol’s rotunda as 
reporters watched. 
 
Schweitzer Enters the 2004 Gubernatorial Election 
Although Brian Schweitzer lost his bid for the Senate in 2000, he used his 
formidable showing in that race to propel him toward the governorship in 2004. Johnson 
recalled,  
When [Schweitzer] lost to Burns [in 2000], he never really stopped running. We [Lee 
Newspaper Bureau reporters] went through clippings from local newspapers, and there’d 
be six people out at some small town in Montana at a Democratic Club meeting, and – 
‘speaker Brian Schweitzer,’ ‘speaker Brian Schweitzer.’ He just kept running.183 
Early in his campaign, Schweitzer acknowledged the unlikelihood of his 2000 candidacy 
and the role that played in preparing for his 2004 candidacy: 
Probably [the 2000 Senate race] was a mountain too high for me to climb… me starting 
so far in the valley with so little equipment. But I’ve got a little more rope this time, I’m 
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starting a little higher up the mountain and I think we know a little more about 
climbing.184 
Indeed, Schweitzer would prove his enhanced political skills in the election ahead. 
 
Schweitzer Easily Wins the Democratic Primary 
It was an impressive sign of Brian Schweitzer’s strength as a candidate that, 
despite his governmental inexperience and the strong likelihood that a Democratic 
gubernatorial candidate could finally retake the governorship in 2004, he received only 
token opposition in the Democratic primary. Gallatin County Commissioner and former 
state legislator John Vincent entered the primary very late, in February 2004. Schweitzer 
handily defeated Vincent, 73% to 27%, although he faced stinging criticism in the 
process. Vincent attacked Schweitzer with more vigor than Brown later did, mainly for 
his governmental inexperience. Yet, according to Johnson, “Schweitzer would just look 
down at his shoes and say, ‘John Vincent’s a really nice guy and I’m glad he’s running. 
He’s a great man.’”185 Schweitzer was probably wise not to engage in bitter disputes with 
Vincent when it was clear that Schweitzer was headed toward victory. Schweitzer also 
wanted to emphasize his constructive approach to governance at this time. He declared, 
“The days of political bickering, name-calling, and finger-pointing are over. We’ve heard 
from people in every corner of the state who were disgusted with the way candidates 
were conducting themselves.”186 Entering the 2004 gubernatorial campaign, there was 
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little reason to doubt that Schweitzer would put forth a credible campaign, and quite 
possibly be elected the first Democratic governor of Montana in sixteen years.  
 
Leadership Emerges as the Central Issue of the Gubernatorial Campaign 
Given widespread voter dissatisfaction with the Republican legislature and 
governor, it was clear from the outset of the 2004 gubernatorial campaign that leadership 
would be a central issue. Therefore, capitalizing on his status as a political outsider, Brian 
Schweitzer tried ardently to focus the campaign on leadership and to cast himself as the 
most credible agent for change in state government. Professor Lopach explained, 
My understanding is that [Schweitzer] set out in a very intentional, calculated way to be 
the candidate of change, which people wanted. They had had enough of Judy Martz, they 
wanted change. So he did things in his style of campaigning, his style of dress, his mode 
of speaking to communicate this…. He projected the image of being an engaged, 
vigorous candidate committed to making change on behalf of the state. And Bob [Brown] 
did not do it.187 
Schweitzer conveyed his credibility as an agent for change primarily through “Brawny 
Rancher” imagery, energetic campaigning, effectively tying Brown to the unpopular 
political establishment, and promoting himself as a government outsider. 
Schweitzer’s “Brawny Rancher” Image 
The Schweitzer campaign effectively portrayed its candidate as an authentic, 
average Montanan, or what many have referred to as the archetypical “Brawny Rancher.” 
This image reinforced Schweitzer’s populist message and assured voters that he was a 
different kind of politician than any they had elected to state leadership in recent years. In 
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contrast to what voters expected from their politicians, Schweitzer regularly dressed in 
jeans, a flannel shirt, and a Bolo tie. At one point he took a two-week campaign tour in 
his pickup truck, tossing his clothes in the backseat and filling the bed with notepads for 
volunteers and additional bags of clothes. Television commercials featured Schweitzer 
working on his farm and herding cattle, because the Schweitzer campaign believed that 
imagery was essential to gaining voters’ trust and affinity. “Visual images are very 
important,” explained Schweitzer’s 2004 campaign manager, Eric Stern. 
The reality is, some voters turn the sound down [on their televisions or radios]. Some 
voters go to vote and they may not have followed the race very closely…. They follow 
the presidential election, they know what they’re doing there. But the governor’s race, 
they may not have focused on. And so they have one image of one guy [Schweitzer] in a 
flannel shirt cutting hay, another image of another guy [Brown] in a button-down suit 
with a big plush office at the capitol. And they say, ‘Well, I like the first guy.’188 
Making this impression among the less-engaged voters might have been especially 
important in a presidential year. Instead of applying presidential preferences to their 
gubernatorial votes for lack of any other voting basis, voters motivated by the presidential 
election were also equipped with a reassuring “Brawny Rancher” image of Schweitzer 
that may have figured prominently in their decisions. 
Schweitzer’s Energetic Approach to Campaigning 
 Brian Schweitzer’s energetic campaign style made a strong impression on voters 
and campaign observers. Johnson said, “I’ve never seen a harder campaigner” than 
Schweitzer.189 As a candidate, he was skilled at maximizing his time and resources, using 
spare minutes to fundraise via telephone, conduct interviews, and greet voters. 
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Schweitzer described meeting voters as valuable job preparation, not just an attempt to 
secure votes. “I want to meet as many people as possible,” he said.  
A good governor needs to know personally all the people that pull the rope in Montana. 
It’s about building personal relationships. The more people you know, the more contacts 
that you make, the more likely that you’re going to be able to pick up the phone and ask 
someone a question or find out something about what government should or shouldn’t be 
doing.190
Schweitzer’s energetic campaigning helped make up for his government inexperience by 
familiarizing him with voters’ concerns and expectations. In terms of leadership, it also 
conveyed to voters that he had the enthusiasm and vigor necessary to take on the 
imposing task of reforming state government. There was no doubt that Schweitzer 
wanted the job, which was more than voters could confidently say about his opponent. 
 Brian Schweitzer’s energetic campaign style was especially striking because it 
differed dramatically from that of Bob Brown. Indeed, “Schweitzer’s gregarious, almost 
bubbly campaign style is in contrast to Brown’s admittedly more low-key demeanor,” 
said Associated Press reporter Bob Anez.191 Professor Lopach recalled one incident from 
a debate late in the campaign, illustrating the contrast between the candidates.  
Bob was sitting down on the stage studying notes, and Schweitzer, with his typical jeans 
and boots, kind of a tweed sportcoat, a western shirt, and Bolo tie, he was working the 
crowd vigorously – row to row to row to row, shaking hands and smiling.192 
Brown’s comparative lack of energy was not just a function of personality 
differences; according to observers, and judging by Brown’s reflections on the race, he 
was not fully committed to the gubernatorial campaign. “In reality, I don’t think that 
Brown much cared if he won or lost,” said Craig Wilson, professor of political science at 
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Montana State University-Billings.193 Johnson agreed, speculating that Brown had only 
gotten involved in the race because “others were twisting his arm.”194 Brown’s earlier 
cited comments on getting into the race as a matter of duty certainly reinforce this 
assessment. Moreover, Brown had difficulty handling unsavory aspects of politics that 
are typically considered part of the business, such as fundraising and negative campaign 
advertisements. He referred to fundraising as “the most unpleasant feeling. Oh! It’s just 
the most sickening aspect of politics.”195 In terms of negative ads, “Those things, they 
bother you, they bother your wife, they bother your kids. You see this ugly photograph of 
yourself on television, and the ominous background music.”196 The gubernatorial 
campaign, unsurprisingly in light of these comments, took its toll on Brown. “I think that 
towards the end of the campaign Bob was very tired, maybe even somewhat ill,” said 
Professor Lopach. “He didn’t look good. And Schweitzer was just building momentum 
and rolling along, and I think that really hurt Bob.”197 Indeed, voters must have gotten the 
impression that Schweitzer was up for the challenge of governor more than Brown. This 
was undoubtedly an important impression for him to make.  
 
Schweitzer Effectively Ties Brown to the Unpopular Political Establishment 
Associating Bob Brown with the unpopular Republican legislature and Martz 
Administration was a central goal of the Schweitzer campaign’s overall strategy. Stern 
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said proudly, “We tied our opponent to the Governor and the current regime, to make it 
look like it was one big circle.”198 
Tying Brown to the legislature was somewhat difficult because Brown was retired 
when the legislature’s great sin, electricity industry deregulation, took place in 1997. The 
Schweitzer campaign managed to implicate Brown in similar activities, though, with an 
ad released in mid-October by the Montana Democratic Party attacking Brown for his 
role as a Columbia Falls Aluminum Company lobbyist. The ad, echoing a similar attack 
posted on the Schweitzer campaign’s website since September, claimed that Columbia 
had “stole[n] millions from workers’ profit-sharing and laid off hundreds of employees to 
make millions selling power out of the state.”199 The ad also criticized Brown for 
supporting a 1987 tax cut that benefited Columbia, albeit eleven years before he joined 
the company as a lobbyist. In Brown’s defense, his campaign manager Jason Thielman 
pointed out that the alleged abuses by Columbia occurred in 1992 and were settled in 
1998, all before Brown began lobbying for the company. Montana Democratic Party 
Executive Director Brad Martin maintained, “You’re judged by the company you keep. 
After this company had all this press about all of its poor dealing with its employees, and 
hiding money from profit-sharing, Bob Brown still felt quite comfortable going to work 
for them.”200 As for the tax cut, the Brown campaign argued that it reduced the Columbia 
plant’s property taxes at a time when it appeared on the verge of closure. Aluminum 
Workers Trade Council President Terry Smith said of Brown’s activities, “He did a lot to 
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help the workers and the plant survive and preserve those good-paying jobs with good 
benefits.”201 Yet the Schweitzer campaign’s efforts were useful in stigmatizing Brown in 
the absence of a direct tie to the legislature’s unpopular electricity industry deregulation.   
 Perhaps most importantly, Schweitzer (“cleverly and effectively” according to 
Bob Brown) tied his opponent to the Martz Administration.202 Schweitzer typically spoke 
of Brown as part of the Martz Administration, although he was elected separately from 
the Governor, as were Democrats elected to other statewide offices. These associations 
were difficult for Brown to rebut because he did not want to further destabilize the 
already fragile Republican coalition by offending Martz supporters. At his campaign 
announcement in July 2003, Brown said approvingly, “Governor Martz has been a 
courageous governor. She’s stood by her convictions and her principles and I admire 
her.”203 Indeed, said Johnson, Brown “never really came out and criticized [Martz]. He 
sort of suggested he might do some things differently [than her], but he never really took 
her on as an issue.” Due to Republican divisions, though, “He probably had to play it that 
way.”204 Still, for those familiar with their private tensions, it was clear that Brown was 
not closely allied with Martz. “There had been a falling out between Bob Brown and Judy 
Martz,” noted Professor Lopach, “and I think he had established that distance between 
them that he couldn’t be viewed as any kind of successor.”205 The Schweitzer campaign 
attempted to make the connection between Brown and Martz, however, and by most 
accounts it was quite effective in doing so. 
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Beyond Bob Brown’s ties to the Republican legislature and Governor Martz, the 
Schweitzer campaign tried to portray Brown more generally as an entrenched member of 
the Montana political establishment. This was partly enabled by Brown’s discussion, 
more pronounced early in the campaign, of his ticket’s government experience. For 
example, the Brown-Lewis ticket’s initial campaign slogan was “Sixty-Six Years of 
Government Experience.” Once the campaign recognized the liability of being identified 
with the Montana political establishment, it promptly retired this slogan. Brown also 
liked to refer to himself as a “workhorse” and to Brian Schweitzer as a “showhorse,” 
describing the gubernatorial election as “a pretty clear contest between a flamboyant 
showman with a gift for finding the political hot buttons and a public servant who’s been 
involved positively, constructively, and effectively in our state for many years, and has a 
record to prove it.”206 Brown’s emphasis on experience worked in some quarters; several 
newspapers endorsed Brown for governor largely on the basis of his governmental 
experience, noting that Governor Martz lacked government experience before being 
elected. Brown should have known early in the campaign, however, that government 
experience was an inadequate selling point. A poll conducted in late May 2004, before 
the Republican primary took place, showed Schweitzer beating Brown by a 45% to 35% 
margin, and Pat Davison losing to Schweitzer by a slightly larger margin of 47% to 
31%.207 Judging by this poll, it made little difference to voters whether Schweitzer was 
matched against a Republican candidate with abundant government experience or none 
whatsoever.  
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Bob Brown’s governmental experience was cleverly used against him by the 
Schweitzer campaign. Brian Schweitzer blamed Montana’s problems on Republican 
domination of state government, and he therefore held Brown responsible as a leading 
Republican legislator. At one debate he asked, “Mr. Brown, you’ve been a part of this 
group that have been running this government now for thirty years. Why should we stay 
the course with you?”208 In a later debate, Schweitzer analogized Brown to a contractor 
hired to fix a leaking roof for twenty-six consecutive years, with no success. He said 
Brown was now asking to be hired for four more years, but “After twenty-six years, I’d 
probably find a new contractor.”209 He suspected that voters wanted a change also.  
 
Schweitzer Promotes Himself as a Government Outsider 
In contrast to Bob Brown’s image as a career politician, Brian Schweitzer 
“portrayed himself as a government outsider promising change and bipartisan rule.”210 
Schweitzer actually claimed that his lack of government experience was an asset, rather 
than a liability as Brown and John Vincent had alleged. Schweitzer said his lack of 
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experience allowed him to transcend traditional partisan loyalties and do what was best 
for the state, regardless of entrenched interests. He shrewdly pointed out that Republican 
icons Ronald Reagan, George W. Bush, and Arnold Schwarzenegger had never held 
elective office before assuming their governorships. Besides, Schweitzer said, business 
experience was what Montana needed at the time.  
I understand this business. I’m not talking about this is in an abstract way. I’ve been an 
innovator in business. I’ve done things, gone places, built things that people hadn’t done 
before. And that’s what it’s going to take to move Montana forward.211 
As a symbol of his government outsider status, Schweitzer declared early in his 
campaign an open audition for a running mate. Over several weeks, he interviewed a 
wide variety of Montanans interested in the position, including small-time politicians and 
a part-time grocery store employee. While most observers regarded the audition as a 
symbolic gimmick, Schweitzer cited it as evidence that “This isn’t going to be an 
administration that is going to be an inside-Helena, back-door deal.”212 Whether voters 
believed that Schweitzer was sincere or not in his search, they certainly got the message 
that he was willing to defy political conventions. 
Schweitzer’s Bipartisan Appeal 
Although Montana was not exactly a “red state,” as many considered it in 2004, 
elected Republicans and Democrats tended to be conservative. Consequently, Brian 
Schweitzer, who “ran as a middle-of-the-road populist Democratic candidate,” knew he 
had to cast himself as a much different type of Democrat than presidential candidate John 
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Kerry and other national Democrats unpopular in Montana at the time.213 Schweitzer 
recognized that Republican and Independent support was essential to electoral victory, 
and to his prospects for success once elected. Upon election in November, Schweitzer 
announced, “I’m the governor of the state, not just those who supported us.”214 Indeed, 
Schweitzer had a keen understanding of conservative opinion. Often he would listen to 
conservative radio talk shows and call in to challenge local hosts. “Though he despised 
the hosts’ messages,” recalled Sirota, “he admired the way they stirred the listeners’ 
grievances about government and liberal elites.”215 The Schweitzer campaign appealed to 
these voters, and others across a wide political spectrum, mainly through two brilliant 
campaign tactics: heavy identification with hunting and fishing issues, and the selection 
of a Republican running mate in John Bohlinger. 
 
The Importance of Hunting and Fishing Issues to Montana Voters 
Hunting and fishing issues were profoundly important to Montana voters in 2004, 
perhaps more than to voters in any other state. Brian Schweitzer referred to these issues 
as “The one[s] that [get] people’s blood pumping,” pointing to polls that showed this to 
be the case for both men and women.216 Montana in 2004 was home to the highest 
percentage of hunters in the United States, and 70% of its residents reported owning a 
firearm.217 According to a 2001 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Survey, 723,000 of 
Montana’s 971,000 residents hunted, fished, or watched wildlife. Schweitzer had long 
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regretted underestimating the importance of hunting and fishing issues in his 2000 Senate 
race, and in 2004 he was determined to make them central to his gubernatorial campaign. 
 
Schweitzer and Brown’s Similar Positions on Gun Rights 
Whereas gun rights versus gun control is often a volatile fault line between 
national Republicans and Democrats, Brian Schweitzer and Bob Brown differed little on 
the matter in their gubernatorial contest. Brown earned a slight advantage over 
Schweitzer by obtaining the endorsement of the National Rifle Association in 2004. 
Based on his voting record, public statements, and responses to NRA questionnaires, 
Brown received a grade of “A” from the NRA’s Political Victory Fund. Schweitzer did 
little to excite NRA opposition, though; he received a grade of “A-” only because he 
lacked a voting record to demonstrate his commitment to gun rights. It probably did not 
help Schweitzer that his running mate, John Bohlinger, received a “C” while Brown’s 
running mate, Dave Lewis, received an “A-.” Yet, quite probably as a result of the efforts 
discussed below, Schweitzer fared very well among Montanans on hunting and fishing 
issues. According to an internal Schweitzer campaign poll from August 2003, voters 
believed that Schweitzer, more than Brown, “shared their values” when it came to 
hunting and fishing issues. Schweitzer assiduously cultivated this impression and utilized 
it to create bipartisan appeal.  
 
Schweitzer Campaign Advertisements Highlight Hunting and Fishing Issues 
Typically, Republican candidates take the offensive on hunting and fishing issues, 
while Democrats emphasize gun control and environmental protection. In the case of the 
Montana gubernatorial election, it was the Democratic Schweitzer campaign that took the 
offensive on hunting and fishing issues. Its first task was to visually identify Schweitzer 
with gamesman culture. To that end, the campaign released a television advertisement 
entitled “Lifestyle.” It featured Schweitzer and his brother Walt carrying rifles through 
the forest, clad in full hunting gear. The ad also proudly announced Schweitzer’s “A-” 
rating from the NRA.  
 Schweitzer regarded “Lifestyle” as an essential message to voters about his 
populist identity, and he wanted it to be broadcast statewide. To illustrate its importance, 
Sirota recounted a telephone call he received from Schweitzer early one morning during 
the campaign, demanding to know why the “Lifestyle” ad was not already running 
statewide. After receiving an unsatisfactory response, Schweitzer accosted him.  
Listen to me very carefully, and get your head in the game. No matter what our major ad 
of the week is, I want that damn gun ad running under everything! I want it in every 
media market, and I want it on TV and radio. The next time I call, I want to know it’s 
happening.218 
The Great Falls Tribune speculated that this ad would allow Schweitzer to “manage to 
hold his own in many rural counties and Republican urban areas,” indicating that it was 
an effective contributor to Schweitzer’s bipartisan appeal.219 Still, the Schweitzer 
campaign realized that in order to gain an advantage on hunting and fishing issues, rather 
than merely inoculating its candidate, it had to go further. According to Sirota,  
[If] we had simply tried to argue that Schweitzer was as hawkish on guns as any 
Republican, we would’ve won magazine covers but lost the election; in absence of 
indisputable proof, voters will believe that Republicans are more likely to protect gun 
rights. We needed to open another front with an issue that showed voters the clear 
difference.220 
The Schweitzer campaign discovered that issue in hunting and fishing land access. 
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The Schweitzer Campaign Outflanks Brown with Hunting and Fishing Land Access 
Issues 
 
For years before the 2004 gubernatorial election, Republicans had been leading 
efforts to privatize land and strengthen private property rights throughout the Mountain 
West region. While these efforts followed Republican convictions about private 
ownership, they also had the effect of restricting access for gamesmen, who were an 
important element of the Republicans’ traditional electoral coalition. Brian Schweitzer 
seized on the potential vulnerability this created. He criticized Republicans, particularly 
Bob Brown, for a recent party platform that had recommended turning over all federal 
lands in Montana to the state. Many believed that the state was incapable of managing 
these vast tracts of land, meaning they would have to sell them to private buyers. 
Consequently, said Sirota, “Some outdoorsmen became worried that the state’s deficit 
woes would be used as a Republican rationale to reduce spending on public land 
management and sell off even more valuable hunting real estate.”221 
The Schweitzer campaign’s efforts to discredit Bob Brown on hunting and fishing 
issues focused mainly on the Stream Access Law. This law, originally passed in 1985 due 
in large part, ironically, to Brown’s initiative, required private land owners to permit non-
commercial fishermen to fish in streams that traversed their properties. In the late 1990s, 
the Montana Republican Party’s platform, with Dave Lewis’ support, called for revisions 
of the Stream Access Law that would have strengthened private property owners’ rights. 
Brian Schweitzer cited this as evidence that a Republican administration would 
dramatically curtail access for Montana gamesmen. Schweitzer also criticized Brown for 
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failing to oppose a 2003 measure designed to give landowners an allotment of big game 
licenses that they could then sell to the highest bidder, if they chose to do so.  
 Brian Schweitzer went to great lengths to identify with gamesmen and highlight 
hunting and fishing land access issues. At one point he met with a Gallatin County 
gamesman group, for the purpose of developing a plan to protect public and private land 
access rights. The completed plan focused on maintaining state control of public lands, 
increasing funding for state land upkeep, and improving access to fields and streams 
through private property easements funded by hunting license fees. The plan was 
announced at a Bozeman town hall meeting of hunters and fishermen, most of them 
political conservatives, who reacted favorably to it and pledged their support. 
 
The Political Value of Land Access Issues 
The Schweitzer campaign believed land access issues were politically potent for 
several reasons. First, they appealed to gamesmen, such as those at the Bozeman town 
hall meeting, who tended to vote Republican. Second, they appealed to environmentalists 
who wanted to prevent public land from passing to private owners. Schweitzer typically 
did not discuss protecting the environment, as such; “You won’t hear him say 
‘environment’ much,” Johnson noted. “He’ll talk about [how] he wants to preserve places 
where people can hunt and fish and hike and camp.”222 Land access issues allowed him to 
placate environmentalists without arousing suspicion among conservatives. “This was 
especially important because we [in the Schweitzer campaign] did not want to alienate 
the environmentalists who would be out in force on Election Day to vote against an 
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initiative to permit cyanide leach mining,” explained Sirota.223 Thirdly, land access had 
important demographic appeal. Gallatin County was one of the fastest growing counties 
in the United States, and many of the new residents were migrants attracted to the area by 
its trademark outdoors opportunities. “Targeting these new residents and making them 
Democratic voters were key not only to the election at hand,” said Sirota, “but also for 
building a majority for the long haul.”224 Lastly, “One key reason the access issue had 
such resonance for Schweitzer was that its propulsive, little-guy-versus-big-guy force 
was in perfect sync with much of the rest of his message and campaign.”225 Hence, the 
Schweitzer campaign’s focus on land access issues was a masterful tactic, useful in 
broadening Schweitzer’s appeal and reinforcing the populist approach to governance 
touted by his campaign. 
 
Schweitzer Selects Republican John Bohlinger as His Running Mate 
Perhaps the Schweitzer campaign’s greatest strategic coup was its selection of 
Republican John Bohlinger as its candidate for lieutenant governor. His selection marked 
the first time that a Democrat and Republican ran on the same gubernatorial ticket in 
Montana history. It was an unmistakable signal to voters of Brian Schweitzer’s 
dedication to unconventional, bipartisan governance.  
 John Bohlinger was a 68-year-old, three-term state senator from Billings. Like 
Brian Schweitzer he had made his living as a businessman, running an upscale women’s 
clothing store with his wife. Politically, Bohlinger was widely regarded as a very liberal 
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Republican; Bob Brown referred to him quite candidly as “The only guy in Montana 
solidly to the left of me in the Republican Party. In fact,” said Brown, “he would 
probably better be a Democrat.”226 The Brown campaign certainly tried to make this 
argument. Thielman asserted at the time of Bohlinger’s selection, “It is clear to any 
Montanan who has reviewed John Bohlinger’s voting record that he is a strong 
Democrat.”227 While in the Montana legislature, Bohlinger was known for his 
independence and willingness to stand up to the Republican leadership. Brown explained 
Bohlinger’s decision to join the Democratic ticket in terms of ambition, describing him as 
“frustrated, a little bit angry” that he had not ascended the Republican Party’s legislative 
leadership.228 Schweitzer’s offer appeared to be Bohlinger’s long awaited opportunity, 
and he accepted it. 
 
Republican Objections to Bohlinger’s Candidacy 
 Bohlinger’s decision to run for lieutenant governor on Schweitzer’s ticket ignited 
fury among Republicans. Bob Brown, for one, felt betrayed by the decision. The two had 
known each other for many years and swapped political favors. Bohlinger had been 
Brown’s “sign captain” in Billings during the 2000 secretary of state campaign, ensuring 
that signs promoting Brown’s candidacy were posted throughout the city. When 
Bohlinger was challenged in a primary for his Senate seat, Brown “was one of just a 
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handful of Republican legislators who stuck their necks out to support John.”229 
According to Brown, Bohlinger had even contributed money to Brown’s gubernatorial 
campaign and pledged his support, just a few months before joining the Schweitzer 
ticket. Bohlinger’s decision therefore struck a particular nerve in Brown; “It really 
wounded me because I regarded him as a personal friend and ally.”230 
Many Republicans refused to accept Bohlinger as a member of their party after 
his decision to join the Schweitzer ticket. For example, in mid-October 2004, Lewis and 
Clark County Republican Central Committee chairman Bill Snoddy and vice chairwoman 
Jane Nofsinger filed a complaint with State Political Practices Commissioner Linda 
Vaughey, objecting to Bohlinger’s being called a Republican after filing on the 
Democratic ticket. Snoddy and Nofsinger asked Vaughey to order the Schweitzer 
campaign to halt all advertisements referring to Bohlinger as a member of the Republican 
Party, and to force the Schweitzer campaign to release new advertisements “correcting 
intentional misstatement.”231 Snoddy portrayed the issue as part of a larger pattern of 
deception and misrepresentation by the Schweitzer campaign. “It’s part of the smoke-
and-mirrors campaign that Brian Schweitzer has been giving the people of Montana for 
months,” lamented Snoddy.232 Nothing came of the complaint, however; Vaughey 
announced that she did not have enough time to rule on the matter before the impending 
November 2 elections, and eventually she concluded that the Schweitzer campaign had 
done nothing wrong. 
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For his part, John Bohlinger maintained that he was still a member of the 
Republican Party. “I’ve not left the Republican Party,” he announced shortly after joining 
the Schweitzer ticket. “I’m going to stay here until they kick me out.”233 He reaffirmed 
his political identity after the election, explaining, “I am a Republican. I’m remaining in 
the Republican Party. I feel that it would be disingenuous of us [the incoming 
administration] to suddenly announce to people that now that we are elected I’m 
becoming a Democrat.”234 
Before leaving the subject it should be noted that some Democrats were just as 
displeased by the Bohlinger selection as were Republicans. According to Stern, “A lot of 
the Democratic Party insiders were furious about it at first. They thought this was some 
sort of betrayal.”235 The Bohlinger selection caused no lasting rifts in the Democratic 
Party, however; members quickly apprehended the important electoral advantage it 
provided their nominee and supported the ticket. 
 
The Impact of the Bohlinger Selection on Schweitzer and Brown’s Bipartisan 
Appeal 
 
The Schweitzer campaign’s selection of John Bohlinger provided significant 
strategic advantages in terms of bipartisan appeal, neutralizing the Brown campaign, and 
attracting support in Billings. The first and most obvious advantage of the Bohlinger 
 
233 Ibid. 
 
234 Anez, “Lewis Wants to Replace Resigning Senator,” Associated Press, November 5, 2004. 
http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=68cd15cbe43995154d65fd8253f681bd&_docnum=1& 
wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkVb&_md5=eda7655a15dea7f5428871a86c23cef5. 
 
235 Stern, op cit. 
selection is that it reinforced the Schweitzer campaign’s emphases on bipartisan 
governance and unconventional politics. At his press conference to announce Bohlinger’s 
selection, Brian Schweitzer cited it as indisputable evidence of his commitment to 
bipartisan governance. “People have talked about coming to Helena to build bridges to 
bring the parties together,” he said proudly. “Guess what? We’ve poured the concrete, 
we’ve bolted together the planks, we’ve put the steel over the top. The bridge is built.”236 
To some it was “an empty gesture” because Bohlinger was only nominally a Republican. 
According to Schweitzer, voters appreciated it nonetheless. He said,  
We hear from the people that it’s a breath of fresh air [to have a Democrat and 
Republican running together]. We will win this election, and the day after we will be 
uniquely qualified to bring Montana together to end this polarization, this finger-pointing, 
this partisan gamesmanship.237 
To make the bipartisan appeal of the Schweitzer-Bohlinger ticket clear to voters, 
the Schweitzer campaign prominently featured party affiliations in its advertisements. 
One such advertisement began with Bohlinger standing in his clothing store and 
introducing himself as a Republican businessman from Billings. The video then cut to 
Schweitzer riding a horse and herding cattle. He introduced himself as a Democrat and a 
rancher from Flathead County. Bipartisan symbolism endured as a focus of the 
Schweitzer campaign beyond the 2004 election. As of early 2006, the Governor’s 
updated campaign website led with a photograph of Schweitzer and Bohlinger together, 
and the headline: “A Democrat and a Republican, working together for Montana.”238 
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In addition to strengthening Brian Schweitzer’s candidacy, the selection of John 
Bohlinger neutralized Bob Brown’s bipartisan appeal, which Brown referred to as 
“maybe the most important part of my political identity.”239 Brown’s bipartisan appeal 
was an essential aspect of his campaign from its outset. At his July 2003 announcement, 
he proudly claimed that he and Lewis “know how to forge majorities and build bridges. 
We have forged them and built them.”240 The Bohlinger selection nullified this 
advantage. Said Brown, 
What [the selection of Bohlinger] made possible to do was… [when] anyone would say, 
‘Bob Brown’s pretty skilled as a bridge builder, he’s reached out to groups and 
organizations and people that most Republicans can’t reach out to,’ Schweitzer would 
look at them and say: ‘What do you mean Bob Brown’s a bridge builder? Heck, my 
running mate’s a Republican.’ He trumped that.241 
The Geographic Significance of the Bohlinger Selection 
Brian Schweitzer’s selection of John Bohlinger as his running mate was not 
merely significant in terms of bipartisan appeal; Johnson described the selection as being 
“as much about geographics as demographics.”242 This was a crucial point that is often 
overlooked in discussions of the 2004 Montana gubernatorial election.  
 Bohlinger hailed from Billings, located in Yellowstone County. Electorally, this 
area was regarded as the most consequential, competitive region of Montana. “It is 
Yellowstone County,” explained Sirota, “that is Montana’s own Ohio, and Billings the 
state’s Columbus.”243 Since 1948, only one successful gubernatorial candidate had lost 
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Yellowstone County. (Schweitzer won it in 2004, 51% to 45%.) Billings was 
Yellowstone’s most competitive city; according to Stern, “Billings is where 25% of the 
persuadable vote is.”244 Schweitzer ended up winning Billings, 52% to 48%, although it 
had typically voted Republican. Brown believed that Schweitzer’s victory there, and the 
selection of Bohlinger, proved decisive. “In a statewide election,” he explained, Billings’ 
vote “would probably amount to close to half of [Schweitzer’s] victory margin. I think 
[Schweitzer’s election] was attributable to that crude maneuver of going in and recruiting 
John Bohlinger to be his lieutenant governor.”245 
Many observers believed that residents of Billings, Montana’s largest city, were 
desperate to elect one of their own as Montana’s governor or lieutenant governor, after 
many years without doing so. During the Republican primary, in which all three 
candidates besides Brown lived in Billings, there seemed to be a good chance that the 
Republican gubernatorial nominee would come from Billings. However, as Brown 
recalled, “When I defeated all three of them in the primary, there was still this lingering 
feeling that Billings was being kind of left out.”246 Bohlinger filled this gap, and perhaps 
influenced the votes of many Billings residents as a result. 
Assessing the Impact of the Bohlinger Selection  
Opinions and data conflict on the significance of Brian Schweitzer’s selection of 
John Bohlinger as his running mate. Schweitzer downplayed its importance as purely 
symbolic, asserting 
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I don’t think that brought me a single Republican voter. And the Independent voters don’t 
like Democrats or Republicans, that’s why they haven’t picked a party. But what it said 
to Independent voters and to a small extent Republicans, is ‘This guy really is different. 
He looks and talks different, his profile is different. But already the first decision he’s 
made about being governor of Montana is different.’247 
A May 2004 poll of Montana voters also suggested that the Bohlinger selection did not 
make a crucial difference in the gubernatorial election. Sixteen percent of respondents 
said that Bohlinger’s presence on the Democratic ticket made them more likely to support 
Schweitzer, 12% said it made them less likely, 4% were unsure, and the vast majority, 
68%, said it would have no impact on their vote.248 Other observers believed 
Schweitzer’s selection of Bohlinger was quite significant. In Johnson’s opinion, “I 
thought it was a very, very successful pairing of two people with different backgrounds 
and different parties, in a state where people get real tired of partisan politics.”249 
Moreover, Brown regarded the Bohlinger selection as a decisive element in the 
Schweitzer victory. He argued, “If you could point to one shrewd political move during 
the campaign that importantly influenced the outcome, I would say that was it.”250
 Determining the significance of Schweitzer’s selection of Bohlinger as his 
gubernatorial running mate is very difficult. At the least, it was a notable symbol of 
Schweitzer’s commitment to bipartisan governance and a new style of political 
leadership; at most, it was the decisive campaign strategy that attracted enough support 
among Republicans and Independents, particularly Billings residents, to deliver 
Schweitzer the election. 
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Prominent Issues in the Gubernatorial Campaign 
It would be difficult to describe the 2004 Montana gubernatorial election as 
issues-based. Due to the overwhelming atmosphere of antipathy toward state leadership, 
it would more accurately be described as a referendum on leadership. Yet there were a 
number of issues addressed in the campaign that highlighted important differences 
between Schweitzer and Brown. Of these issues, the economy was the most prominent. 
Prescription drugs and state ballot initiatives also generated significant discussion in the 
campaign. Nonetheless, the campaign focused more on general themes of leadership and 
character, in no small part because Schweitzer’s moderate stance on typically divisive 
partisan issues, such as gun ownership and gay marriage, removed them from contention. 
Desperate for compelling issues, the Brown campaign resorted to petty controversies that 
did not advance Brown’s candidacy in any detectable way. Schweitzer ultimately shaped 
the election as a referendum on leadership, and this worked to his advantage. 
 
Economy 
Of any issue discussed seriously in the gubernatorial campaign, the economy was 
by far the most prominent. Montana’s economy had been stagnant for several years. 
Wages were the lowest in the United States, and a large budget deficit loomed in the 
public mind. Brian Schweitzer and Bob Brown disagreed about the size of the impending 
budget deficit, but the governor’s office estimated it at $100 million and Schweitzer said 
that it would soon become $250 million. Schweitzer blamed Republican leadership for 
the ballooning deficit, claiming that the legislature had relied too heavily on one-time 
taxes and business property tax breaks to balance the budget for the time being. Despite 
their disagreements about the nature and causes of Montana’s economic trials, both 
candidates made the economy the top substantive issue of their respective campaigns. 
Their similar focus was indicated by nearly identical slogans; Schweitzer sought to 
“Grow Montana,” while the Brown campaign sought to “Advance Montana.” According 
to polling done shortly before the election, economic distress was also the foremost issue 
in voters’ minds. A late September 2004 poll had 29% of voters ranking the economy and 
unemployment as the most important issues facing them that November, with state 
budget, taxes, and government spending coming in second at 17%.251 
Brian Schweitzer blamed the poor Montana economy on an era of Republican 
dominance that allegedly favored large out-of-state corporations over small in-state 
businesses. Therefore, Schweitzer’s strategy for reviving Montana’s economy centered 
on aiding small businesses. Schweitzer sought to shift the tax burden from in-state to out-
of-state businesses, particularly “big-box” stores, such as WalMart, that avoided paying 
income taxes by registering as limited liability corporations. Schweitzer’s close 
association with small business interests suited the populist tenor of his campaign. In his 
first television advertisement, Schweitzer discussed his business experience and his 
intention to make small businesses the centerpiece of his economic recovery plan. He 
noted that 85% of Montanans owned or worked for a small business, and that Montana’s 
wages were the lowest in the country. As a result, he believed that small businesses 
merited substantial attention in order to reenergize the state’s dormant economy. 
 Besides small business development, Schweitzer presented many other proposals 
for economic development. He proposed creating an office for encouraging business in 
Montana, convening a task force of state businessmen to cut $60 million in government 
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waste without cutting services, and encouraging youth to attend college and work in 
Montana. Schweitzer referred to Montana as a “salmon economy” in which “all our 
young leave the state and then they come home to die.”252 Montana’s trade school tuition 
was the highest in the nation while, again, state wages were the lowest. Therefore, it was 
no surprise that so many young Montanans pursued their aspirations elsewhere. To help 
address this problem, Schweitzer proposed forgiving up to $12,000 of student debt for 
students who agreed to teach in Montana for four years or more. He also proposed 
training workers at two-year colleges of technology and Montana State University’s 
engineering school. 
 Bob Brown took a much different perspective on the economy than Schweitzer. 
Brown claimed that Montana’s economy had been disrupted in the 1980s by poor 
Democratic leadership, and that it was improving by 2004 thanks to traditional 
Republican policies of reducing taxes and government regulations. He acknowledged that 
further steps had to be taken to advance the economy. Brown believed that Montana’s 
future economic security depended on the development of natural resources such as coal, 
oil, gas, wind energy, and biofuels. Newer and cleaner technologies, he predicted, would 
allow for dramatically increased production of these resources, particularly coal, so as to 
create jobs (13,000 jobs, he boldly estimated at one point) and increase energy 
independence. Schweitzer did not oppose natural resource development, but he tended to 
focus more on developing incentives to encourage ethanol plants, hydrogen power 
projects, and wind power. Schweitzer did, however, object to the aspect of Brown’s plan 
that would divert money from the state’s coal tax trust fund in order to upgrade 
infrastructure and develop natural resources. While Brown foreswore any intention of 
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raiding the trust fund to balance the budget or serve other purposes besides natural 
resource development, the issue provided a rare point of clear, substantive disagreement 
between the candidates. 
 Another essential aspect of Brown’s economic development plan was to rein in 
taxing and spending policies. Brown advocated a cap on state spending and a new vote in 
the legislature on a statewide sales tax that would reduce the state’s dependence on 
income taxes. While he refused to rule out tax increases, Brown made it clear that they 
would be a last resort; “rather than looking for more taxes, I would look for more 
taxpayers,” he explained.253 Schweitzer countered that Brown and other Montana 
Republicans lacked credibility on tax issues because the Martz Administration oversaw 
tax increases on cigarettes, lodging, and rental cars. Schweitzer also claimed that Brown 
had supported tax increases on 73 occasions, although that figure included multiple votes 
on the statewide sales taxes (intended by its supporters to decrease overall taxes) and 
similarly complicated votes. 
 
Prescription Drug Reimportation 
Brian Schweitzer continued to emphasize prescription drug reimportation in the 
2004 gubernatorial campaign, as he had in the 2000 Senate campaign. In the intervening 
four years, he lamented, “All we have gotten from state government is excuses, 
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obstruction, and inaction” on the issue.254 To emphasize the need for a drug reimportation 
plan, Schweitzer set up a press conference in October featuring Pfizer Vice President 
Peter Rost. At the press conference, Rost dismissed claims that reimported drugs are 
unsafe; “The thrust is that reimportation had been done safely within Europe for over 
twenty years and can be done safely here right now.”255 
Bob Brown responded to the Schweitzer campaign’s drug reimportation plan by 
stating that he was in favor of finding ways to obtain affordable prescription drugs for 
Montanans, but that it was irresponsible for gubernatorial candidates to advocate 
violating federal law. “Lawlessness is not leadership,” he was fond of saying. Instead 
Brown vowed that as governor he would petition Congress to change laws prohibiting 
prescription drug reimportation. Yet he damaged his credibility on the prescription drug 
issue when, at a debate late in the campaign, he referred to it as “really not a relevant 
issue now.”256 He meant that the issue had been more relevant four years prior when 
Schweitzer was pursuing a Senate seat from which he could reshape federal policy, but 
Brown’s comment gave voters the impression that he cared less than Schweitzer about 
providing affordable prescription drugs.  
State Ballot Initiatives 
In addition to choosing a president, governor, and other public officials, Montana 
voters were faced in 2004 with decisions on several controversial state ballot initiatives. 
One of these initiatives was an attempt to end the state’s ban on cyanide mining. Montana 
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was the only state in the nation to enforce such a ban. Brown supported ending it because 
he believed that this would help the mining industry to grow and revitalize southwestern 
Montana. This position was in line with his stated approach to environmental issues, 
which was that he would not “want to protect the environment to the extent that we 
foreclose on any job opportunities.”257 Schweitzer did not take a position on the cyanide 
mining issue.  
 Another important state ballot initiative proposed an amendment to the state 
constitution, defining marriage as the union of a man and a woman. The amendment 
passed with 67% of the vote. Schweitzer and Brown supported the amendment, although 
Schweitzer opposed a similar amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
 
Agreement on Divisive Partisan Issues Focuses the Gubernatorial Election on 
Leadership 
 
“I don’t think there were really great areas of disagreement” between the two 
major gubernatorial candidates, said Bob Brown. He added, “I don’t think [Schweitzer] 
wanted any big policy differences.… [His] powerful theme was, ‘It’s time for new 
leadership.’”258 Indeed, Schweitzer agreed with Brown on many of the major issues that 
divided Republicans and Democrats on the national level, including gun rights and same-
sex marriage. His conservative positions on these critical issues, which aligned with the 
majority of Montana voters, deprived Republicans of traditional attack lines at a time 
when national partisan sentiments were most pronounced due to the simultaneous 
presidential election. Moreover, by removing divisive partisan issues from the campaign 
debate, Schweitzer was able to focus the election on the more general and advantageous 
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theme of leadership. Montana voters, Schweitzer explained, “were looking for a chief 
executive of the state. And if you take some things off the table that make them nervous 
about your values, now they’re looking for the most competent guy.”259 It is impossible 
to know to what extent Schweitzer adapted or enunciated his conservative views on 
divisive partisan issues in order to remove them from debate. It is clear, however, that his 
approach helped Schweitzer to cultivate bipartisan appeal and keep the campaign focused 
on leadership. 
 
Lack of Contentious Issues Leads the Brown Campaign to Focus on Trivialities 
Brian Schweitzer and Bob Brown’s agreement on divisive partisan issues led the 
Brown campaign, in desperation, to seize on several issues that appeared petty and 
irrelevant to voters. The most prominent example involved Schweitzer’s purchase of a 
truck in Idaho. In June 2004, Kalispell auto dealer Greg Scarff faxed to other Montana 
auto dealers receipts from Schweitzer’s purchase of a truck in Idaho earlier that year. The 
Idaho dealership, Dave Smith Motors, was notorious among Northwestern dealers for 
attracting regional customers with exceptionally low prices. In 1998, the dealers’ 
resentment led them to threaten a boycott of Chrysler unless the company began 
providing fewer cars to Dave Smith Motors.  
 After hearing about Schweitzer’s out-of-state purchase, the Brown campaign 
adopted it as an example of Schweitzer’s alleged hypocrisy. Brown, who vowed that he 
had never bought a vehicle out of state, ridiculed Schweitzer for promoting the growth of 
Montana small businesses at the same time that he bypassed them for major purchases. 
As a result, said Brown, “There is a question of Brian Schweitzer’s credibility. People 
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need to trust their governor as well as agree with him. This incident casts doubt on our 
ability to trust Brian.”260 Dave Lewis went so far as to hold a press event at the Helena 
car dealership where he purchased his new pickup truck. “I’m proud I could buy locally,” 
Lewis announced. “As a candidate for lieutenant governor, I know I can’t sell Montana 
and Montana products if I sell out by spending my money out of state.”261 
The Schweitzer campaign dismissed the controversy as trivial. The campaign 
even converted it to Schweitzer’s advantage by portraying his purchase as an act of 
admirable fiscal responsibility. Schweitzer produced documents showing that he had 
saved between $5,000 and $13,000 by purchasing his truck in Idaho, insisting that he had 
acted as any other Montanan would in seeking the best deal available. When urged to 
apologize for the purchase,  
I said, ‘Like hell I’m going to do that. It was a good business decision to do that, and as 
my job in running a business is to buy for the lowest price and sell for the highest price, 
that’s my job. And as governor of Montana I’ll run Montana the same way.’262 
The Schweitzer campaign also questioned the relevance of this controversy to the 
gubernatorial campaign; why not instead discuss important policy issues such as health 
care, prescription drugs, education, and the economy? Many observers agreed that the 
campaign needed to focus on more important matters of governance,263 leading 
Schweitzer to conclude that the truck purchase issue “hurt [supporters of the Brown 
campaign], not helped them.”264 
260 Anez, “Candidate’s Auto-Buying Decision in Political Spotlight,” Associated Press, July 20, 2004. 
http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=fd2e395c474cd6eca174389f24c7f013&_docnum=1& 
wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkVb&_md5=7d6330151eebdcbbd01bc6016449c96a. 
 
261 Ibid. 
 
262 Brown, op cit. 
263 Professor Wilson reflected, “It’s a little sad. Both [men] are qualified to be governor. One would hope 
they would use some bigger issues.” Wilson, op cit. 
 
Likewise, in early October Brown released his tax records and challenged 
Schweitzer to do the same. When Schweitzer refused on grounds that, until elected, his 
taxes were matters of private record, the Brown campaign ran advertisements suggesting 
Schweitzer had something to hide. Then, in the last weeks of the campaign, the 
Republican Governors Association released television and radio advertisements alleging 
that Schweitzer was unethical in his business practices. The ads featured three people 
whom allegedly had been sold wet bales of hay by Schweitzer, leading them to describe 
him as “unethical.” It later turned out that one of the persons featured in the ad was a 
cousin of Brown’s. For his part, Brown disapproved of the ads. The Brown campaign, 
however, had no say in the matter because campaign finance laws forbid it from 
coordinating with the RGA, as a so-called 527 organization.265 Brown preferred focusing 
on state issues and maintaining a positive message. “If I was putting political ads together 
myself,” he said, “that’s not how I’d go about them.”266 
Controversies such as the ones just described created a bitter campaign. Both 
candidates initially attempted to preclude a negative campaign when they drafted and 
signed pledges in Summer 2004 to refrain from negative attacks on their opponent, unless 
the other candidate first broke his pledge. The Brown campaign believed that the 
Schweitzer campaign broke this pledge with its website attacks on Brown’s lobbying 
activities for the Columbia Falls Aluminum Company. Schweitzer, on the other hand, 
said Brown broke his pledge by focusing on the car and ethics controversies described 
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above. Angrily, Schweitzer characterized a negative ad late in the campaign as “a 
desperate act from a desperate career politician who, after 26 years in Helena, has 
absolutely no record to run on and no ideas for the future of our state.”267 Schweitzer’s 
bitterness lasted well beyond the gubernatorial campaign, when he described the Brown 
campaign in early 2006 as follows: 
Their campaign was negative, from beginning to end. All negative about me.… [Instead] 
of trying to sum up the case, ‘Vote for our candidate,’ they summed up the case, ‘Vote 
against the other guy’…. They ran 90% of their points negative on me…. They just 
claimed that I was a bad guy and [voters] should not trust me. It wasn’t even issues that 
they came after me for.268
Frankly, though, Schweitzer’s characterization of the Brown campaign does not comport 
with newspaper and observer accounts. Johnson, for one, called Schweitzer’s 
characterization an “overstatement,” and noted that the Brown campaign had produced 
positive policy statements on many issues.269 
The Presidential Election Minimally Impacts the 2004 Montana Gubernatorial 
Election 
 
As was the case in Vermont, there was very little evidence to suggest that the 
2004 presidential election significantly impacted that year’s Montana gubernatorial 
election. Unlike Vermont’s gubernatorial election, however, the candidate whose 
presidential election counterpart was expected to win Montana’s vote, Republican Bob 
Brown, made no effort to link his opponent to unpopular Democratic presidential 
candidate John Kerry.  
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Simultaneous Gubernatorial and Presidential Elections in Recent Montana History 
Recent Montana electoral history suggested that the presidential election would 
not play an important role in the simultaneous 2004 gubernatorial election. According to 
Bob Brown, Montana’s “history shows no consistency between the candidate who carries 
the state for president and the candidate who carries the state for governor.”270 Indeed, 
since 1964 Montanans have chosen gubernatorial and presidential candidates of the same 
party on only three occasions. More recent elections, however, indicate that a new trend 
might be emerging; Republican gubernatorial and presidential candidates were both 
chosen in three of the past five election cycles, 1988, 1996, and 2000.  
 
2004: Montana’s Gubernatorial Election Overshadows the Presidential Election 
It was clear from the outset that 2004 presidential politics would be muted in 
Montana. According to Professor Wilson, “Democrats basically conceded the state well 
in advance of the election” because they knew that President George W. Bush would 
easily win its three electoral votes.271 Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry was 
widely perceived as too liberal for Montana’s tastes. “People in Montana, the only way 
they would like someone like John Kerry would be for breakfast,” said Bob Brown. “He 
just doesn’t fit here.”272 Consequently, there was minimal presidential campaign presence 
from either side. Kerry’s sister was the only representative of either campaign to visit 
Montana, and the only time Montanans saw ads for the presidential race was when the 
ads were featured on national cable channels such as Fox News, MSNBC, and CNN. It 
was hardly surprising that the presidential election failed to swallow the simultaneous 
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gubernatorial election, given the subdued nature of the state presidential campaign. “The 
coattails of Bush were negated by the state issues that were more important,” according 
to Brown.273 The available evidence supports this assessment. 
 
The Gubernatorial Candidates Choose Not to Emphasize National Politics 
Some participants in the gubernatorial election expected national politics to play a 
very prominent role. Sirota typified this expectation by writing, “With gay marriage, 
medical marijuana, and environmental initiatives on the ballot, the Republicans would be 
relentless in calling Schweitzer a Kerry clone.”274 Yet in striking contrast to Peter 
Clavelle’s campaign for the Vermont governorship, the Brown campaign chose not to 
“nationalize” the gubernatorial election or attempt to tie its opponent to Democratic 
presidential candidate John Kerry. “I can’t remember that national issues, even including 
the Iraq situation, were important in this campaign at all,” said Brown, as if it were the 
first time the thought had crossed his mind.275 Besides featuring Kerry’s name in perhaps 
a campaign press release or two, Brown recalled, “I didn’t attempt to tie Schweitzer to 
John Kerry.”276 Nor was there strong pressure to do so, according to Brown.  
We had people, old friends and political advisers and that sort of thing, and we had more 
than one bull session, and I’m sure it probably came up. But it never emerged as an 
important part of our campaign strategy.277 
Surely, the Brown campaign resisted temptations to link Schweitzer to Kerry in part 
because it strongly doubted the efficacy of such a strategy. Brown was quite aware of 
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Montana’s history of electing gubernatorial and presidential candidates of different 
parties in the same election year. He also realized that Schweitzer was too clever to align 
closely with Kerry and his policies. Brown speculated, “I think Schweitzer smelled that 
[Kerry was very unpopular in Montana] and he probably deliberately tried to make it as 
difficult as possible to tie him in any way to the Democratic national ticket.”278 
The Schweitzer campaign, for its part, also believed that national politics had little 
relevance to the gubernatorial election. “Voters tend to look at state issues separately 
from national issues,” noted Stern.279 Schweitzer also believed strongly in the need to 
focus on state issues. He said,  
A governor doesn’t need to talk about national issues. The governor doesn’t have any 
juicy national issues. There’s no reason for you to even proffer an opinion about defense 
issues, and national taxation policies, and things like [abortion] choice or not, because 
those are all national issues.280 
Thus, the 2004 presidential election figured minimally in that year’s gubernatorial 
campaign because both candidates believed that it was irrelevant to the state issues that 
were most important to voters.  
 
Assessing Schweitzer’s Gubernatorial Election Victory 
 On November 2, 2004, Brian Schweitzer defeated Bob Brown in the Montana 
gubernatorial election by a margin of 51% to 47%. (A small percentage of the vote went 
to the Green and Libertarian candidates.) Despite Schweitzer’s rather narrow margin of 
victory, he had been the favorite throughout virtually the entire campaign. Yet this hardly 
indicates that campaign strategies of the Schweitzer campaign and the Montana 
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Democratic Party were irrelevant. In fact, it is reasonable to conclude that campaign 
strategies were essential to preserving Schweitzer’s lead and ultimately providing his 
narrow margin of victory.  
 
Polling Shows Schweitzer Leading Brown During the Gubernatorial Campaign 
 
Every significant poll conducted during the gubernatorial campaign showed Brian 
Schweitzer leading Bob Brown, by varying margins. The earliest poll, conducted in 
December 2003 by Mason-Dixon Polling & Research, had Schweitzer leading Brown 
42% to 39%, with 19% of respondents undecided. Mason-Dixon Managing Director Brad 
Coker attributed Schweitzer’s early lead to his status as the best-known candidate in the 
race at the time. Indeed, the Mason-Dixon poll showed Schweitzer with 35% favorable 
name recognition, 14% unfavorable, 43% neutral, and only 8% of respondents failing to 
recognize his name. Brown, on the other hand, was known favorably to 28% of 
respondents and unfavorably to only 6%, while 43% were neutral and 23% did not 
recognize his name.281 It is a testament to Schweitzer’s hard-fought 2000 Senate race and 
constant activity around Montana in the years afterward that he was familiar to more 
voters entering 2004 than a twenty-six-year state legislator and sitting secretary of state.  
 Later polling continued to show Schweitzer with a healthy lead over Brown, 
although sometimes by widely varying margins. A Mason-Dixon poll released in late 
October gave Schweitzer a 48% to 43% advantage, while 8% of respondents were 
undecided.282 Just days before that poll’s release, a Montana State University-Billings 
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poll presented quite different results. The MSU poll showed Schweitzer leading Brown 
43% to 28%, with 27% of respondents undecided.283 Given the wide discrepancy between 
this poll and others conducted throughout the campaign, Thielman dismissed it as 
inaccurate. “I don’t want to disparage the students and their polling,” he said, “but this is 
not a professional poll and doesn’t match with any of the other polling, public or private, 
that we’ve seen.”284 
Schweitzer’s Decisive Monetary Advantage 
One of Brian Schweitzer’s most important advantages throughout the 
gubernatorial campaign was his superior campaign funding. In total, Schweitzer raised 
nearly $1.5 million, spending all but $95,000, while Brown collected $1.2 million and 
spent all but $3,000. These figures were skewed by a late surge on Brown’s part; in the 
last twenty-five days of the campaign, Brown raised $83,248 to Schweitzer’s $40,545.285 
By that point, though, it was difficult for Brown to compete with Schweitzer, as 
Schweitzer outspent him by an almost two to one margin in the critical months of 
September and October.  
 Complicating the fundraising activities of Schweitzer and Brown was the fact that 
the candidates were often competing for a very similar pool of donors. According to the 
 
282 “Schweitzer Leads Brown in New Poll,” Associated Press, October 24, 2004. http://web.lexis-
nexis.com/universe/document?_m=0d8bcff63a469b36953ab7023815ac2a&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-
zSkVb&_md5=8595e3babf593efe5f8797b58d787ccd. 
 
283 Anez, “Resumes.” 
 
284 Anez, “Poll Shows Schweitzer With Big Lead Over Brown,” Associated Press, October 14, 2004. 
http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=8bf89dde980fc89c7dc8f10d289a3d3a&_docnum=1&w 
chp=dGLbVtz-zSkVb&_md5=fd0d1bbf82ff9f6c59799c8c17b38640. [Hereafter cited as Anez, “Shows.”] 
285 Anez, “Governor’s Race Fund-Raising Tops $2.3 Billion,” Associated Press, October 18, 2004. 
http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=2e107a7dfc113806758c6d204758a64e&_docnum=1& 
wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkVb&_md5=f7c05a8de3e2bba968182b4117fa6e39. 
Great Falls Tribune, both received most of their contributions from business owners, 
retirees, lawyers, teachers, and farmers.286 Moreover, most of their contributions came 
from the same six cities: Billings, Missoula, Bozeman, Helena, Great Falls, and 
Whitefish.287 There were important differences in their fundraising patterns, though. As 
of early September, Schweitzer had attracted 8,500 donors to Brown’s 3,700. Out-of-state 
contributors, many of them donors to his 2000 Senate race, provided Schweitzer with 
$214,000, or 19% of his total campaign funds. Meanwhile, Brown was able to attract 
only 8.5% of his contributions from outside Montana.288 Schweitzer boasted of his 
fundraising successes as evidence of broad and diverse support for his candidacy. “I’ve 
got a wide band of support,” he said. “I have Republicans and Democrats and 
Independents. We have hundreds of people, maybe thousands of people, who have never 
contributed to a campaign before.”289 
Contributions of the Montana Democratic Party 
As a candidate intent on distancing himself from partisan politics and portraying 
himself as a government outsider with broad bipartisan support, Brian Schweitzer did not 
rely heavily on the Montana Democratic Party to deliver his electoral victory. The party 
helped with many basic aspects of the campaign, including organization, leaflets, 
canvassing, and get-out-the-vote efforts. Moreover, it had the ability to raise money 
indirectly for Schweitzer’s campaign and attack his opponent without reflecting directly 
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on Schweitzer. For the most part, however, Schweitzer “distanced himself from the 
formal [Democratic] Party in Helena.”290 This was indicated by Schweitzer’s decision to 
establish campaign headquarters in his hometown of Whitefish, two hundred miles 
outside of Helena. It was a very unusual move for a statewide candidate to run his 
campaign out of anywhere but the state capitol. Yet this decision was an important 
symbol of Schweitzer’s intention to run as an individual not bound by partisan 
constraints. “We didn’t call on them,” Schweitzer said dismissively of the Montana 
Democratic Party’s role in his gubernatorial campaign. 
We had our own volunteers. We built a base of Brian supporters, not a base of Democrats 
who were showing up for Brian…. It looked a lot different than the traditional 
Democratic supporters. We went out and mined new people to get excited about politics. 
A great part of the people who worked for us had never been involved in politics in their 
lives.291 
While the Montana Democratic Party provided logistical assistance to the 
Schweitzer campaign, the above evidence indicates that it was not an essential strategic 
partner in the Schweitzer gubernatorial campaign. This level of involvement differs from 
the Vermont gubernatorial election, in which the Vermont Republican Party cooperated 
intimately with the Douglas campaign. Thus, even if campaign strategies are to be 
deemed primary factors in state voter choices of gubernatorial and presidential candidates 
of different parties in the same election year, in some cases the strategies are not 
attributable to the efforts of state party organizations. This study’s thesis therefore must 
be qualified to reflect the varying contributions of state party organizations. 
 
Evaluating the Significance of Schweitzer Campaign Strategies 
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The Schweitzer campaign believed it had a strong chance of victory from the 
outset of the campaign. “We were in about as good a position as you could possibly ask 
for,” Stern reflected.292 Indeed, Brian Schweitzer was an excellent gubernatorial 
candidate who far exceeded expectations in his only previous race, while his opponent 
was a reluctant candidate hamstrung by party disunity and a backlash against Republican 
state governance. Although the presidential election did not seem to have any coattail 
effects in the gubernatorial election, Schweitzer was quite possibly the beneficiary of a 
late surge toward Democratic candidates in Montana. An October poll showed that 49% 
of respondents planned to vote for a Republican candidate in the upcoming legislative 
elections, while 35% said they would vote for a Democrat and 13% were undecided.293 
Given the fact that Democrats won control of the legislature in the November elections, it 
would appear that voters broke heavily toward Democratic candidates at the end of the 
campaign. Thus, the Schweitzer campaign had several independent factors pointing 
toward victory, including voters’ strong preference for change in state leadership, an 
excellent candidate, a weak opponent, and the minimal attention paid to the presidential 
election by Montana’s largely pro-Bush electorate. Yet the foregoing analysis suggests 
that it would be a mistake to discount the role of gubernatorial campaign strategies in 
shaping the final election results. 
 As was the case in Vermont, Montana’s winning gubernatorial candidate never 
polled at his eventual vote percentage before Election Day. In Brian Schweitzer’s case, 
his 51% of the vote made for a much narrower margin of victory than Jim Douglas 
enjoyed in Vermont. Schweitzer’s slim victory meant that campaign strategies had all the 
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more opportunity to influence the outcome of the election than Douglas’ did in his race. 
As delineated above, the Schweitzer campaign introduced several brilliant tactics that 
may have accounted for voters’ eventual decisions to support his candidacy. Projecting 
the “Brawny Rancher” image was important in gaining voters’ trust while reinforcing the 
populist, outsider theme of the Schweitzer campaign. The Schweitzer campaign also 
succeeded in gaining voters’ trust by identifying him with hunting and fishing issues. (Its 
success is indicated by the previously mentioned Schweitzer campaign poll in which 
respondents stated that Schweitzer “shared their values” more than Brown.) Instead of 
accepting a defensive stance on hunting and fishing issues, given Republicans’ traditional 
advantages on them, Schweitzer masterfully outflanked his Republican opponent by 
focusing on land access. While appealing strongly to conservative gamesmen as the most 
aggressive protector of hunting and fishing rights in the race, Schweitzer also appealed to 
his Democratic base through land access because his plan benefited the environment and 
maintained state control of public lands. With hunting and fishing issues, as well as with 
gay marriage, Schweitzer cleverly removed from the gubernatorial election debate some 
of the most divisive partisan issues often used by Republicans to demonize Democratic 
opponents. While it is difficult to catalogue these positions as campaign strategies 
because they may simply represent honest enunciations of the candidate’s deeply held 
convictions, it is fair to say that Schweitzer was forthright in advertising these views. 
Quite likely, he did this to assure Montana voters that he shared their core values. Most 
significantly, though, by taking these divisive issues off the table, Schweitzer ensured a 
campaign focused less on contentious issues and more on the general theme of leadership 
that was advantageous to his candidacy.  
The Schweitzer campaign dominated the gubernatorial election’s core issue, 
leadership, thanks in large part to its effective campaign strategies. Foremost among these 
strategies were tying Bob Brown to the Republican political establishment, portraying 
Schweitzer as a government outsider, and selecting Republican John Bohlinger to run on 
the Democratic ticket for lieutenant governor. The Schweitzer campaign managed to 
“cleverly and effectively” tie Brown to: the Republican legislature’s unpopular 1997 
electricity industry deregulation, although he was not a member of the legislature at the 
time; the Judy Martz Administration, although he was not a member of it and had little 
affinity for Martz; and the Republican political establishment, although he was among its 
most moderate, independent members. Given the strong antiestablishment current among 
voters at this time, it was a tremendous coup for the Schweitzer campaign to 
convincingly argue these tenuous ties, to the detriment of Brown’s candidacy.  
Moreover, the Schweitzer campaign was able to further capitalize on 
antiestablishment sentiment by effectively portraying Schweitzer as a government 
outsider. Since Schweitzer had never held political office, this should not have been very 
difficult. Yet he reinforced this perception cleverly, by distancing himself from the 
formal Democratic Party apparatus, holding a lieutenant governor’s audition, and 
campaigning differently from typical candidates in terms of dress, speech, and 
enthusiasm. Lastly, and perhaps most important, was Schweitzer’s selection of John 
Bohlinger as his running mate. This move unmistakably signaled to voters that 
Schweitzer was serious about bipartisan governance and defying political conventions. It 
also had other, less obvious consequences beneficial to the Schweitzer campaign. First, 
creating a bipartisan ticket deprived Brown of his general election trump card, his 
reputation and record of bipartisan cooperation. Second, Bohlinger’s selection helped 
Schweitzer to gain support in Billings, the most electorally significant city in Montana 
and typically a Republican stronghold.  
 Like the Vermont gubernatorial election, the Montana gubernatorial election did 
not produce exit polling in which voters were asked to assess the importance of 
gubernatorial campaign strategies and other factors behind their votes. While there is thus 
no way to scientifically measure the impact of gubernatorial campaign strategies in the 
2004 Montana gubernatorial election, there are substantial indications that they played 
the decisive role in Brian Schweitzer’s bare-majority victory. Certainly, factors 
independent of campaign strategies contributed to Schweitzer’s victory, including voter 
dissatisfaction with Republican governance, Schweitzer’s attractive personality and 
moderate political philosophy, Brown’s uninspired candidacy, and Republican disunity. 
Voters were aware of these factors early in the campaign, or at least well before the very 
end. Yet Schweitzer’s final share of the vote, 51%, was not reflected in any of the polling 
done throughout the campaign; he peaked in October at 48%.  
Why did the necessary amount of voters decide at the end of the gubernatorial 
campaign to support Schweitzer? Might it have been that voters, as Stern suggested, 
opted for the populist image of the “Brawny Rancher” for lack of any substantive voting 
basis? Might they have been convinced by the Schweitzer campaign’s arguments that 
Brown was an establishment politician incapable of bringing meaningful change to 
Helena, or by the argument that Schweitzer was actually capable of bringing such a 
change? Were they impressed by the symbolism of an unprecedented bipartisan ticket? 
Were they convinced that Schweitzer was the more credible protector of hunting and 
fishing rights? These, too, are all distinct possibilities, and it is hard to see how they 
could be ruled out as contributors to the gubernatorial election outcome. They were also 
products of a very focused, perceptive, adept gubernatorial campaign on behalf of Brian 
Schweitzer. 
Thus, the 2004 Montana gubernatorial election provides an important test of the 
thesis that campaign strategies of gubernatorial candidates and their state party 
organizations are the primary factors affecting state voter choice of gubernatorial and 
presidential candidates of different parties in the same election year. The evidence 
shows that this study’s thesis must be qualified to reflect the varying contributions of 
state party organizations to the development and implementation of gubernatorial 
campaign strategies. More importantly, though, the evidence does not provide a 
concrete basis for evaluating the essence of this study’s thesis, that campaign 
strategies are primarily responsible for mixed partisan outcomes in simultaneous 
gubernatorial and presidential elections. Yet the lack of a concrete basis for 
evaluation does not invalidate this study’s thesis. This study has uncovered many 
important indications that its thesis is for the most part valid. 
 
Chapter V: Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Study
This study tests the thesis that campaign strategies of 
gubernatorial candidates and their state party organizations are the 
primary factors affecting state voter choice of gubernatorial and 
presidential candidates of different parties in the same election year. It 
does so by presenting data interpretations, media analysis, and case 
studies featuring personal interviews with campaign participants and 
observers. 
The previous chapter has already indicated that this study’s thesis necessitates 
qualification to reflect the varying roles of state party organizations in developing and 
implementing gubernatorial campaign strategies. Drawing firm conclusions on the 
validity of this study’s thesis is further complicated by conflicting evidence on the 
influence of presidential coattails. Recent electoral data presented in Chapter II show that 
mixed partisan outcomes occur more frequently in separated versus simultaneous 
gubernatorial and presidential elections. Yet the explanation for this disparity is elusive. 
The preceding case studies of Vermont and Montana’s 2004 gubernatorial elections 
exhibit no evidence of significant presidential coattail effects. Moreover, data presented 
later in this chapter indicate that, while presidential elections produce much higher 
gubernatorial vote totals in simultaneous versus separated gubernatorial elections, they do 
not exert discernible coattail effects. In fact, the most recent electoral data actually 
indicate that gubernatorial candidates of a state’s losing presidential party improve their 
vote percentages in simultaneous versus separated gubernatorial and presidential 
elections, while outperforming gubernatorial candidates of a state’s winning presidential 
party in simultaneous elections. 
 The intriguing disconnect between these data require further research. It also 
complicates evaluations of this study’s thesis. If presidential coattails significantly 
influence simultaneous gubernatorial election results, this is all the more reason to expect 
that persuasive gubernatorial campaign strategies are necessary to produce mixed partisan 
outcomes. On the other hand, if presidential coattails do not significantly influence 
simultaneous gubernatorial elections results, there is nothing unique about the role of 
gubernatorial campaign strategies in causing mixed partisan outcomes in these elections. 
This is not to say that gubernatorial campaign strategies then would not be decisive and 
this study’s thesis would be invalid, only that they would be equally consequential in all 
cases of gubernatorial and presidential mixed partisan outcomes. As a result, there would 
be no need for gubernatorial campaigns to compensate in any way for simultaneous 
presidential elections. There would also be no reason to further study simultaneous 
gubernatorial and presidential elections as a unique phenomenon and no reason for state 
legislators to concern themselves with scheduling gubernatorial elections so as to avoid 
presidential influences.  
 This chapter presents conclusions on the significance of simultaneous 
gubernatorial and presidential elections, in terms of how they impact gubernatorial 
campaigns and election outcomes. It draws on these conclusions to evaluate the validity 
of this study’s thesis, and proposes areas for further study. 
 
Differing Dynamics Among States With Simultaneous Gubernatorial and Presidential 
Elections 
 
Chapter II indicates that there is no clear formula for predicting which types of 
simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections will produce mixed partisan 
outcomes. Recent election data indicate that there are no sweeping votes for change and 
no correspondence between mixed partisan outcomes in close elections or landslides. 
Each election must be examined individually to determine the reasons for its outcome. As 
Bob Brown explained, “If you look at the governor’s race in Kentucky or Missouri or 
Florida or wherever, you’d find a set of circumstances unique to that state and that 
election and that time.”294 Although only four states produced mixed partisan outcomes 
in simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections in 2004, they represented a 
remarkably diverse set of states and political environments. Moreover, the campaigns 
examined in this work’s two case studies demonstrate that presidential elections do not 
affect simultaneous gubernatorial elections uniformly.  
 
Mixed Partisan Outcomes in Simultaneous Gubernatorial and Presidential Elections Occur in a Variety of States and Political 
Environments 
 
The occurrence of mixed partisan outcomes in simultaneous gubernatorial and 
presidential elections is not restricted to particular types of states or political 
environments. The 2004 elections produced such results all over the country, including 
New England (Vermont), the Mid-Atlantic (West Virginia), the South (North Carolina), 
and the West (Montana). Moreover, they occurred in less populated, rural states 
(Vermont, West Virginia, Montana), as well as a more populated and industrial state 
(North Carolina).  
 In terms of political environments, mixed partisan outcomes in simultaneous 
gubernatorial and presidential elections occurred in Republican presidential states (West 
Virginia, North Carolina, Montana) and a Democratic presidential state (Vermont); they 
occurred in a presidential swing state (West Virginia),295 the neighbor of a swing state 
(Vermont, neighbor of New Hampshire), a weakly contested state (North Carolina), and a 
virtually uncontested state (Montana); they occurred by narrow margins in gubernatorial 
elections (Montana), as well as by gubernatorial landslides (West Virginia, North 
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Carolina, Vermont);296 they occurred in incumbent gubernatorial elections (Vermont, 
North Carolina), as well as open seat elections (West Virginia, Montana); they occurred 
at the same time that the winning gubernatorial candidate’s party gained control of their 
state legislatures (Montana, North Carolina), at the same time that the winning 
gubernatorial candidate’s party lost control of its state legislature (Vermont), and at the 
same time that the winning gubernatorial candidate’s party maintained control of its state 
legislature (West Virginia). 
 
Gubernatorial Campaigns Do Not Uniformly Incorporate Simultaneous Presidential Elections  
 
The case studies presented earlier on Vermont and Montana’s 2004 gubernatorial 
elections demonstrate that presidential elections have widely varying impacts on 
simultaneous gubernatorial election campaigns. The presidential election and national 
politics played a very prominent role in Vermont’s gubernatorial campaign. Democratic 
gubernatorial candidate Peter Clavelle made Republican Governor Jim Douglas’ support 
of Republican President George W. Bush and the Iraq war a central campaign issue 
during the campaign’s final month. Clavelle’s first television ad featured a car with a 
bumper sticker for the Bush-Cheney presidential ticket alongside a Douglas for Governor 
bumper sticker. Clavelle’s first Internet ad featured a caricature of Douglas in cowboy 
dress, speaking in a thick Texas accent about his support for the Bush ticket. 
Rhetorically, Clavelle and his campaign representatives told voters that they could not 
support Douglas’ candidacy without also supporting Bush’s candidacy. 
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Douglas defeated Democrat Peter Clavelle, 59% to 38%.  
By contrast, the campaign of Montana Republican gubernatorial candidate Bob 
Brown did not attempt to tie Democratic opponent Brian Schweitzer to Democratic 
presidential nominee John Kerry, despite Kerry’s unpopularity in the state. Brown also 
did not emphasize national political issues, such as the Iraq war. Schweitzer, for his part, 
did not discuss the presidential election and national politics. He was not a visible 
supporter of Kerry, whereas Governor Douglas served as chairman of the Bush-Cheney 
campaign in Vermont.  
 
Conclusions on the Relevance of Presidential Elections to Simultaneous Gubernatorial 
Elections 
 
Analysis of simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections, 
particularly voting data from the 2004 elections, lead to two important 
conclusions about the relevance of presidential elections to 
simultaneous gubernatorial elections. First, the total votes cast for 
governor increases dramatically when coinciding with a presidential 
election. Second, the increase in votes cast for governor during a 
presidential election year does not confer a detectable benefit, or 
coattail effect, on the gubernatorial candidate of a state’s winning 
presidential party. The second conclusion, as discussed earlier in this 
chapter, conflicts with the evidence presented in Chapter II 
demonstrating that mixed partisan outcomes are more likely to occur in 
separated versus simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections. 
Thus, further study is required to explain this conflict before any 
definitive conclusions can be reached on the influence of presidential 
coattails on simultaneous gubernatorial election results. 
 
Increases in Gubernatorial Voting 
 
Presidential elections have a clear and dramatic impact on the total votes cast for 
governor. In simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections, the total votes cast for 
governor are nearly identical to the number cast for president; in 2004, 15,225,053 votes 
were cast for governor in states that also cast 15,371,615 votes for president. The 
gubernatorial vote total in states with simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential 
elections thus equaled 99% of the total votes cast in those states for president. This is in 
sharp contrast to states with separated gubernatorial and presidential elections; in these 
states, 70,241,301 votes were cast for governor in elections held between 2001 and 2003, 
whereas 106,774,207 votes were cast in these states for president in 2004. The 
gubernatorial vote total in states with separated gubernatorial and presidential elections 
thus equaled only 65.8% of the total votes cast in those states for president. This means 
that gubernatorial voting rates increased by more than half in simultaneous versus 
separated gubernatorial elections. (See Chart 1 for gubernatorial and presidential vote 
total comparisons in simultaneous versus separated gubernatorial and presidential 
elections, 2001-2004.)  
 
Chart 1. Gubernatorial and Presidential Vote Total Comparisons in Separated Versus Simultaneous Gubernatorial and Presidential 
Elections, 2001-2004 
 
Separated Gubernatorial and Presidential Elections 
 Election Presidential  Gub'torial Presidential Gub'l % of
Year Vote Total Vote Total Minus Gub'l Prs'l Vote 
Alabama 2002 1,883,415 1,366,603 -516,812 72.6
Alaska 2002 312,598 231,484 -81,114 74.1
Arizona 2002 2,012,585 1,226,111 -786,474 60.9
Arkansas 2002 1,054,945 805,332 -249,613 76.3
California* 2003 12,450,804 8,657,915 -3,792,889 69.5
Colorado 2002 2,129,630 1,412,602 -717,028 66.3
Connecticut 2002 1,578,769 1,022,942 -1,106,688 64.8
Florida 2002 7,609,810 5,058,272 -2,551,538 66.5
Georgia 2002 3,298,790 2,025,861 -1,272,929 61.4
Hawaii 2002 429,013 376,656 -52,357 87.8
Idaho 2002 598,376 411,477 -186,899 68.8
Illinois 2002 5,274,322 3,538,883 -1,735,439 67.1
Iowa 2002 1,506,908 1,025,802 -481,106 68.1
Kansas 2002 1,187,756 818,688 -369,068 68.9
Kentucky 2003 1,795,860 1,083,443 -712,417 60.3
Louisiana 2003 1,943,106 1,407,842 -535,264 72.5
Maine 2002 740,752 494,578 -246,174 66.8
Maryland 2002 2,384,238 1,693,014 -691,224 71.0
Mass. 2002 2,912,388 2,192,878 -719,510 75.3
Michigan 2002 4,839,252 3,177,565 -1,661,687 65.7
Minnesota 2002 2,828,387 2,252,473 -575,914 79.6
Mississippi 2003 1,152,145 894,487 -257,658 77.6
Nebraska 2002 778,186 480,991 -297,195 61.8
Nevada 2002 829,587 504,079 -325,508 60.8
New Jersey 2001 3,611,691 2,185,027 -1,426,664 60.5
New Mexico 2002 756,304 484,229 -272,075 64.0
New York 2002 7,448,266 4,579,078 -2,869,188 61.5
Ohio 2002 5,627,903 3,228,617 -2,399,286 57.4
Oklahoma 2002 1,463,758 1,035,620 -428,138 70.8
Oregon 2002 1,836,782 1,257,549 -579,233 68.5
Pennsylvania 2002 5,765,764 3,582,560 -2,183,204 62.1
Rhode Island 2002 437,134 331,834 -105,300 75.9
S. Carolina 2002 1,619,898 1,106,562 -513,336 68.3
S. Dakota 2002 388,215 334,559 -53,656 86.2
Tennessee 2002 2,437,319 1,624,087 -813,232 66.6
Texas 2002 7,410,749 4,553,982 -2,856,767 61.5
Virginia 2001 3,198,367 1,871,411 -1,326,956 58.5
Wisconsin 2002 2,997,007 1,720,749 -1,276,258 57.4
Wyoming 2002 243,428 185,459 -57,969 76.2
Totals   106,774,207 70,241,301 -36,532,906 65.8
* California held a special recall vote for governor in 2003. Its regular elections take place in even non-
presidential years (2002, 2006).  
Simultaneous Gubernatorial and Presidential Elections 
 Election Presidential Gub'torial Presidential Gub'l % of
Year Vote Total Vote Total Minus Gub'l Prs'l Vote 
Delaware 2004 375,190 365,008 -10,182 97.3
Indiana 2004 2,468,002 2,448,503 -19,499 99.2
Missouri 2004 2,731,364 2,719,599 -11,765 99.6
Montana 2004 450,434 446,146 -4,288 99.0
N. Hampshire 2004 677,662 665,539 -12,123 98.2
N. Carolina 2004 3,501,007 3,486,688 -14,319 99.6
N. Dakota 2004 312,833 309,873 -2,960 99.1
Utah 2004 927,844 919,960 -7,884 99.2
Vermont 2004 312,309 309,285 -3,024 99.0
Washington 2004 2,859,084 2,810,058 -49,026 98.3
W. Virginia 2004 755,886 744,394 -11,493 98.5
Totals   15,371,615 15,225,053 -146,562 99.0
Additional Voters in Simultaneous Gubernatorial and Presidential Elections Do Not Create a Presidential Coattail Effect 
 
The Douglas campaign, according to Lunderville, was concerned in 2004 that increased turnout among partisan 
Democrats for the presidential election “could have the effect of swallowing the governor’s campaign” in Vermont. Indeed, the 
disparity between gubernatorial vote totals in presidential and non-presidential years indicates that a large segment of the 
presidential-year gubernatorial electorate, approximately 33%, turns out only because it is motivated by the presidential 
election. Logic suggests that these voters are less knowledgeable and passionate about the gubernatorial election than the two-
thirds of the presidential electorate that also turns out for separated gubernatorial elections. Logic further suggests that less 
knowledgeable and passionate gubernatorial voters motivated primarily by presidential politics will be heavily influenced by 
presidential politics when deciding their gubernatorial votes. In other words, presidential year gubernatorial voters seem 
much more likely than off-year gubernatorial voters to vote for the same party in gubernatorial and presidential elections. 
Surprisingly, the evidence does not support this logic. 
 Judging by the most recent electoral data, gubernatorial candidates of a state’s losing presidential party actually 
benefit more from simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections than gubernatorial candidates of a state’s winning 
presidential party. (See Chart 2, listing state votes for gubernatorial candidates of the winning and losing presidential parties 
in separated versus simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections.) In gubernatorial elections held from 2001 to 2003, 
gubernatorial candidates of a state’s winning presidential party received 47.9% of the gubernatorial vote, compared with 
45.9% for gubernatorial candidates of a state’s losing presidential party. In 2004, gubernatorial candidates of a state’s 
winning presidential party received 48.7% of the gubernatorial vote, compared with 49.7% for gubernatorial candidates of a 
state’s losing presidential party. This data indicate that voters were not more likely in a presidential election year to base their 
gubernatorial votes on presidential preferences than they were in non-presidential years. In fact, quite the opposite appears to 
have been the case. The vote percentage of gubernatorial candidates of a state’s losing presidential party not only increased in 
a presidential election year, it exceeded that of gubernatorial candidates of a state’s winning presidential party. 
Moreover, gubernatorial candidates of a state’s losing presidential party exceeded their party’s presidential vote 
total in 2004, while gubernatorial candidates of a state’s winning presidential party fell short of their party’s presidential vote 
total. In these elections, gubernatorial candidates of a state’s winning presidential party earned 7,407,084 votes, equal to 
85.3% of the state presidential winner’s 8,681,482 votes. Gubernatorial candidates of a state’s losing presidential party, on the 
other hand, earned 7,564,986 votes, equal to 115.8% of the state presidential loser’s 6,535,504 votes. 
Chart 2. State Votes for Gubernatorial Candidates of the Winning and Losing Presidential Parties in Separated Versus Simultaneous 
Elections 
 
Separated Gubernatorial and Presidential Elections 
Elxn Presidential Gubernat'l Pr'l Winner Win.Pr.Party Party Pr'l Loser Los.Pr.Party Party 
Year Vote Totals Vote Totals Vote Totals Gu.VoteTotals % Vote Totals Gu.VoteTotals % 
Alabama 2002 1,883,415 1,366,603 1,176,394 672,225 (R) 57.1 693,933 669,105 (D) 96.4 
Alaska 2002 312,598 231,484 190,889 129,279 (R) 67.7 111,025 94,216 (D) 84.9 
Arizona 2002 2,012,585 1,226,111 1,104,294 544,465 (R) 49.3 893,524 566,284 (D) 63.4 
Arkansas 2002 1,054,945 805,332 572,898 427,082 (R) 74.5 469,953 378,250 (D) 80.5 
California* 2003 12,450,804 8,657,915 6,745,485 2,724,874 (D) 40.4 5,509,826 4,206,284 (R) 76.3 
Colorado 2002 2,129,630 1,412,602 1,101,255 884,583 (R) 80.3 1,001,732 475,373 (D) 47.5 
Connec. 2002 1,578,769 1,022,942 857,488 448,984(D) 52.4 693,826 573,958 (R) 82.7 
Florida 2002 7,609,810 5,058,272 3,964,522 2,856,845 (R) 72.1 3,583,544 2,201,427 (D) 61.4 
Georgia 2002 3,301,867 2,025,861 1,914,254 1,041,677 (R) 54.4 1,366,149 937,062 (D) 68.6 
Hawaii 2002 429,013 376,656 231,708 179,647 (D) 77.5 194,191 197,009 (R) 101.5 
Idaho 2002 598,376 411,477 409,235 231,566 (R) 56.6 181,098 171,711 (D) 94.8 
Illinois 2002 5,274,322 3,538,883 2,891,550 1,847,040 (D) 63.9 2,345,946 1,594,960 (R) 68.0 
Iowa 2002 1,506,908 1,025,802 751,957 456,612 (R) 60.7 741,898 540,449 (D) 72.8 
Kansas 2002 1,187,756 818,688 736,456 376,830 (R) 51.2 434,993 441,858 (D) 101.6 
Kentucky 2003 1,795,860 1,083,443 1,069,439 596,284 (R) 55.8 712,733 487,159 (D) 68.4 
Louisiana 2003 1,943,106 1,407,842 1,102,169 676,484 (R) 61.4 820,299 731,358 (D) 89.2 
Maine 2002 740,752 494,578 396,842 238,179 (D) 60.0 330,201 209,496 (R) 63.4 
Maryland 2002 2,384,238 1,693,014 1,334,493 813,422 (D) 61.0 1,024,703 879,592 (R) 85.8 
Mass. 2002 2,912,388 2,192,878 1,803,800 985,981 (D) 54.7 1,071,109 1,091,988 (R) 101.9 
Michigan 2002 4,839,252 3,177,565 2,479,183 1,633,796 (D) 65.9 2,313,746 1,506,104 (R) 65.1 
Minn. 2002 2,828,387 2,252,473 1,445,014 821,268 (D) 56.8 1,346,695 999,473 (R) 74.2 
Miss'ppi 2003 1,152,145 894,487 684,981 470,404 (R) 68.7 457,766 409,787 (D) 89.5 
Nebraska 2002 778,186 480,991 512,814 330,349 (R) 64.4 254,328 132,348 (D) 52.0 
Nevada 2002 829,587 504,079 418,690 344,001 (R) 82.2 397,190 110,935 (D) 27.9 
New Jer. 2001 3,611,691 2,185,027 1,911,430 1,256,853 (D) 65.8 1,670,003 928,174 (R) 55.6 
New Mex. 2002 756,304 484,229 376,930 189,090 (R) 50.2 370,942 268,674 (D) 72.4 
New York 2002 7,448,266 4,579,078 4,314,280 1,534,064 (D) 35.6 2,962,567 2,262,255 (R) 76.4 
Ohio 2002 5,627,903 3,228,617 2,859,764 1,865,007 (R) 65.2 2,741,165 1,236,924 (D) 45.1 
Oklah. 2002 1,463,758 1,035,620 959,792 441,277 (R) 46.0 503,966 448,143 (D) 88.9 
Oregon 2002 1,836,782 1,257,549 943,163 618,004 (D) 65.5 866,831 581,785 (R) 67.1 
Penns. 2002 5,765,764 3,582,560 2,938,095 1,913,235 (D) 65.1 2,793,847    1,589,408 (R) 56.9 
Rhode I. 2002 437,134 331,834 259,760 150,147 (D) 57.8 169,046 181,687 (R) 107.5 
S. Car. 2002 1,619,898 1,106,562 937,974 585,422 (R) 62.4 661,699 521,140 (D) 78.8 
S Dakota 2002 388,215 334,559 232,584 189,920 (R) 81.7 149,244 140,263 (D) 94.0 
Tenness. 2002 2,437,319 1,624,087 1,384,375 786,803 (R) 56.8 1,036,477 837,284 (D) 80.8 
Texas 2002 7,410,749 4,553,982 4,526,917 2,632,541 (R) 58.2 2,832,704 1,819,843 (D) 64.2 
Virginia 2001 3,198,367 1,871,411 1,716,959 887,234 (R) 51.7 1,454,742 984,177 (D) 67.7 
Wiscon. 2002 2,997,007 1,720,749 1,489,504 800,515 (D) 53.7 1,478,120 734,779 (R) 49.7 
Wyoming 2002 243,428 185,459 167,629 88,873 (R) 53.0 70,776 92,662 (D) 130.9 
Totals   106,774,207 70,241,301 58,914,966 33,670,862 57.2 46,712,537 32,233,384 69.0 
*California held a special recall vote for governor in 2003. Its regular elections take place in even non-presidential  
years (2002,2006). 
Simultaneous Gubernatorial and Presidential Elections 
Elxn Presidential Gubernat'l Pr'l Winner Win.Pr.Party Party Pr'l Loser Los.Pr.Party Party 
Year Vote Totals Vote Totals Vote Totals Gu.VoteTotals % Vote Totals Gu.VoteTotals % 
Delaware 2004 375,190 365,008 200,152 185,687 (D) 92.8 171,660 167,115 (R) 97.4 
Indiana 2004 2,468,002 2,448,503 1,479,438 1,302,907 (R) 88.1 969,011 1,113,879 (D) 115.0 
Missouri 2004 2,731,364 2,719,599 1,455,713 1,382,419 (R) 95.0 1,259,171 1,301,442 (D) 103.4 
Montana 2004 450,434 446,146 266,063 205,313 (R) 77.2 173,710 225,016 (D) 130.0 
N. Hamp. 2004 677,662 665,539 340,511 339,925 (D) 99.8 331,237 325,614 (R) 98.3 
N. Car. 2004 3,501,007 3,486,688 1,961,166 1,495,021 (R) 76.2 1,525,849 1,939,154 (D) 127.1 
N. Dakota 2004 312,833 309,873 196,651 220,803 (R) 112.3 111,052 84,877 (D) 76.4 
Utah 2004 927,844 919,960 663,742 531,190 (R) 80.0 241,199 380,359 (D) 157.7 
Vermont 2004 312,309 309,285 184,067 117,327 (D) 63.7 121,180 181,540 (R) 149.8 
Washing. 2004 2,859,084 2,810,058 1,510,201 1,373,361 (D) 90.9 1,304,894 1,373,232 (R) 105.2 
W. Virg. 2004 755,886 744,394 423,778 253,131 (R) 59.7 326,541 472,758 (D) 144.8 
Totals   15,371,615 15,225,053 8,681,482 7,407,084 85.3 6,535,504 7,564,986 115.8 
Although a simultaneous presidential election produces a substantial increase in votes cast for governor over 
separated elections, the above data indicate that voters motivated to turn out by the presidential election do not automatically 
select gubernatorial candidates of the same party as their preferred presidential candidate. In fact, voters distinguish between 
gubernatorial and presidential elections and often choose candidates of different parties. This evidence, as well as the 
qualitative evidence gathered from the Vermont and Montana case studies, afford no method for explaining the consistent 
advantage of separated versus simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections in producing mixed partisan outcomes, as 
detailed in Chapter II. 
Some speculative explanations for the mixed evidence of presidential coattails are worth considering. Perhaps 
separated and simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections are trending toward similar rates of mixed partisan 
outcomes and it is only showing in the most recent electoral results. This would explain why evidence from elections held 
between 2001 and 2004 give different indications about presidential coattail effects in gubernatorial elections than evidence 
from elections held between 1980 and 2004. Graph 3 from Chapter II indeed shows a smaller gap in recent years between 
simultaneous versus separated gubernatorial and presidential elections than in previous years when the gap widened 
consistently. In 2000, the rates of mixed partisan outcomes were virtually identical, and in 2004 there actually would have been 
a higher rate in simultaneous versus separated gubernatorial and presidential elections had only 130 more Washingtonians 
voted for Republican gubernatorial candidate Dino Rossi.  
The last point highlights another important consideration; with only eleven states holding simultaneous 
gubernatorial and presidential elections today, compared with thirty-nine states that hold them separately, comparisons 
between rates of mixed partisan outcomes in simultaneous versus separated gubernatorial and presidential elections are highly 
sensitive to the political phenomena of a single state. Perhaps the small group of eleven states now holding simultaneous 
gubernatorial and presidential elections, or even an influential one or two, weighs presidential coattails differently than most 
other states and that skews the overall statistics. These are possible explanations, but the truth is not yet clear. Perhaps 
election data from 2008 and beyond will provide needed clarification.  
 
Conclusions on the Role of Gubernatorial Campaign Strategies in Producing Mixed Partisan Outcomes in Simultaneous Gubernatorial 
and Presidential Elections 
The mixed evidence of presidential coattail effects in simultaneous gubernatorial election complicates evaluation of 
this study’s thesis. If presidential coattails do not have a significant impact on simultaneous gubernatorial election results, the 
thesis would be valid yet misleading. It would then imply that campaign strategies of gubernatorial candidates and their state 
party organizations are the primary factors affecting state voter choice of gubernatorial and presidential candidates of 
different parties in the same election year, but not in other years. If presidential coattails do not significantly impact 
simultaneous gubernatorial elections, the primary factors affecting their outcome must be the same that affect all other types 
of gubernatorial elections. In other words, simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections would be unexceptional and 
the thesis’ focus on them would be unnecessary. 
While the above scenario would render the thesis somewhat misleading, it would not render it invalid. The thesis 
could still be valid, only it would need to be put in context. A more troubling obstacle when attempting to certify the thesis’ 
validity is the lack of conclusive data, as well as methods for discovering them. Exit polling presents advantages toward 
producing such data, but, for reasons discussed below, it is not a conclusive source of information.  
The best available tools for testing the thesis are utilized in this study, including data interpretation, media analysis, 
and case studies of Vermont and Montana’s 2004 gubernatorial elections featuring campaign polls and personal interviews 
with campaign participants and observers. These sources of information yield valuable understandings of the campaign 
strategies useful to gubernatorial candidates running in the same year that their party’s presidential candidate loses their 
state’s vote.  
 
Would Improved Exit Polling Help to Assess This Study’s Thesis? 
Exit polling has two distinct advantages over other methodological tools. First, unlike polls conducted during the 
gubernatorial campaign, they only elicit responses from people who have actually voted. Second, voters provide information to 
exit pollsters at the end of the campaign, after they have made their election decisions and absorbed all the potential factors 
influencing their votes.  
Voters’ responses to several exit poll questions would help to evaluate this study’s thesis. Useful questions would 
include, “How important was the gubernatorial campaign run by your preferred gubernatorial candidate and his state party 
organization in influencing your vote?” “What campaign strategies were persuasive to you?” “What other factors influenced 
your vote?” “Did the presidential election influence your vote for governor?” 
 While responses to the questions would be helpful in assessing this study’s thesis, respondent and institutional 
defects prevent exit polling from providing conclusive data. In terms of respondent defects, most voters are incapable of 
pinpointing with absolute certainty what factors have decisively influenced their votes. Some voters are able to identify exactly 
why they voted for a given candidate; for example, they may be single-issue voters or inflexible partisans. For most voters, 
however, their decisions are more complicated. Many factors contribute to human decision-making processes, consciously and 
subconsciously, making it extremely difficult for any individual to comprehensively assess the interplay and consequences of 
all the factors influencing their vote choices. Therefore, most voters would be unable to give exit pollsters a reliable 
explanation of their choices. Voters might also be incapable of distinguishing between campaign strategies and other factors 
independent of campaigns. For example, who and what is responsible for a vote cast in favor of Governor Jim Douglas based 
on a favorable opinion of his personality? Does the voter learn to value Douglas’ personal traits by meeting him at campaign 
events designed to familiarize voters with him, or by observing him through the media coverage inevitably given to a sitting 
governor?  
Voters’ vanities might also obstruct accurate exit polling. Voters typically want to believe that they are 
knowledgeable and conscientious enough to reach electoral decisions on their own terms, rather than being manipulated by 
gubernatorial campaign strategies. They are also likely to be too embarrassed to admit the influence of presidential coattails 
on their gubernatorial votes, because their admission would make them appear uninformed and illogical. Exit polling is also 
complicated by institutional defects: absentee voters are not included in exit polls; not every voter is willing to reveal his vote 
or his understanding of the reasons behind it; not all respondents are honest when responding to exit pollsters.  
The 2004 presidential election provides a fine example of the unreliability of exit polling. Election Day polls showed 
Kerry defeating Bush, only to have Bush win the nation’s popular and electoral votes. Thus, exit polling is uniquely valuable 
because it polls actual voters at the end of the election campaign, but it is not a conclusive source of information for evaluating 
this study’s thesis. 
 
Campaign Polls and Interviews Indicate the Thesis’ Validity 
Although they lack the delineated advantages of exit polling, polls conducted during the gubernatorial campaign 
provide valuable indications of developing voter sentiment. One of the most important contributions they make to this study is 
the revelation that the final election results in Vermont and Montana’s gubernatorial elections did not take shape until the end 
of the campaigns. In Vermont, Governor Douglas maintained a bare majority in polls conducted during the gubernatorial 
campaign, but he finished with a much higher share of the gubernatorial vote, 59%. Brian Schweitzer never polled a majority 
of respondents during his campaign, but he earned 51% of the vote on Election Day. The disparities between the candidates’ 
performances during the campaign and in their elections indicate that gubernatorial campaign strategies had an opportunity 
to influence electoral outcomes, perhaps decisively. Other factors often cited in explaining Douglas’ victory, such as 
incumbency and greater familiarity to voters than his opponent, were known from the outset of the campaign. Similarly, in 
Montana Republicans were divided from the beginning of the general election campaign, Bob Brown’s weaknesses as a 
candidate were immediately evident, and Schweitzer had established his personal appeal in the 2000 Senate election. Yet 
campaign polls indicate that the decisive final results of these elections were not shaped early in the campaign when these 
realities first emerged. Since institutional factors such as those just described were constants throughout the campaign and 
gubernatorial campaign strategies are dynamic influences tailored to developing campaign conditions, it is reasonable to 
conclude that these strategies made the difference when voters formed their crucial final decisions at the end of the campaigns.  
 Without conclusive data to determine the validity of this study’s thesis, perhaps the most useful source of 
information is the assessments by the campaign observers and participants who were most intimately involved with the 
gubernatorial campaigns. All interviewees for this study, including winning and losing gubernatorial candidates and their 
campaign chairmen, described gubernatorial campaign strategies as very important or decisive in shaping the election results. 
For example, Lunderville claimed that the Douglas campaign’s September health care advertisement discredited Clavelle so 
thoroughly that it virtually ended the Clavelle campaign’s chances of victory. In Montana, Brown described Schweitzer’s 
selection of Republican John Bohlinger for his ticket’s lieutenant governor candidate as the strategic maneuver that won 
Schweitzer the gubernatorial election. This is not to say that, according to the interviewees, the election outcomes would have 
been reversed if not for one strategy or another. Instead, they recognized the potential of gubernatorial campaign strategies to 
strongly influence public opinion, and they believed that this was accomplished by the winning gubernatorial campaigns in 
their races.  
 
Which Gubernatorial Campaign Strategies Are Most Useful in Producing Mixed Partisan Outcomes in Simultaneous Gubernatorial 
and Presidential Elections? 
 
The Vermont and Montana case studies provide valuable bases for evaluating which gubernatorial campaign 
strategies are most useful in producing mixed partisan outcomes in simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections. The 
central challenge to a gubernatorial candidate in these circumstances is overcoming the electorate’s biases against his national 
party at a time when national partisan sentiments are charged by the presidential election. Many campaign strategies evident 
in the Vermont and Montana case studies were useful in overcoming voters’ national partisan biases. First, the winning 
candidates muted discussions of ideology by emphasizing their interest in pragmatic, bipartisan governance. They often spoke 
of themselves as moderates and bolstered these claims through their actions and rhetoric. They also focused their campaigns 
on broad, unifying themes rather than divisive partisan issues; Douglas sought to build on his first-term record, particularly in 
terms of promoting economic growth, and Schweitzer focused on the need for change in state leadership.  
One of the most effective ways in which the winning gubernatorial candidates overcame their electorates’ national 
partisan biases was by adopting symbolically important state issues typically associated with the opposing party. Governor 
Douglas recognized that environmental protection was uniquely important to Vermont voters, and internal polls indicated that 
it was the only issue on which he needed to distance himself from President Bush. In response, Douglas touted his lawsuit 
against the Bush Administration over Midwest coal pollution and his efforts to remove phosphorous from Lake Champlain. 
He spoke of these issues prominently on the campaign trail and in television commercials. Environmental protection was a 
particularly safe issue for Douglas to adopt because it appealed to voters who typically would not support Republicans, but it 
also did not alienate state Republican voters who tended to favor stricter environmental policies than those advanced by their 
national counterparts. 
Brian Schweitzer chose to emphasize hunting and fishing rights in the Montana gubernatorial election, an issue 
uniquely important to state voters and typically associated with the Republican Party. Montana had the nation’s highest rate 
of gamesmen, and 70% of its residents owned guns. Consequently, Schweitzer identified himself very visibly as a hunter 
during the gubernatorial campaign. His campaign aired statewide an ad featuring Schweitzer and his brother carrying rifles 
and wearing hunting equipment. The ad also touted his “A-” rating from the NRA Political Victory Fund on gun issues. 
Substantively, Schweitzer gained a valuable advantage on hunting and fishing issues by promoting increased land access for 
gamesmen. These efforts led Montanans to regard Schweitzer as the campaign’s more aggressive protector of hunting and 
fishing rights. A Schweitzer campaign poll showed that Montanans believed Schweitzer shared their values more than Brown 
did. Like Douglas, Schweitzer adopted an issue that appealed to voters typically unfavorable toward Democrats. At the same 
time, land access did not alienate Democratic state voters because it encouraged environmental protection and maintained 
state control over public lands. 
Adopting symbolic issues was important because it helped Douglas and Schweitzer to gain the trust of the electorate 
and avoid categorical demonization as members of parties disfavored in their states. Another important way in which the 
gubernatorial candidates gained voters’ trust was by meeting with them personally. Douglas was one of the most familiar faces 
in Vermont politics, having been a regular candidate for elective office since 1970. As treasurer and governor, he traveled 
extensively through the state, to the point that many opponents criticized him for excessive traveling.  Douglas was widely 
regarded as a nice and genuine person. His cultivation of this reputation made it very difficult for Clavelle to foster distrust 
and dislike of Douglas when associating him with President Bush, the object of antipathy for many Vermonters. 
Schweitzer was not as well known in Montana as Douglas was in Vermont, due primarily to his limited political 
experience. His run for the U.S. Senate in 2000, however, made Schweitzer a better-known candidate among the electorate 
than his opponent, Bob Brown. Schweitzer built on voter familiarity with him by meeting and talking with as many potential 
voters as he could during the gubernatorial campaign. Observers recalled debates at which Schweitzer would spend his extra 
time shaking hands with nearly everyone in the room, while Brown sat on the stage studying his notes. The Schweitzer 
campaign also gained voters’ trust and approval by projecting the “Brawny Rancher” image that made Montanans believe he 
was “one of them.” Television ads featured Schweitzer herding cattle, and he typically campaigned in jeans and flannel shirts.  
Beyond overcoming national partisan biases among the electorate, gubernatorial campaign strategies were 
necessary to exploit opponent weaknesses. In Vermont, Clavelle was not well known to voters, his previous membership in the 
Progressive Party unnerved many Democrats and Independents, he was unable to clearly explain his universal health care 
program, and he focused intently and fruitlessly on national politics. The Douglas campaign exploited these weaknesses very 
effectively. It targeted voters unfamiliar with Clavelle, as well as moderate Democrats and Independents, when defining 
Clavelle early on as a liberal extremist and highlighting his participation in a 1989 pro-Sandinista march. The Douglas 
campaign also magnified Clavelle’s failed attempt to clearly explain his universal health care proposal at a press conference, 
by using excerpts in a high-profile campaign advertisement. 
In Montana, Brown was also not well known to voters, he led a Republican Party divided by a bitterly contested 
primary, he lacked compelling campaign issues, and he was widely regarded as an uninspiring, reluctant candidate. The 
Schweitzer campaign agitated existing divisions in the Republican Party by selecting Republican John Bohlinger as its 
nominee for lieutenant governor, while neutralizing the bipartisan appeal that was central to Brown’s intended campaign. The 
Schweitzer campaign also successfully defined Brown as an extension of the governing political establishment for voters who 
did not fully understand his background and his place within the Montana Republican Party.  
Lastly, the winning candidates were wise to dismiss national politics and the simultaneous presidential election. 
Certainly, gubernatorial candidates of a state’s losing presidential party would be foolish to bring presidential politics into 
their campaigns. In Vermont, though, Douglas was forced to confront the presidential election and national politics because 
his opponent made them central issues in the gubernatorial campaign. Rather than defending President Bush and the Iraq 
war when pressed by Clavelle, Douglas dismissed discussions of national politics as irrelevant to a gubernatorial election. He, 
like Schweitzer, remained focused on state issues. When insignificant issues distracted the gubernatorial campaigns, including 
national politics in Vermont and trivial issues such as car purchases in Montana, the Douglas and Schweitzer campaigns 
reminded voters that more serious and relevant issues merited discussion, such as the economy and health care. Based on 
discussions with the gubernatorial candidates and their top campaign officials, it is clear that the campaigns regarded national 
politics as irrelevant to gubernatorial elections. Many other participants and observers have agreed with this approach, and 
voters responded favorably to it. 
 
Scant Evidence that Gubernatorial Campaign Strategies Useful in Simultaneous Gubernatorial and Presidential Elections Are 
Uniquely Applicable to Such Elections 
The case studies of Vermont and Montana’s 2004 gubernatorial elections indicate that the above strategies are 
useful for gubernatorial candidates running in the same year that a presidential candidate of their party is expected to lose the 
state’s presidential vote. Yet these strategies (emphasizing practical, bipartisan governance; embracing broad, unifying 
themes; adopting symbolically important state issues; familiarizing voters with the candidate; exploiting opponent 
weaknesses; dismissing presidential politics to focus on state issues) seem equally applicable to gubernatorial candidates 
running in states that vote for presidential candidates of a different party in another year.297 Perhaps some strategies are more 
consequential in presidential voting years when voters intuitively seem more likely to bring national partisan biases into their 
gubernatorial voting decisions. Yet the data presented earlier in this chapter indicate that voters are not especially likely to 
apply their national partisan biases to gubernatorial votes in simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections. If this is 
an accurate indication, then there is no need for gubernatorial campaigns to craft their strategies any differently in a 
presidential year than they would in a non-presidential year. Whether this is the case, of course, depends on whether 
presidential coattails have a significant impact on simultaneous gubernatorial election results, and the available evidence is 
mixed.  
 
Areas for Further Study 
 
This study provides useful insights about simultaneous 
gubernatorial and presidential elections. It also highlights related issues 
worthy of further study that would help clarify contradictions in the 
election data and inform further research in the field. Specifically, it 
proposes further study of presidential coattail effects in simultaneous 
gubernatorial and presidential elections, and partisan incoherence in 
gubernatorial popularity trends.  
297 For most of the strategies, this observation is obvious. Dismissing presidential politics in favor of state 
issues is one strategy that may strike some as particular to simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential 
elections. Yet national politics often figure prominently in off-year elections, even in non-congressional 
election years. For example, in 2005, a year in which no federal offices were on the ballot, the campaign of 
New Jersey’s winning Democratic gubernatorial candidate, Jon Corzine, ran advertisements focusing on 
Republican gubernatorial candidate Doug Forrester’s ties to President Bush. Bush was very unpopular in 
New Jersey at the time. 
Resolving Mixed Evidence of Presidential Coattails in 
Simultaneous Gubernatorial Election Results  
 
Do presidential coattails significantly impact simultaneous 
gubernatorial election results? Or are presidential coattails an 
antiquated phenomenon ready to be declared nonexistent in today’s 
electoral system? The mixed evidence of presidential coattails 
presented in this study indicates that further research must be done 
before these questions are answered with certainty. How can this be 
done? 
 This study was designed to explain the occurrence of mixed 
partisan outcomes in simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential 
elections. Expanding its scope would help to determine whether 
presidential coattails still exist. First, case studies could be conducted 
on coherent partisan outcomes in simultaneous gubernatorial and 
presidential elections. Evidence of presidential coattails in 
simultaneous gubernatorial elections are most likely to be found in 
cases where state voters choose gubernatorial and presidential 
candidates of the same party in the same year. For example, a case 
study of Indiana’s 2004 gubernatorial election might be instructive. 
Indiana voted heavily for President Bush at the same time that it elected 
Republican Mitch Daniels to replace a Democratic governor. Perhaps 
presidential coattails were responsible for the governorship’s partisan 
shift. Or perhaps the electoral results were driven by other factors. 
Further study would illuminate the true causes, and help to gauge the 
influence of presidential coattails in simultaneous gubernatorial 
election results.  
 Other presidential election years must also be studied in order to 
measure the impact of presidential coattails in gubernatorial elections. 
Case studies could be conducted on gubernatorial elections from other 
presidential years, particularly if doing so would introduce examples 
that differ importantly from those presented in this study.  
Gubernatorial elections from non-presidential years should also 
be studied to determine why these elections are more likely than 
simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections to produce mixed 
partisan outcomes. Such research would seek answers to two questions: 
Do national politics play a different role in off-year gubernatorial 
elections than in presidential year elections? Do national politics play a 
different role in congressional election years than in odd-numbered 
years, when no federal offices appear on the ballot? 
 
Partisan Incoherence in Gubernatorial Popularity Trends 
This study’s focus on mixed partisan outcomes in simultaneous 
gubernatorial and presidential elections highlights the frequent 
incoherence of voters’ state versus national political preferences. 
Another fascinating, and vastly underappreciated, example of this 
incoherence is found in gubernatorial popularity trends. Recent polls 
consistently show governors of different parties than their states’ 2004 
presidential favorite with higher approval ratings than governors of the 
same party as their state’s presidential favorite. According to a 
February 2006 Survey USA poll, the two most popular governors in the 
country were Connecticut’s Jodi Rell, a Republican in a solidly pro-
Kerry state, and West Virginia’s Joe Manchin, a Democrat in a solidly 
pro-Bush state. Meanwhile, the two least popular governors were 
Republicans from pro-Bush states, Alaska’s Frank Murkowski and 
Ohio’s Bob Taft. In fact, of the thirty governors with approval ratings 
of 50% or higher, seventeen were governors of different parties than 
their state’s presidential favorite. Of the twenty governors with 
approval ratings of less than 50%, sixteen were governors of the same 
party as their state’s presidential favorite.298 The reasons for this 
counterintuitive trend would provide a fascinating study. It would also 
help to clarify many areas of scholarship related to this study, including 
straight and split-ticket voting and state versus national political 
alignments.  
 In short, this study is indicative but not conclusive. It presents 
qualitative data that support its thesis, including media analysis and 
case studies featuring personal interviews with campaign participants 
and observers. In terms of quantitative data, campaigning polling and 
comparisons of gubernatorial and presidential voting behavior also 
support this study’s thesis. However, conclusive quantitative data are 
not available to test the thesis. Moreover, two instances of mixed 
evidence necessitate clarification. First, the varying role of state party 
organizations in developing and implementing gubernatorial campaign 
 
298 “Approval ratings for all 50 governors as of 02/14/06,” http://www.surveyusa.com/50State2006/50State 
Governor060214 Net.htm. Accessed March 25, 2006. 
strategies means that they are not essential to producing mixed partisan 
outcomes in simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections. 
Second, if presidential coattails do not significantly influence 
simultaneous gubernatorial elections, as much of this study’s evidence 
indicates, campaign strategies are equally consequential in all 
gubernatorial elections. Hence, this study raises important research 
questions and provides answers that differ from some of the literature 
of the field. Further study is needed to test whether these findings are 
definitive. 
The particular contribution to political science literature that this study makes is to: 
document the historical development of simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential 
elections; develop a compelling primary explanation for mixed partisan outcomes in 
such elections; present case studies that examine the influence of presidential politics 
and campaign strategies in simultaneous gubernatorial elections. This study also 
proposes areas for further research that will be useful in clarifying lingering questions 
and developing the literature of the field. 
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